The result is usually described as a paradox, but perhaps it is much more the combined effect of imperial nostalgia, unrealistic expectations, everyday bullying and the desire to develop an identity somewhere between the vastness of the Eurasian steppe and the complacency of the Western club. Much as the Canadians resent the role of, as they say, ‘the hewers of wood and the drawers of water’, Russians after a century of catastrophe, humiliation and disappointment have a need to define for themselves a role in accord with their self-respect and their newly discovered – one-dimensional and therefore fragile – power. The national discourse is not only about material well-being, it is also about the meaning of Russianness, history, civilization, the relationship with Europe, and the mirror image of the US.
This, however, is not where the EU Commission can be very helpful, nor the Western companies seeking business in Russia. While the latter would like to divorce business and democratic values, the EU cannot – and the business community should not. During the Cold War the responsibility of Western companies ended at the Iron Curtain while, in the globalized market place of today, cross-cultural investment is growing all the time and standards of fairness, rule of law, answerability and transparency work across political borders. That is why the EU must be concerned about the cultural and legal underpinnings of trade with Russia or – for that matter – the PRC. This dilemma will not be solved soon. ‘EU-Russia trade and investment are booming and our energy interdependence is growing. European business is rushing to the Russian door. There are huge profits to be made on the Russian market, but we have serious differences as regards the political relationship, and in some questions of foreign and security policy.’
Politics still matters
The EU is not liked in the Kremlin, nor is the principle of shared sovereignty accessible to Russian thinking. In the Soviet past, Russian analysts waited for the Western capitalists to go for each others’ throats. When this did not happen, a younger generation in IMEMO, at the Institute of Europe and even in the Foreign Ministry began to study the architectural principles of European integration more carefully and found that Comecon could even learn something. But this recognition came late in the day and bore no fruit. Apart from political expediency this is one of the reasons why Kremlin rulers to this day prefer to work with individual countries bilaterally instead of with the EU Commission. The Brussels Commission, in turn, has not been able to summon full and unwavering support for its policies, be it the fight against Russia’s boycott of meat from Poland, or the long-term planning and realization of the Nabucco pipeline from Central Asia to Europe, bypassing Russia.
EU member states still strike their own bargains with Russia whenever they can, and they leave the nagging and criticizing of Russia’s human rights practices to the EU while concentrating on the business side of the relationship. Thus they play the Russian game of divide and rule. Meanwhile, the EU Commission does not resign itself to an observer role. It voiced its concern before the Duma elections of 2 December 2007 because of the restrictions placed on OSCE observers, and finally decided not to take part in a charade. The Commission also regularly raises concerns on human rights issues such as the limitations on freedom of radio and TV, attacks on journalists, pressure on NGOs and the miserable situation in the northern Caucasus, and they do it on all levels from the summit down to the twice-yearly consultations among human rights experts. It is noted in Brussels that ‘sometimes these consultations can degenerate into an exchange of recriminations’, as for instance when Putin mentioned that the police practices at the G8 Heiligendamm meeting were no softer than anything happening elsewhere.
Give me the EU telephone number
The Commission is strongest when it deals with economic matters, and weakest when it takes up political issues. This imbalance is clearly reflected in the EU-Russia relationship. EU countries rarely speak with one voice, except in routine matters. Foreign policy is jealously guarded by national governments, but individual governments are not strong enough to impress the Kremlin, while together their common denominator is often weak to the point of being meaningless. Both sides seem to speak past each other. The slow-moving conflict over the future of the Serbian province of Kosovo – independence or far-reaching autonomy – was a striking example. It reached a tipping point when, on 10 December 2007, the UN Security Council failed to agree on the report by former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari. Before this, a ‘troika’ commission that brought together Russian and American diplomats and German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger worked for a last-minute reconciliation. It failed as expected. The EU Commission does not cut an impressive figure when it appeals to Russia to ‘act responsibly’. ‘It is not in the interest of Russia itself to stir up tensions there or elsewhere and to continue to speak of “precedent”. This may turn against Russia at some point.’ Of course, the Commission was aware, long before the UN non-decision, that Russia seeks compensation elsewhere; Putin at Heiligendamm had warned that Kosovo could be the starting point for looking, once again, at the Soviet inheritance elsewhere. He probably meant Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the Russians still keep troops, some as peacekeepers under blue helmets, some under Russian colours. He also, starting at the Munich Security Conference on 10 February 2007, had distanced Russia from the CFE Treaty in its revised version of 1999, which the West had made conditional on Russia withdrawing most of those soldiers. Only two days after the UN vote on Kosovo Putin formally suspended application of the treaty’s provisions, leaving the fate of this important element of confidence- and security-building in limbo.
The Commission, which under the Lisbon Treaty would have been entitled to more than an opinion on foreign policy, indeed a determining role, cannot resolve the dilemma that to influence Russia requires more cohesion than it can muster, while at the same time this is the most challenging test of its foreign policy competence. Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran or Burma: ‘Where we share the same ultimate objectives, Russia tends to emphasize differences of approach.’
Can the EU Commission translate economic clout into political leverage? This requires the EU to speak with one voice and Russia to respect this single voice instead of turning to individual European capitals. The EU has to avoid a confrontational tone but, as DG RELEX tries to bridge the gap: ‘We need to speak firmly in defence of our interests and thereby to find common ground with Russia.’ In an ideal world, this can work. In the real world of 2008, this is more difficult.
EU-Russia: managing differences
Indeed, the EU-Russia relationship is by nature asymmetric, and the diversity of national interests which the EU Commission has to take into account tends to make compromise inevitable; and sometimes it fails altogether. The legal basis for EU-Russian relations is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 1994, which came into force in 1997. The Russians today claim that it reflects a time of Russian weakness and that is why they are pressing for a thorough revision. A new agreement is being negotiated which would have to take into account Russia’s new assertiveness – open-ended. Meanwhile, in 2005 four-‘common spaces’, in well-chosen Eurospeak, were defined, together with four ‘roadmaps’ setting out an ambitious-sounding agenda which, however, basically means talking among the relevant working groups. They range from industrial and regulatory policy to border cooperation (notably Kaliningrad/Königsberg), judicial cooperation, foreign policy, and science and technology. Not much of this hits the headlines, nor is there much reason for it to do so. It is basically the groundwork for a new overall agreement at some time in the future. Parallel to the issue-oriented working groups in 2003 a Permanent Partnership Council was set up to replace the Cooperation Council of the past. This means that EU chiefs and Russian ministers can meet in many sectoral forums, supplementing the two annual summit meetings. But this is all politics. There is no effective forum on a senior official level between expert and ministerial get-togethers. On one level, there is no politics; on the other level, there is only politics.