In view of their rapidly deteriorating nuclear arsenal the Russians are also willing to further reduce the number and calibre of nuclear weapons on a bilateral (with the US) or multilateral (with the other legitimate nuclear powers) basis ‘to reach minimum levels required by the need for strategic stability’.
In a troubled world, overall strategic stability continues, much as during the later, more enlightened years of the Cold War, to be the linchpin of Russian military thinking. This is an element Russians want to retain from the old bipolar system, and to impress also on the Americans who otherwise would invest more and more in high-tech wizardry and leave the Russians behind. Strategic stability for the Russians is a mantra, meaning equilibrium. This has been, as high-ranking members of the general staff pointed out at various meetings, ‘over three decades inseparable from the dialogue between NATO represented by the US and the USSR/Russia, and from the tangible results of this dialogue’. Russian officers also attach great importance to controlling the means of delivery, especially missile technology; in this, of course, they find themselves in conflict not with the Americans, who tend to think in parallel, but with the powerful Russian military-industrial complex ailing from many years of underfunding and loss of foreign markets. It is wishful thinking when the general staff lets it be known that ‘Russia does everything possible to prevent weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery from going out of control and is seeking innovative ways to curb proliferation.’
While in the past Russian military exports were mostly, if not always, of second-rate quality, so that the Russians would always have an edge over any users, be they Soviet satellites or Third World customers, in recent years Russian factories have taken to selling cutting-edge technology to, amongst others, India – which accounted for 40 per cent of Russian arms exports – and China. To what extent anti-air systems recently sold to Syria and Iran, much to the irritation of the US, Israel and all other Middle East countries, are of the more advanced category is, for most outsiders, a matter of speculation.
The spectre haunting Russia
The monster that the Russians perceive, however, is not conventional attack or even nuclear aggression – it is terrorism in all its varieties. They feel haunted by the spectre of asymmetric warfare which they experienced in the traumatic Afghan war, also in the Northern Caucasus. Moreover, Russian general staff officers understand, much as their Western counterparts, that the complex nature of modern societies invites terrorist attack against critical infrastructure and technological nerve centres. Referring to 9/11, Russian military leaders find themselves on the same side as the Americans and the rest of the modern world. Terror, they say loud and clear, ‘has challenged the entire global community’, and Russia can no longer cut itself off from the rest of the world. ‘Terrorism has recently exceeded the limits of a national security threat and grown into a threat to international security. This challenge therefore takes a prominent place in Russian military policy – and even more so as Russia has for many years been engaged in combating the henchmen of international terrorism in the Northern Caucasus.’
It is interesting to note that the men in grey-green uniform, more than their political masters in pinstripe suits, are painfully aware of the limits of military action, and do not want to see the army sent into battles that soldiers on their own have no chance of winning. ‘It is obvious that terrorism cannot be eradicated by means of force alone. Non-military means to control its feeding grounds should be explored’ – advice, no doubt, to politicians in Moscow. ‘Such ground is provided by social and economic cataclysm, poverty, large-scale unemployment, armed conflict, international organized crime, drug-trafficking, an illegal and uncontrolled arms trade. The evil of terrorism can only be fought by comprehensive means and in a joint effort.’ If this is a caveat for the politicians in Moscow, it implies also an offer to collaborate with Western countries, and possibly worldwide. It would be foolish not to take up the chance.
The Russian general staff officers at that Helsinki seminar came back to the subject of terrorism again and again, taking pains to make this a common effort: ‘No nation on its own can secure the homeland or counter the threat of modern transnational terrorism. Only by merging our capabilities can we protect our people, defend our societies, and preserve our ideas and principles for future generations. That is why Russia and European and transatlantic security institutions such as NATO and the European Union must work together to confront this dangerous post-Cold War phenomenon.’ The Russians understand full well that this kind of anti-terrorist effort is a new model of cooperation, transcending traditional notions of national sovereignty. What they mean is ‘direct involvement in the military operations against terrorists and also blanket overflight rights, access to ports and bases, refuelling assistance and stepped-up intelligence efforts and, last but by no means least, public diplomatic support’.
It is ironic to remember in this context that, when President Reagan met Secretary General Gorbachev in Reykjavik in 1986 for arms control negotiations, both men, in a more philosophical moment, posed the question as to when the East-West conflict would ever end. They came up with the answer: when planet Earth is invaded by Martians. By now, the Martians, this time mostly from the Greater Middle East, are at the gates, and some are already inside the walls. New enemies produce new alliances.
NATO: strained relations
Within the Russian military establishment the bitterness about NATO enlargement is not to be underestimated, and it grew throughout the 1990s. Relations between the Russian Federation and NATO were, for the Russians at least, a key issue in foreign and security affairs. There are overarching concerns, like the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The Russians seem to have hoped for a reliable framework to consolidate the effort. The NATO-Russia Cooperation Council for them was a disappointment, especially after NATO’s Kosovo air campaign, waged against Russian opposition in the UN.
But the military top brass wants results and is very concerned about deficiencies in the common anti-terror struggle. There is open self-criticism of the Russian attempt to split the Western Atlantic alliance. ‘Any attempt to stop NATO enlargement or to create an anti-NATO block failed.’ The reference of course is to the run-up to the Iraq war. ‘Russia overestimated transatlantic contradictions in the security field.’ The concept of treating the US and NATO as enemies and Europe and the EU as friends of Russia and aiming for a split was entirely misplaced. ‘The present state of transatlantic relations is geared more towards common cause than towards separation.’ This recognition in turn caused Russian policy-makers to be more realistic and pragmatic. Time and again Russian general staff officers come back to the refrain: ‘Russian policy towards NATO must be based on a full understanding of contemporary threats to the country’s security, such as international terrorism, not in the stereotypes of the Cold War era, still prevalent in Russia-NATO relations.’ What they mean but dare not say is that the long-term strategic competitors are China in the east and Islam, in its many variations, to the south. The Russian military elite has, ever since the end of the Cold War, cultivated military-to-military relations and has made full use of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the NATO-Russia Cooperation Council and the many variations on Russia-NATO cooperation, at Harvard, at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, or on the strategic level.