Back in business
In 2006, in his state-of-the-army speech Putin went on to present a much improved picture. Modernized and high-tech weaponry had been introduced into the forces, but chiefly in the strategic dimension and patently useless for deployment against Chechen rebels hiding in the northern slopes of the Caucasus. Putin praised the introduction of two intercontinental missile complexes, Topol-M and Bulawa-30, and the building of two new nuclear submarines – the first since 1990. As far as conventional arms were concerned, Putin had little to offer. He praised improved training, a better fighting spirit among soldiers and officers, and the high morale of the troops. But not much hardware would be coming their way though Putin asked for high-class performance: ‘We must have forces capable of taking up the fight in global, regional and, if necessary, several local conflicts, and at the same time.’ In this, Putin echoed the Pentagon in the mid-1990s, which had boasted that two and a half wars could be fought simultaneously, and be won. Time and again, the US is the mirror image that sets the standards for the Russians.
In particular, Putin singled out six objectives for the next decade, some hard, some soft, some strictly military, some much broader – and altogether probably overambitious:
• The Russian forces should study and understand the planning and development of competing forces abroad and find superior responses. One wonders to what extent the Chinese armed forces on their way to Asian dominance are silently included in this threat assessment.
• Two-thirds of the armed forces should be transformed into an all-volunteer army, and military conscription reduced to twelve months – revealing a strategy based much more on high-tech weaponry than on the traditional Russian mass army.
• Adressing a problem unsolved since the withdrawal of the Red Army from much of Central Europe and Central Asia, housing for officers and soldiers should be of a much higher standard.
• Half of military expenditure should be invested in better training, more effective weaponry and technical development.
• Discipline among the troops should be enhanced, but no recipe was offered for how to transform the disciplinary code and rough customs throughout the army into behaviour consonant with a modern high-tech establishment.
• The prestige of those serving in the army should be restored. Somebody defending the motherland, Putin put it, should have a high social and financial status. But how to achieve this lofty goal, except by fiat, the soldiers were not told. One wonders what the reaction may have been among the rank and file, most probably the traditional Russian philosophy of ‘The God is high, and the tsar is far away’.
The Kremlin is acutely aware of the shortcomings, and Putin’s announcements in 2006 could also be read as an overall, and not too favourable, evaluation of what the five-year plan announced in the year 2000 had achieved – or failed to achieve. That plan, originally handed over to Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, formerly of the KGB and not a military man, had been a roadmap for reform. But where did the road lead? First of all, and inevitably, into serious confrontation with the generals as no fewer than 300 general officers’ posts would be scrapped, traditional arms programmes discontinued and the giant military establishment of the Cold War cut down.
In due course, Ivanov’s first step had been to reduce the overall size of the army to its present numbers of just over 1.1 million personnel. He then proceeded to change budget allocations and, by implication, the composition of the army. Before, 70 per cent of the budget had gone towards manpower and maintenance, and only 30 per cent into research and development. Official figures for 2006 indicate a much improved ratio of 60:40. This should continue until in 2010 a 50:50 ratio will be achieved.
In addition, between 2010 and 2015 the armed forces will no longer be administered through military districts but organized according to territorial integration on land, at sea and in the air. The Far Eastern Command will include the Far East, Siberia, the Volga-Urals district and the Pacific Fleet; the Central Asian Command will comprise the Northern Caucasus and the Black Sea Fleet; and the West European Command will include the military districts of St Petersburg and Moscow as well as the Northern Fleet and the Baltic Fleet.
A military-industrial complex
Taking a leaf from the American book, Putin created a high-level arms-industrial commission, a powerful steering committee superimposed on the military-industrial complex which throughout the 1990s had drifted out of the Kremlin’s control and, by selling hardware to sinister clients like Iran and Syria, had created some strategic embarrassment. The new institution, with a combined general staff, arms agency and defence ministry on top of the older institutions, would also oversee all government ministries involved, controlling both the budget and the armed forces. Therefore, in early summer 2007, Sergei Ivanov was promoted from defence minister to deputy prime minister at the head of this commission – all powerful, at least in name. Henceforth, all government activities are to be organized and controlled by the commission, as well as production, procurement and foreign sales.
Most military establishments are given to waste and inefficiency but in the big league the Russian armed forces are probably the winners. In 2006 military expenditure, according to Russian statistics and corroborated by Western estimates, amounted to 2.74 per cent of GDP (equivalent to 667 billion roubles or USD 24 billion), up from 550 billion roubles and a mere USD 20 billion the year before). Procurement in 2006 amounted to 236 billion roubles. For 2007 the Russian government planned an investment increase of 300 billion roubles. Sergei Ivanov announced a huge armaments programme – huge by Russian standards, small by comparison with American efforts. But, relatively speaking, the Russians, given the vast difference in purchasing power, probably get more for their money.
At the time of the Soviet Union Russia used arms exports to buy influence, loyalty and dependence on a large scale. Therefore, much was handed over to foreign governments on long-term credit and never paid for. Today, while exports continue to flourish – in fact, after gas and oil, arms are Russia’s third largest export commodity – the military-industrial complex is very keen not only to bolster its meagre income at home and make production more efficient through economics of scale, but also to be paid on time. What has also changed is the quality of weaponry sold. While under Soviet rule what was for sale was only second best, factories can sell cutting-edge technology – except, of course, nuclear and missile technology.
In the past mainland China, long seen as the great and ever-growing rival for hegemony in the Far East and, on top of the strategic threat, also capable of high-class re-engineering, had to be content with second- and third-rate military hardware. For some time, and within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Chinese have been allowed to buy top-end technology for naval battle management and any number and quality of fighter jets. It is most probable that Russian general staff officers baulk at seeing this technology transfer going in the direction of their most dangerous rival, but the arms industry wants to survive and even recover its former key position. So exporting for ready cash whatever is on the shopping list of potential buyers, no matter what they may have in mind, is the lifeline for an industry that experienced breakdown not so long ago. While in 2000 exports brought in just over USD 2.7 billion, in 2004 it was already USD 4.7 billion, and the curve continues to rise. For 2007, according to Sergei Ivanov, an export volume of USD 7 billion was being planned. Another USD 22 billion worth of military goods, according to proud announcements by Ivanov, is already under contract from abroad.