The elections were manipulated in many ways, some brutal, some fanciful, all of them betraying deep-seated anxiety, but they were far from meaningless. In summing up the modus operandi one could say they were, on the whole, half free and half fair. Meanwhile, the result was bound to mean different things to different people. The Kremlin at least had the good taste not to insist on the 99 per cent approval required of the people during Soviet times. But even the comfortable two-thirds majority for United Russia was not obtained, despite so much pressure and propaganda: 64 per cent for United Russia, given the noise and commotion before the elections, was unimpressive and amounted to less than the triumphal victory expected. Nevertheless, the elections for the lower house on 2 December have to be seen as the start of a critical transfer of power in two stages – equal in importance to the electoral victory of Boris Yeltsin as the first democratically elected president of Russia or the elevation of Vladimir Putin in 1999 from being an unknown official in the Kremlin to new tsar.
After the elections to the state Duma the presidential elections of 2 March 2008 were the second part of the process. In the run-up it seemed ever more likely that the combination of the quasi-referendum of December 2007 and the presidential election 100 days after would usher in a new phase of authoritarian democracy in Russia. The announcement of the Putin Plan, intentionally unspecific, meaning all things to all men, allowed the assumption that in the hurly-burly of the future the role of Putin would be significant, and probably central. The elements are all there, formal and informal, but given the turmoil during the autumn of 2007 throughout the state apparat it would be astounding if the future distribution of political and economic power were to be enacted without serious – and visible – conflict at the top. The triangle of power between the state machinery, the intelligence services and the oligarchs is anything but monolithic, the distribution of power and the nature of governance anything but settled. Who gets what, and how much of it, has not yet found a firm and reliable answer. The various groups have irreconcilable differences of outlook, investment opportunities, alliances and modus operandi.
The party of power sees no need for an opposition, except of course the communists as they have to make the bogeyman to show the outside world as well as doubters at home that, whatever the shortcomings of the Putin system, it is, to say the least, the lesser evil. The arguments of political opponents were not discussed but simply ignored. In any society this approach comes at a price, and in Russia too. Former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov and other opposition personalities predict, if the authoritarian system persists and hardens, social unrest and political upheaval within three years from 2007.
Wanted: civil society
The long-term implications of the election campaign, however genuine or manipulative the process and the outcome may have been, will be twofold. The emergence of civil society throughout Russia, a painful process at the best of times, will be seriously thrown back, and foreign and security policy will continue to intone the shrill sounds of resentment. Civil society was the real loser of those December elections.
It is remarkable that Putin, when naming the weaknesses of today’s Russia to Western audiences invariably deplores the absence of civil society – and he is right to do so. It must indeed be doubtful that in today’s Russia there is enough independence from state and state organizations to allow for the unfolding of the manners and morals that, throughout history, have tended to accompany and transform the rise of the market society. The path of Russian democracy is punctuated with intimidation of dissenters, even the occasional murder of journalists through traffic accidents, mysterious disappearances or outright assassination.
György Konrád, Hungarian dissident and writer, talks about an anti-political mentality throughout Eastern Europe, where people are tired of the overdose of politics and rhetoric, and there is ample scepticism concerning politicians’ character, effectiveness and ability to deliver on their promises.
In Russia, however, things seem to be different. There are many who are tired of politics or given to more pleasurable pursuits, but there is also a growing number of citizens seeking the expression of their values and aspirations. They can be divided into two camps, activists of both an optimistic-nationalist conviction and those of a more liberal persuasion. Both sides are present in public discourse and engage in tense dialogue. Nasi, the youth wing of United Russia, reflects the proud pro-government and nationalist activism but is now paying the price of having been created from above. There is a deficit of authenticity. Inventing the Putin Youth has misfired.
Meanwhile, there is another variation on the theme of proud nationalism, loyal to the powers that be and on the ascendant throughout Russian society. The majority are well-educated, intelligent and publicity-conscious young technocrats who are out to create a forward-looking Zeitgeist. Meanwhile, the protagonists of the new Russia tend to be conservative in outlook and social orientation. Their philosophy is guided by two principles: nostalgia for the empire and refusal to be part of the West. Self-confidence is back to levels absent for most of the Soviet period. The mineral wealth of Siberia, at present surely the base for Russia’s rise, is seen as providing a launchpad for a better future for Russia beyond oil, gas and pipelines.
Beyond democracy: a new public discourse
The political ideal is not Western-style democracy but an enlightened authoritarianism, free of contradictions and in control of its own destiny. The ‘vertical of power’ – as Putin likes to describe the new geometry for running state and society – is seen as the winning formula, and the new Russians are not afraid to talk of a systemic conflict with the West. They display confidence that their system will ultimately prevail. This new thinking is promoted by a new Russian intelligentsia, organized around think tanks, journals and university seminars, giving shine to Putin’s system. The main public TV channels First Channel and Rossiya are used to promote the new thinking about Russia and Russia’s destiny in the world. So far, success has crowned their efforts. Opinion polls reveal that most Russians see autocracy as by far the best form of government.
Russia is still in the Hobbesian state. John Locke will have to wait. Wealth and material well-being does not automatically produce a liberal middle class. On 25 November 2007 about 500 demonstrators tried to stage a march on Nevsky Prospekt in the middle of St Petersburg. They called themselves the ‘Disagreeing’. A third of the demonstrators were briefly taken into custody by the police. These included a prominent former prime minister, Boris Nemtsov, who was invited in no uncertain terms to sign a record of his conversation with the police. Intimidation works, and many denizens of St Petersburg who otherwise might attend political events and demonstrations feel that discretion is, once again, the better part of valour. The state-controlled media invariably paint such marches in the darkest of colours. The liberals, handicapped and intimidated, lose their public presence and their voice in public discourse.