Trump and his supporters have a different view of that investigation, taking it more personally, more politically, the two almost inseparable in Trump’s case. “The Russia investigation is being used by his political opponents to delegitimize his entire presidency and to delegitimize his agenda,” said Sam Nunberg, identified as a “longtime Trump political advisor who remains close with West Wing aides.”[21]
Though it may be difficult for Trump and some of his supporters to fathom, national security is of greater importance than Trump’s presidency and agenda. Yet there is also no denying that for Trump’s political opponents the Russia investigation offers the tantalizing prospect of a Trump impeachment. Still, Trump and his rise to power prove that this is a time where even the most grotesquely improbable events can and do occur.
And there is, as historian Douglas Brinkley put it, “a smell of treason in the air.”[22]
But even in all this swirling murk a few things are definite and clear. There are simply too many points of connection between the Trump campaign and the Russians to be mere matters of chance. On the opening day of the House Intelligence Committee hearings, ranking member Adam Schiff stated the matter with eloquent logic in this abbreviated version of his remarks since there are simply too many instances to cite here:
In December, Michael Flynn has a secret conversation with Ambassador Kislyak, about sanctions imposed by President Obama on Russia over attacking designed to help the Trump campaign. Michael Flynn lies about the secret conversation. The vice president unknowingly then assures the country that no—no such conversation ever happened. The president is informed that Flynn has lied and Pence has misled the country. The president does nothing.
Two weeks later, the press reveals that Flynn has lied and the president is forced to fire Mr. Flynn. The president then praises the man who lied, Mr. Flynn, and castigates the press for exposing the lie.
Now, is it possible that the removal of the Ukraine provision from the GOP platform was a coincidence? Is it a coincidence that Jeff Sessions failed to tell the Senate about his meetings with a Russian ambassador, not only at the convention, but a more private meeting in his office and at a time when the U.S. election was under attack by the Russians?
Is it a coincidence that Michael Flynn would lie about a conversation he had with the same Russian Ambassador Kislyak, about the most pressing issue facing both countries at the time they spoke, the U.S. imposition of sanctions over Russian hacking of our election designed to help Donald Trump?
Is it possible that all of these events and reports are completely unrelated and nothing more than an entirely unhappy coincidence? Yes, it is possible. But it is also possible, maybe more than possible, that they are not coincidental, not disconnected and not unrelated and that the Russians use the same techniques to corrupt U.S. persons that they employed in Europe and elsewhere. We simply don’t know, not yet. And we owe it to the country to find out.[23]
And there was one other point that that was raised by the Committee Chairman Devin Nunes with equal clarity and urgency, concerning the fact that “our inability to predict Putin’s regime plans and intentions has been the biggest intelligence failure that we have seen since 9/11…”[24]
To resolve the issue of collusion is the task of congressional investigative committees and the FBI.
To illuminate Putin, his background, his mind-set, his style of rule, and to indicate where he has brilliantly succeeded and grievously failed, is the task of this book.
PART ONE
THE PRESENT AS PROLOGUE
The war between the security services is our separation of powers.
1
ARMS AND THE MAN
On April 5, 2016, Russian president Vladimir Putin did a most extraordinary thing—with the stroke of a pen he created his own personal army, 400,000 strong. To be known as the National Guard (and also as Rosguard), it will be staffed largely by troops from the Interior Ministry, including the fearsome OMON a mix of SWAT and riot police. Possessing nine battle tanks, thirty-five artillery pieces, twenty-nine airplanes, and seventy helicopters, the National Guard will be about half the size of Russia’s regular army and among the world’s ten largest. The guard was created by presidential decree without a scintilla of public discussion or debate, but, as one Russian commentator waggishly put it: “As is often the case in Russia, the creation of the National Guard was long anticipated, and therefore, caught everyone by surprise.”[26]
Unlike any other part of the Russian administration from agriculture to space, the National Guard will not report to a minister but directly to Putin himself and so has already been dubbed Putin’s Praetorian Guard. Putin, of course, remains commander in chief of Russia’s armed forces, but as such he has to contend with an array of strong-minded generals and admirals, not to mention the highly popular minister of defense.
The National Guard is unique in reporting directly to Putin, and the man who will lead the National Guard and do that reporting, Viktor Zolotov, is considered unique in his loyalty to Putin. Whether based on demonstrated trust or complicity in crime or the acquisition of wealth, loyalty has always been of the essence for Putin. In a Darwinian society only loyalty stands as a bulwark against greed and violent ambition.
“When it comes to President Vladimir Putin’s personal trust, Viktor Zolotov has no peers,” wrote Mikhail Fishman in a Moscow Times article, “A Bigger Bludgeon.”[27] Zolotov has all the basic characteristics to pass Stage One of Putin’s Loyalty Test. They are both from the same city, Leningrad, and from the working class, and they are of the same generation, less than two years apart in age. They even look somewhat alike, with very Russian blue-gray eyes that stare intently and allow no entry. Most important, they are both former KGB, and as Putin is wont to remark, there is no such thing as that.
Stage Two of Putin’s Loyalty Test is prolonged, close contact, especially in sharp and sudden situations when there is no time to dissemble and true colors come out. His relationship with Zolotov goes back to the early 1990s, when Zolotov was assigned to head up the bodyguard for the mayor of St. Petersburg and his deputy, Vladimir Putin, recently returned from five years of KGB service abroad in Dresden. Zolotov became Putin’s sparring partner in boxing and judo, attempting to punch or flip him when he was not ensuring his safety.
Between 2000 and 2013 Zolotov was chief of security for the president and the prime minister of Russia, both of which offices Putin would occupy in that time. Little is known about Zolotov, as befits a secret service chief, yet there are fascinating and ominous glimpses of him in Comrade J, the memoirs of Colonel Sergei Tretyakov, who ran foreign intelligence for Russia in the United States after the end of the Cold War.
Newly elected president Vladimir Putin was scheduled to attend the UN Millennium Summit in New York in the first week of September 2000. The deputy head of Putin’s advance team Aleksandr Lunkin was an old friend of Colonel Tretyakov’s, and pumped Tretyakov for information about Zolotov. Lunkin recounted a conversation between Zolotov and an associate trying to decide which of Putin’s rivals and enemies should be assassinated to better secure the new president’s hold on power. Methods were discussed—how to make the killings look like a Mafia hit or the work of a Chechen terrorist. But one killing would necessitate another, the targets ranging from political figures to members of the press corps who might investigate the crimes. After much serious consideration, Zolotov concluded: “There are too many. It’s too many to kill—even for us.”[28]
21
Glenn Thrush, Maggie Haberman, “Why Letting Go, for Trump, Is No Small or Simple Task,”
25
Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services,” European Council on Foreign Affairs, ecfr.eu.
26
Nikolai Petrov, “How Putin Changed the Balance of Power Among Russia’s Elite,”