After that introduction to world affairs Karaganov came to the hard core of commonality: ‘There is, on top of everything else, a common though unspoken concern, and that is the management of the United States of America. The objective must be to persuade this important country to give up its ruinous unilateralism and return to a policy of effective leadership in a multilateral framework.’ The Europeans should side with Moscow for the purpose of reminding the US of the rules of the game – and of the limits of power. Of course, a seasoned Kremlin adviser tends to understand very well, especially after the Chirac-Schröder imbroglio with the US over Iraq, that the Europeans, if they side with Moscow, would fall apart between pro-American and anti-American tendencies and, before long, paralyse each other. In a multipolar world Russia would be the main beneficiary. Oil, gas, pipelines and, in the foreseeable future, liquefied natural gas are strong arguments for a historic compromise.
Energy is seen as the main strength of Russia, and also the main weakness of Europe. Russia as a supplier, Karaganov argued, is interested in moderately high prices, while the Europeans want moderately low prices: ‘This conflict could have been solved if both sides had a common, overriding strategy.’ That means not only a long-term predictable and equitable price – Putin quoted USD 50 in September 2006. For Russia it means above all downstream participation in distribution networks, for the Europeans co-ownership and partial control of Russian production. This, Karaganov concluded, had been the hard core of what Putin had offered, but the Europeans refused and, instead, accused Russia of energy imperialism. The oil offer was followed by the long list of Russian grievances, from the EU’s support for Ukraine’s Orange revolution in 2004 – indeed for the Kremlin leaders a traumatic experience – to its sympathy with the national independence of Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and on to the removal of the bronze Red Army soldier from the centre of Tallinn to the outskirts of the Estonian capital.
Those are the ‘misunderstandings and details’ that were irritating for Karaganov and the Kremlin. Meanwhile, he came back to grand strategy concerns: Russia and Europe are united in the secular decline of their position in the world at large. Russia has to cope with the rise of China and of militant Islam, while Europe’s international standing is suffering ‘due to the incompetence of the small states’. In military matters and in energy policy Europe, Karaganov insisted, does not count for much.
What follows from all of this? The long-term advice from the Kremlin is unequivocaclass="underline" ‘A Russia-EU alliance may not conform to today’s political correctness. But it offers so many advantages to both sides that it will surely be back, one day, on the table.’ The Atlantic Alliance? Karaganov would have no regrets over its demise. Russia would win where the Soviet Union lost: the Great Game for Europe’s future.
Soon after, in a more substantial paper Karaganov talked of what he termed the NEC: ‘the New Era of Confrontation’. It sounded like a position paper for the Kremlin’s master and was in fact a variation upon the theme Putin had pronounced in Munich in early February, but couched in more academic language and in systematic order. A long list of the West’s sins was produced, with the US again in the dock. Meanwhile, the Europeans, after the departure of Germany’s Schröder and France’s Chirac, were not granted attenuating circumstances. In fact from NATO enlargement towards Eastern Europe to Ukraine’s Orange revolution of 2004, from the US anti-missile project in the Czech Republic and Poland to the unilateral sponsorship of Kosovo’s separation from Serbia – hardly an item irritating the Russians was left out.
Was NEC the announcement of a new Cold War? Karaganov and whoever else helped in preparing that memo took a more balanced view, remembering that throughout the rest of the world Russia has few friends, and some of those of doubtful reputation and value. Surely the honeymoon of the early 1990s is over. But the Europeans are by far Russia’s number one partner for imports and exports, and the strategic relationship with the US is indispensable for bestowing on Russia the coveted status of the other world power. To what extent a future relationship with the US would be based on antagonism, to what extent on partnership would be decided case by case, without sentimentality or grace. But maintaining the non-proliferation regime in working order (including keeping Iran away from bomb-grade enrichment of uranium) is surely among the essentials common to both powers. Russian entry into the World Trade Organization would be difficult to achieve against a US veto, and the same would apply to OECD membership. Altogether, Karaganov understands a few important things: on the one hand the Russian regime needs a foreign enemy to maintain discipline at home; a little diplomatic deterrence cannot do much harm but will earn respect. On the other hand, from the preservation of the non-proliferation regime to cyber security and the fight against Islamic militancy, Russia and the West have strategic and overriding interests in common, and another arms competition as in the past would be costly, wasteful and destructive – most of all for Russia. So the NEC will stop short of a new Cold War. But the West should prepare for, from time to time, resentful rhetoric, displays of military-industrial prowess, and the occasional spell of cold weather from the East.
Status quo or Russia resurgent?
The overriding question, for Europeans as much as for the rest of the world, is about Russia’s long-term Grand Strategy. Is there a repeating pattern which would correspond to something like a grand design, administered and executed from within the Kremlin? And, if so, what would be, for better or worse, the distinctive elements? Cold War or no, after the hopes and illusions of the 1990s had vanished, and the United States turned from a policy of balance and respect for Russia to a concept of hegemony and disregard, there is still ‘the West’. Even where ‘the West’ is deeply divided, seen from Moscow it is still a defining concept.
Russia resurgent: the question for the West is whether the new, post-Soviet Russia sees itself as a status quo power or as a force for revolutionary change – and will act accordingly. What is abundantly clear, before Putin threw down the gauntlet at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, and even more so afterwards, that the time is past when Russia came, cap in hand, and asked for loans.
Russia’s leaders and the vast majority of the Russian people do not wish to relive the past, not Stalin’s brutal regime, not the modest civility after, not the ‘leaden years’ of Brezhnev, and not the phased breakdown that followed. The year One in the modern Russian calendar is when the oil price began to rise; when the rouble came back to life and mutated into a convertible hard currency; when, after a calamitous pause, pensions and salaries began to be paid. No wonder that Putin, the man who happened to preside over the Russian economic miracle, is seen as the man of destiny, saviour of the nation and guarantor of a modest, hitherto unknown measure of happiness.
Russians count their new era as beginning in 1999-2000, and there are plenty of reasons to do so, not least the widely shared assumption that the new era is fragile, that too much depends on the steady flow of oil and gas and continuing high prices, and that, between Western democracy and Russian authoritarianism everything is still in flux. In many respects Russia is still caught in the past. That the legacy must be overcome is precisely where the Russian people and their leaders seem to agree. This needs, among other things, a fair amount of working together with Western countries, not least the US. The new era of limited and controlled confrontation is as much a reality as the need to cooperate on overriding concerns. ‘The earth is flat’ – Thomas Friedman argues with some conviction. That means that, inevitably, what unites Russia and the West is more important than what divides them. Too much is at stake for Russia, just as for other big players in the Great Game.