The August 2008 crisis casts a long shadow. But it is not too early to pose the question as to who are the winners and who are the losers. On the losing side the Georgian president figures prominently. He failed to settle the problem of those breakaway territories of Abchasia and South Ossetia that Georgia had inherited from the Soviet Union. He has also compromised, probably for a long time to come, the chances of Georgia becoming an associate member of the two foremost Western clubs, EU and NATO. If the US, seconded by the Eastern Europeans, presses for membership, Washington risks a severe crisis within the Atlantic Alliance, with Germany and France unwilling to alienate Russia and compromise their energy supply as well as their promising trading position.
On the losing side too, while the US elections were on, is Barack Obama. The dynamics of the election campaign have changed in favour of the Republican frontrunner John McCain who, when it comes to Russia, has firmly established himself as a hardliner.
The European Union is also among the losers. Once again, the Kremlin has pursued a traditional divide-and-rule strategy. In strategic crisis management, Europe is essentially unable to translate economic clout into political negotiating power. It was a favourable coincidence that when the crisis broke French President Nicolas Sarkozy held the rotating presidency of the European Council, bringing to the table the combined might of France and the EU. But by and large the EU has not had much of an impact. The EU’s ‘Nabucco’ project through Georgia, the southern alternative to Gazprom’s virtual pipeline monopoly for natural gas flowing in the direction of European consumers which bypasses Russia, has declined in credibility. Its very feasibility, now that the physical risks have becom apparent, is now in jeopardy.
Nor can the US be counted among the winners. Not only was the State Department – according to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice – unable to restrain the Georgian leaders in the run up to the ill-chosen military intervention; the Russians also demonstrated to the US the limits of their control over faraway places. If in the future the US carries on regardless and pursues NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, it risks rendering the Atlantic Alliance hollow and overstretched, or entering into a serious and fundamental conflict with a resurgent and assertive Russia – or both. If the US pushes for a Membership Action Plan for either Georgia or Ukraine – or both – they are upping the ante. In that case Ukraine, an unstable political proposition by any standard, will be under severe strain and could break apart, with uncontrollable repercussions throughout Europe and beyond.
Moreover, all of the important issues pending with Russia, from containment of Iran to control of the drugs-and-weapons bazaar, from climate change to mass migrations, will be much more difficult to negotiate, let alone bring to a satisfactory conclusion. In the wider geopolitical context, Russia’s Chinese and even Iranian options will be strengthened; instead of the European and transatlantic option implicit in Medvedev’s proposal from early July 2008, in Berlin and elsewhere, about a future security system from Vancouver to Vladivostock – and not to Beijing.
Russia, too, is a loser, in spite of appearances. When the bad news about tanks rolling into South Ossetia broke in Moscow, the all-Russian stock exchange took a dive and billions were lost. Russia’s economy, being built on gas, oil and pipelines, urgently need Western imports, investment, and know how. They will be much slower to materialize in the foreseeable future. Political risk has increased, and every investor is questioning the security of investment and the reliability of the overall investment climate. Western countries, especially Italy, France, and Germany, will continue to export and invest, but with greater circumspection.
The drama in the Caucasus will not only impact on international affairs. It will also be a defining moment for the domestic set-up, much as the coup of 1993 or the dismemberment of Yukos in 2003. On the Russian side the winner is clearly Dmitri Medvedev, but he is also the loser. His popularity ratings shot up, much as Putin’s ratings received a boost eight years earlier when, through the war in Chechnya, he rallied patriotic sentiment, fear of Islam and frustration and changed the political landscape in his favour. Medvedev has gained in domestic prestige and foreign policy clout. But what happened to Mr Nice Guy? Medvedev the reformer and moderniser of Russia, the man of the great national projects, has lost his shine and much of his credibility while Putin has demonstrated to the world that the time of Russian weakness is over, that there are red lines which Russia wants respected, and that Russia is able to exert a quid pro quo for the West’s success in carving out of Balkan turmoil the statelet of Kosovo. Whatever the merits of the Kosovo-South Ossetia-Abchasia comparison in international law and political legitimacy, the Kremlin rulers were able to give substance to their early warning: if Kosovo goes its way, South Ossetia and Abchasia might follow, but in the opposite direction. Perhaps there is more to come following a somewhat similar script.
But Russia has to be careful in assessing the damage, including the damage to its own national interest. Support from its Central Asian friends was slow in coming. The Chinese signalled open disapproval. The impact on all those inside Russia dreaming of self-determination is not difficult to guess. The wider repercussions across the whole of Asia will become clearer as time goes by.
There is no need to look for a repeat performance of the Cold War. At best what could and should be restored is a healthy respect for the other side, its instincts and its needs, including face-saving, inspired by nuclear weapons and resulting not only in the vast and complex arms-control architecture but also in a sense of global responsibility. Moreover, ever since the dual crisis over Berlin and Cuba in 1958–1962, an exercise in brinkmanship if ever there was one, both superpowers were united in an informal but effective cartel of war avoidance. This also included respecting security distances and zones of influence.
Today, a new Great Game is taking shape. The new rules, however, are not fixed. The new players are inexperienced, ignoring at their own peril – and at everybody else’s peril – the rules so painfully learned at the time of the great confrontation. The so-called ‘post-cold-war’ period has come to an end. A new era of limited confrontation has begun. Confrontation and competition, but also cooperation in an uncertain mix, are on the agenda. US neo-containment meets Russia’s imperial instincts and uncertainties. Where does the US democracy mission find its limits? And where does Russia’s Near Abroad end? Maybe at the border posts. Maybe where Russians live, many on the other side of those posts. Two uncertain giants are moving in uncertain directions, sure of where to draw the red lines which the other side must not cross, but unsure about self-restraint and that brutal discipline which, at the time of the Cold War, nuclear weapons imposed on those in power.
Will the Europeans pull themselves together and finally, in the face of mounting danger, translate economic power into international muscle? This is hard to believe, given the recent experience when Europeans where faced with the Caucasus imbroglio: the East Europeans firmly on the side of the US, the West Europeans including Germany trying desperately to steer clear of a new Cold War. All in all, the Europeans, without a coherent energy strategy or a concept of how to deal with a resurgent Russia, did not cut a dashing figure. Those differences, today still in the early stages, could well develop into a serious rupture – almost irrespective of the future course of NATO enlargement.