Выбрать главу

[T]his is the feeling of pride in one’s Fatherland, its history and great events. It is the endeavour to make one’s country more beautiful, richer, more powerful, happier. If these feelings are free from national megalomania and imperial ambitions, there is nothing blameworthy, conservative, in them. It is the basis of the courage, the perseverance, the power of the people. If we have lost patriotism, and the national pride and dignity that go with it, we lose ourselves as a people capable of great events.[26]

Although Putin paid lip service to democratic freedoms, he stated that the “universal principles of the market economy and democracy” should be “organically integrated with the realities of Russia,” because “every country, Russia included, is obliged to seek its own way of modernization.” To adapt the universal principles of democracy to “the realities of Russia” meant that Putin advocated a Russian Sonderweg, a “special course,” implying that these universal principles are in fact not universal, but in need to be adapted to the Russian situation. This, in essence, introduces the theory of “sovereign democracy” that some years later would be developed by Putin’s spin doctor Vladislav Surkov. This theory, therefore, was, perhaps, not so originaclass="underline" Surkov was only acting as his master’s voice.

Putin’s “Russian Idea” can be summarized as follows: state power, the aggrandizement of state power, and pride of the citizens in this accumulating state power. The three pillars are: great power status for the state externally (derzhavnost), a strong state internally (gosudarstvennichestvo), and patriotism: the pride of the citizen in this external and internal state power. On the first element, Russia’s great power status, a commentator wrote: “The undemocratic and even authoritarian nature of derzhavnost is self-evident. Foreign and security policy implication of this ideology has been so far the assertion of Russia’s national interests which in many fields are considered to be conflicting with those of the West.”[27] On the necessity of a strong state internally, Putin wrote:

Russia will not soon, if ever, become a second edition of, let us say, the U.S.A. or England, where liberal values have a long historical tradition. In our country the government, its institutions and structures, have always played an exclusively important role in the life of the country, the people. A strong government is for the Russian citizens not an anomaly, but, on the contrary, the source and the guarantee of order, the initiator and main force of any change.[28]

Putin’s ideology, therefore, begins with the state and ends with the state. The ultimate goal of every Russian citizen should be the aggrandizement of state power and not the aggrandizement of his or her personal freedom and well-being. Putin’s words remind us of the words of Nobel Prize Laureate for Literature John Steinbeck, who, after a visit to the Soviet Union, wrote:

It seems to us that one of the deepest divisions between the Russians and the Americans or British, is in their feeling toward their governments. The Russians are taught, and trained, and encouraged to believe that their government is good, that every part of it is good, and that their job is to carry it forward, to back it up in all ways. On the other hand, the deep emotional feeling among Americans and British is that all government is somehow dangerous, that there should be as little government as possible, that any increase in the power of government is bad, and that existing government must be watched constantly, watched and criticized to keep it sharp and on its toes.[29]

NATIONAL REBIRTH AND CONSENSUS BUILDING

It is telling that Putin defined patriotism as the “endeavor to make one’s country more beautiful, richer, more powerful, happier”—as if happiness can be attributed to a country instead of being the exclusive domain of the human individuals who inhabit it. It is a clear indication of the personification of the state by Putin, for whom the state is the ultimate value, an object of worship and veneration. By paying lip service to democracy he conceals the fact that his ideal of a strong state inevitably clashes with the democratic freedoms of the citizens. He expects Russian citizens not to hamper the expansion of state power by political dissension (e.g., by voting for political parties that propose an alternative to Putin’s program). Instead they should remain unified and stand—as one bloc—behind the leader whose supreme task it is to enhance the power of the state, which is the incarnation of the mythical Fatherland (with a capital F). Therefore Putin continuously stresses the necessity of consensus building.

How important consensus and patriotism are for him is further clarified in the address read by him six months later on the occasion of the combined session of the Duma and the Federation Council.[30] In this text he stressed again “that the growth of society is unthinkable without consensus on common goals. And these goals are not only material. No less important are spiritual and moral goals. It is the patriotism, which is characteristic for our people, the cultural traditions, common historical memory, which strengthen the unity of Russia.”[31] In Putin’s exaltation of a strong state and in his emphasis on national consensus building we find a striking resemblance with Mussolini’s Italy. Like Putin, Mussolini wanted to overcome the internal divisions in the population and to build a national consensus around himself, Il Duce, who was the incarnation of a unified people. Only in this way did he think he would be able to build a strong, militarized, and centralized Italian state. It led in Italy to the suppression of political parties, the abolition of the free press, the persecution of political adversaries, and the introduction of a one-party state.

Apart from this emphasis on consensus building and the exaltation of state power, there is, furthermore, a third ingredient in Putin’s text that reminds one of Mussolini’s Italy. Two days before his appointment to acting president, Putin said: “Today we find the key for a rebirth and resurrection of Russia in the sphere of government and politics. Russia needs a strong and powerful government and must have this.”[32] In his address six months later, he spoke of “a new Russia” and “the beginning of a new spiritual elevation.”[33] Here we clearly recognize the palingenetic ingredient of a theory of national rebirth, which, according to Roger Griffin, is a fundamental element of fascist ideologies.[34] Curiously enough one can observe a parallel between the positions not only of Putin and Mussolini, but also of Putin and Stalin. According to Aleksandr Yeliseev, “It must be said that neither socialism, nor even the state were in themselves values for him [Stalin]. The leader of the USSR considered them instruments necessary to guarantee what was most important—national independence…. Socialism, in Stalin’s thinking, had to overcome the class divisions inside the nation and make her monolithic and unified in face of all possible foreign challenges.”[35] It is easy to recognize here Putin’s derzhavnost (great power status) and his stress on internal consensus. In the concept of “sovereign democracy” we find the same emphasis on national independence.

вернуться

26

Putin, “Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletii,” 6.

вернуться

27

Sergei Medvedev, “The Role of International Regimes in Promoting Democratic Institutions: The Case of NATO and Russia,” NATO Research Fellowships 1994–1996 (Brussels: NATO, 1996). http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/94-96/medvedev/02.htm.

вернуться

28

Putin, “Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletii,” 6.

вернуться

29

John Steinbeck, A Russian Journal, with photographs by Robert Capa (London: Penguin, 2000), 26. Steinbeck’s Journal is a record of a forty-day trip to the Soviet Union between July 31 and mid-September 1947.

вернуться

30

Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Federalnomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii” (July 8, 2000). http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2000/07/28782.shtml.

вернуться

31

Putin, “Poslanie Federalnomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” 4.

вернуться

32

Putin, “Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletii,” 7.

вернуться

33

Putin, “Poslanie Federalnomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” 4.

вернуться

34

Roger Griffin, wanting to define the essence of fascist systems, came up with the following definition of the “fascist minimum”: “Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythical core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism.” Ideas of national rebirth (palingenesis) were, according to him, essential for fascist movements. (Cf. Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Routledge, 1993), 26. See also Marcel H. Van Herpen, Putinism: The Slow Rise of a Radical Right Regime in Russia, Part II: The Specter of a Fascist Russia (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).)

вернуться

35

Aleksandr Yeliseev, “Slavyanofil v Kremle,” Politicheskiy Klass 12, no. 60 (December 2009), 69–70.