Moreover, if the last few years of rising oil revenue presented a window of opportunity, the Kremlin has failed to make the best possible use of it and reform the country from top to bottom. There is no judicial system deserving the name; Medvedev himself spoke about the ‘legal nihilism’ haunting the country. This is one of the crucial differences compared with India and even China. Corruption, a Russian disease through the centuries, is worse than ever before, and even Putin had to admit that he and his administration have failed to curb it. Most of the infrastructure is decrepit, including some of the older pipelines, suffering from underinvestment and negligence. Trains are moving slowly in order to move at all. Most of the internal air travel binding the vast Russian lands together is done by Ilyushin bombers fitted with rows of seats, many of the planes older than the pilots who fly them. Four out of ten villages, according to Putin, have neither running water nor electricity. Poverty is widespread, although salaries and pensions are at long last being paid, and rising. But inflation and public unrest – as in 2005 – loom large over an economy based on natural resources. The science-based economy of the future is far away, but it is precisely the promised land that Medvedev, as Putin before him, wants to reach. For this, the West is needed, both in terms of know-how and foreign direct investment.
Russia’s national interest
What foreign policy to expect, and what role for Russia in the world? This is a question not only about Medvedev but even more about the Russian establishment, including the Russian Orthodox Church, and, moreover, a question about the geopolitical challenges and aspirations of Russia. But, the tsar being the tsar, the question is not unjustified as to what long-term vision Medvedev will promote. And what place for Russia in the world? Wedded to the status quo or out to reverse, no longer through tanks and missiles, but through oil, gas, LNG and pipelines, the setbacks experienced by the empire that is no more but still looms like a giant shadow over the minds of many Russians? Does Medvedev share Putin’s oft-quoted view that the fall of the Soviet Union was one of the great disasters of the twentieth century?
Medvedev states, philosophically, that empires come and go but what matters is the enduring national interest. He means Russia, not the shadows of the Soviet Union. He will have to pay much more attention to the CIS countries, with Ukraine wanting to move closer to the EU and even NATO, and the Central Asian oil and gas states trying to avoid, after shedding their old Soviet dependence, a new dependence on Gazprom and Rosneft. The Kremlin will have to be more business-minded and less imperial in outlook and appearance. And there are also the frozen conflicts of South Ossetia, Abkazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria to attend to that the Kremlin cannot control, nor anybody else. Medvedev will not be a walkover for anybody inside or outside. Putin, when talking to German Chancellor Merkel on International Women’s Day in 2007, warned the West against underestimating Medvedev: ‘He does not have to prove his liberal credentials but I can tell you that he is as much a Russian patriot – in the good sense – as I am. I do not think that our partners will find him any easier to deal with. He will stand up most actively for the Russian federation’s interests on the international stage.’ Medvedev will turn his attention to improving the ‘lone wolf’ image of Russia sported by his predecessor. But as far as substance is concerned he cannot afford to give anything away – nor will he.
In short, the outside world should not expect much change, and certainly not a U-turn, but keep in mind what Churchill, in describing Russia as ‘a riddle inside an enigma, shrouded in a mystery’, said in conclusion: ‘The only key is the national interest.’ So what is, finally, Russia’s national interest? First and foremost to be, once again, a great power with global reach, making sure that no important matter close to Russia’s new borders or anywhere around the globe is decided or settled against Russia. Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in early 2008 is a case in point, which the Kremlin will not soon forgive or forget. Russian ‘greatness’ also implies that other powers should keep a respectful distance. This should be taken as a warning to NATO Councils preparing a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine in the near future and thinking about doing the same on behalf of Georgia. If the Europeans do not have the stomach for serious confrontation they should think again. Even the Americans must reflect on whether the soup is worth the calories. In a world troubled by climate change, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, failed states and, possibly, cyber war, they surely have more important business to attend to, such as containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions or keeping North Korea in the box. Russia, too, will want to preserve the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, nuclear pre-eminence and the Russian place among the world powers. China and Russia have suggested to Washington a treaty to keep outer space off limits for military installations and equipment, so far without takers.
In the long run, Russia’s national interest will force Russia to mend fences with the Europeans and with the new administration in Washington. Climate change, terrorism, Islamic jihad, cyber space, drugs, organized crime – all of the above force Russia into concerted action with the Atlantic nations, and vice versa. A long-term sustainable relationship, however, rests on the assumption that Europeans and Americans slow down the race to the Kremlin in order to obtain special favours. Most importantly, the self-fulfilling prophecy of mutual enmity has got to stop. It is too perilous to be pursued, and it can end in tears.
Dmitri Medvedev in all of this is not only an heir to Putin and to Russia’s troubled past. He wants to go down in history as a great reformer. On 14 February, at Krasnoyarsk en route to the presidential elections, he began his address by quoting Catherine the Great: ‘Liberty is the soul of everything, without it everything is dead. I want everybody to bow under the law but not as a slave.’ Medvedev is the man to pronounce that freedom is better than slavery, that democracy is a productive force, that modern societies need to combine freedom and the rule of law and, finally and foremost, that the fundamental interests of Russia and the West are mutually compatible and, in fact, mostly complementary. The rest is, from time to time, a little intelligent conflict management.
POSTSCRIPT
War brings things to light that otherwise remain obscure. The five-day war in the southern foothills of the Caucasus is no exception. Russia has drawn a red line to be respected not only by a small neighbour, but also by the Europeans and by the imperial power from beyond the sea. Russia plays according to age-old rules. What is at stake is not so much the affiliation of the little border districts long controversial between Georgia and Russia. The paramount objective is to keep NATO and the US at a distance. You must protect your periphery and, if possible, position your soldiers on both sides of the fence; and expect compensation (in the Caucasus, for example) when you have lost something elsewhere (in the Balkans, for example). Politics is seen as a zero-sum game, and is not for the faint-hearted. Sending in the military is the continuation of political intercourse by other means. Before the West gets red under the collar, it would be wise to reconsider the path to South Ossetia.
Russian assertiveness in the ‘Near Abroad’ is a prelude, and more, no doubt, is to come. After the Georgian leadership got out of control and sent in the tanks, the West was not going to allow itself to be dragged into a real war, nor will Russia take more than a calculable risk. In between, however, there are at least a handful of frozen conflicts in Russia and around Russia, most notably the Crimean Peninsula – now part of Ukraine – that can be unfrozen at any time. Much as the Jugo-succession is still sending tremors across the Eurasian continent, the Soviet succession has not yet found a trust-inspiring form. Legality and legitimacy are at odds in many places. But from now on Russia will insist on a decisive say over the Soviet succession, well beyond today’s Russian borders. This implies conflict and crisis and, possibly, even military confrontation. Russia under Putin has put the West on notice.