City warfare is similar to warfare in the country in many regards. Modern, properly led infantry elements preparing to take a hill no longer line up at the base to receive a pep talk from their leaders, listen to martial bagpipe music, and then charge on up. Instead, a huge bomb is probably dropped on top of the hill and the infantry instantly helicoptered in for an assault from the top down. Urban combat is envisioned as being only slightly different.
Commanders will identify the tallest, most impressive high-rise building in the center of a contested city—one that is sufficiently stout to support rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, and mortars. Incredibly, modern urban warfare doctrine suggests that these prominent buildings should be taken by helicopter assault groups moving from the top down, often after high explosives placed on the top floors clear them of defenders.
When enemy fire and other considerations preclude helicopters, it is the current wisdom that attacking infantry forces first climb to the top of targeted buildings on fire escapes or inside stairs. Once on top, they begin their assault, fighting their way back down again. Defenders will no doubt attempt to hinder these assaults by placing barbed wire, antipersonnel mines, and other obstacles in stairwells to impede the progress of attacking forces.
Out in the country, high-profile hills are not good places to survive. The same is true in cities. The tallest buildings will likely be at the center of heavy fighting. Survivors should avoid these.
Radio communications between soldiers and commanders in cities are often poor, resulting in both good and bad conditions for city survivors—a soldier on his own may be easier to deal with, but on the other hand he is also unencumbered by his commander’s ethical directives.
Incredibly, commercial phone systems—most of which operate through deeply buried conduit-encased lines—are seen as being more resistant to attack. Contending parties will each attempt to appropriate civilian phone service for their own use. Survivors near central telephone switch facilities may be subject to some rude treatment.
Groups of attacking infantry, as well as defenders, will quickly be splintered into small, isolated units, operating completely independently. Each will be responsible for its own decisions, many of which may not be wise or—at a minimum—may not fit into the big picture. The loss of a small group of infantry many not be immediately obvious. Exactly why it was lost, under what specific circumstances, may never ever come to light.
This brings us to realize that often within cities under attack, small groups of isolated infantry may possibly be taken out with no repercussions for the survivors. But the probability is that one never knows when this will be true: Battlefield communications capabilities are increasing dramatically. It is best not to count on this defense when other devices such as deep hiding are available.
City survivors who very cleverly hide their presence in unobtrusive, untargeted places often survive nicely. This will probably entail removing all signs of their retreat. They will have to learn the art of camouflaging and carefully hide all survival supplies—all signs of their presence—while simultaneously not participating in the war raging about them.
This is not easy. City survivors report that because of crowded living conditions, accompanied by great sanitary and disposal problems, retreats are frequently located by smell alone! Even cooking food among the smell of destruction can be an instant giveaway. Military targets in cities, when they are exposed, are most frequently visible at ranges of 100 meters or less. As a result, urban conflict tends to be low-tech. Infantry units will have to have some compelling reason to come into your immediate area; otherwise, your retreat may be completely overlooked.
Close, violent combat with light auto and semiauto weapons, flamethrowers, hand grenades, mines, and light antitank weapons (taking the place of artillery), is common in urban warfare. Obviously, many traditionally civilian weapons likely to be in the hands of urban survivors will work nicely in these situations. Defenders will not have to rely on standard military equipment to make an adequate showing. Knowing that the reliable, scope-sighted semiauto .22-caliber rifle could be used at the short ranges in cities to trump well-armed attackers is certainly a source of comfort.
Urban conflict is notorious for the vast, virtually disproportionate amount of munitions it chews up. Internal defenders without regular lines of resupply are at an advantage if they have enough prepositioned supplies. Theft of war materiel is a great concern for attacking forces, but since capturing enemy supplies is risky, experienced city fighters report that most of their stuff came from preexisting, internal stockpiles. Again, city survivors should only get involved if their most immediate area is compromised.
The rule of thumb in this case is that, again, city survivors should not get involved in battles. If they do, their precious private supplies will be quickly exhausted. Replacement by capture does not work and should not be part of a survival plan, experts claim.
This advice proved accurate in the reduction of Berlin and Beirut, but not so accurate in the Warsaw Ghetto. Certainly it’s a matter of how badly either side wants to continue to fight and what sorts of skilled manpower are available.
City combat is different from combat in the countryside in some deadly regards. A veteran of World War II city fighting recalls that whenever a city had to be taken, he and his fellow soldiers never, never allowed themselves to be channeled down existing streets and roads when entering the city. Instead they used satchel charges, tank guns, and tanks as bulldozers to punch holes through lines of houses and through factories. By moving through the insides of existing structures they kept out of the enemy’s sight and out of his ambushes, he said.
But predictions are tough. Houses along main thoroughfares were often targeted, while those behind were frequently spared. Attacking soldiers also avoided remote neighborhoods where no obvious resistance was organized, especially if barriers and minefields were in place. Another lesson for city survivors.