The blessing of oil will end, sooner or later. Putin is thinking about the day after oil and talks of a science-based economy – a kind of Walter Rathenau vision that so captured Lenin’s imagination for the future of the Soviet Union. In fact he is aware of what is being described as the ‘oil curse’ – the counterproductive addiction to oil coupled with neglect of a broad-based economy: ‘What we need is economic modernization, a new middle class as the backbone of the economy, German style, secure property rights and affordable housing.’ There is now, he adds, ‘a well-oiled market for mortgages, including specialized banks, and the people make use of the new facilities. Investors need security’ – does he mean physical or legal security, predictability of taxes or the weeding out of corruption? Clearly, this President’s insights reach far beyond his power.
Putin does not trust stock exchanges abroad. Investment in equity, he warns, is not secure enough. He would rather convert petrodollars into securities. But, if that is the philosophy at the top, what is the meaning of a 5 per cent stake, required recently, of EADS-equity, the Franco-German high-tech giant? Putin is on his guard: ‘We do not wish to infiltrate other countries. What matters is mutual integration of energy interests. If the West makes concessions downstream, we are willing to admit investment upstream.’ Is this the outline of a deal?
After two hours the conversation turns to foreign and security policy. Would a complete withdrawal of US troops from Iraq be good for regional stability, or bad? His answer surprised everybody around the table because of its well-balanced perspective. ‘The Americans are not in Iraq to keep the country forever occupied. We were against the invasion from the beginning. What the objectives are at present [he adds with an ironic smile] is beyond my understanding.’ In this, Putin is certainly not alone. And what about democracy for Iraq and the Greater Middle East? ‘In Chechnya we had occasion to learn that democracy cannot be created through war. Sooner or later the Americans have to withdraw their troops. But not before the Iraqis themselves are capable of guaranteeing domestic security. It might be useful to give a date so that Iraqis are under pressure to act responsibly themselves.’
And what would be the worst-case scenario? The answer is unequivocaclass="underline" ‘Partition into three statelets. This would not be the end of fighting but the starting point of even more vicious conflicts.’ What about Afghanistan? ‘We are very concerned, especially about what goes on throughout the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. We do what we can to help our Western partners to succeed. But a good ending is far away.’ There was not a hint of schadenfreude or I-told-you-so, but rather the concern that the conflict might be contagious and, once again, affect Russia.
On Kosovo, obviously Putin was reluctant to commit himself. ‘Once the Kosovo Albanians declare independence towards the end of this year, everything depends on the West’s reaction. Support in cultural and economic matters would be acceptable. Full political recognition would be another matter.’ His advice to Western nations, especially the Europeans, is to go slow. But to what extent Russia will seek compensation elsewhere, and in what dimension, remains an open question. At the G8 meeting in Heiligendamm, two months before, Putin had hinted that the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space might be revisited. Maybe, he hints, the EU could make the Serbs an offer impossible to refuse? Putin makes it clear that the present state of uncertainty is better than a solution forced upon the Serbs and, by implication, upon Russia.
How to deal with the European Union? Putin remembers the European Council meeting of heads of state and of governments at Lahti, under the Finnish presidency, in late 2006. He was clearly nonplussed. He had been accused of not taking the EU seriously and of always choosing a bilateral approach. Russia (and he sounded bitter at this point) felt rebuffed. ‘There are outdated stereotypes, a silly Atlantic solidarity. The position of many European countries is not reliable. Russia is a European nation – with several million Muslims. We have vast interests in Asia. With China we have thousands of miles of border. China is an attractive place for producing industrial goods. We shall not waste our chances with the EU.’ Suddenly, there seemed to be another Putin in the room, no longer suave but angry and abrasive. And what about the Baltic pipeline? ‘The North Stream pipeline is good for Europe. Do we tread on anybody’s rights? We have to diversify. But we meet with obstruction.’
Once back to oil, Putin continues, anticipating unfriendly questions: ‘We have subsidized Ukraine for fifteen years. If the West wants an orange revolution, please pay for it. Do you think we are fools?’
Yes, things are improving. But there is no guarantee: ‘The trend is not irreversible. We in Russia, you in Europe and in North America – we should be more patient with each other and stay away from lecturing each other.’
Then, as an afterthought, he mentions that teenagers from both countries are working together to look after the graves of German and Soviet soldiers from World War II. ‘We must overcome the distorted values of the past.’
And what are the guiding ideas, the last question is put to him, for the future of Russia? Panslavism, Putin says, is a thing of the past. And so is world revolution. Under the tsars as much as under the commissars, an expansive foreign policy had to complement and support the domestic order, and vice versa. Lenin’s Russia was built on the idea of world revolution, and caught by it: ‘People were cheated of their land, the fruit of their labour and a humane way of life. Russia refuses to repeat those mistakes. We do not pretend that we are a world power. We pursue no missionary ideas. We seek self-respect and fairness among nations.’
Talking with the Russian President is an experience like none other. He is self-assured. There is no notetaker, let alone an advisor who might from time to time intervene. Putin is proud not only of his sporting achievements but also of the facts and figures he has at his fingertips. He is the man for the big picture, but also for anecdotal evidence, putting every little detail into the wider context, especially when it comes to oil and gas and pipelines. This is where he earned his doctorate at the celebrated mining institute of his home town. But he is also a shrewd operator. ‘Communication’ is how he once described his profession. It was one of those rare occasions when he talked about his earlier incarnation. Communication is indeed what became second nature to the man who joined Soviet intelligence at the tender age of twenty-two. The means employed in the service of communication are variable indeed, and sometimes Putin is both Mr Nice Guy and Mr Tough Guy. His roles range from factual analysis in business style to the grand design for Russia’s future, from open flattery to confessions of friendship. But for good measure there is also, from time to time, a hint of threat or cynicism, well hidden behind a wry smile. Anybody in the West or, for that matter, in Russia underestimating Mr Putin would do so at his own peril.
4
Putin’s people
‘The Russians’ Byzantine policy, working in the shadows, carefully conceals from us all that is thought, done and feared throughout the country.’
It was in the foggy winter days before the recent Duma election. On 30 November 2007 Kommersant, the reliable Moscow-based business paper, carried a substantial interview that was, by any standards, unusual. Somebody, until that day largely unknown, had dropped a brick on the polished floors of the Kremlin administration. It is reasonable to assume that this came as an unpleasant surprise to some of the siloviki, Russian slang for those in power, including members of the armed forces, the FSB and other security services.