Which brings us to an unpleasant, but vitally true, point:
If you and your friend are jogging in the woods, and you get chased by a bear, you don’t have to outrun the bear. You just have to outrun your friend.
Except at the level of very high-value executive protection (presidents, high-profile businessmen, ambassadors and other dignitaries), you are not trying to outrun the bear. You are trying only to outrun your friend.
Let’s combine these two concepts-thinking like the opposition, outrunning your friend-with an example from the realm of home security. And let’s add an additional critical element: that all good security is layered.
If you wanted to burglarize a house, what would you look for? And what would you avoid?
Generally speaking, your high-level objectives are to get cash and property, and to get away (home invasion is a separate subject, but is addressed, like all self-protection, by reference to the same principles). You’d start by looking at lots of houses. Remember, you’re not trying to rob a certain address; you just want to rob a house. Which ones are dark? Which are set back from the road and neighbors? Are there any cars in the driveway? Lights and noise in the house? Signs of an alarm system? A barking dog?
Thinking like a burglar, you are now ready to implement the outer layer of your home security. By some combination of installing motion sensor lights, keeping bushes trimmed so as to avoid concealment opportunities, putting up signs advertising an alarm system, buying a dog, keeping a car or cars in the driveway, and leaving on appropriate lights and the television and making sure there are no newspapers in the driveway or mail left on the porch when you’re away, you help the burglar to immediately decide during his “casing” or “surveillance” phase that he should rob someone else’s house.
If the burglar isn’t immediately dissuaded by the outer layer, he receives further discouragement at the next layer in. He takes a closer look, and sees that you have dead bolt locks on all the doors, and that your advertisement was not a bluff-the windows are in fact alarmed. If he takes a crack at the doorjamb, he discovers that it’s reinforced. If he tries breaking a window, he realizes that the glass is shatter resistant. Whoops-time to go somewhere else, somewhere easier.
Okay, the guy is stupid. He keeps trying anyway. Now the second layer of security described above, which failed to deter him, delays him. It’s taking him a long time to get in. He’s making noise. At some point, the time and noise might combine to convince him to abort (back to deterrence). But if he insists on plunging ahead, the noise has alerted you, and you have bought yourself time to implement further inner layers of security: accessing a firearm; calling the police; retreating to a safe room; most of all, preparing yourself mentally and emotionally for danger and possible violence.
Another example: personal protection from an overseas kidnapping attempt. As with everything else, this form of protection starts with you thinking like the bad guy. Your objective is to kidnap a foreigner. Not a certain Jim Smith, for example; high-value targets are a separate problem (although, again, subject to the same principles). Just any old foreigner, perhaps in particular an American. Now what do you need to do to carry out your plan?
First, you need to pick a target. This part is easy-any foreigner will do. Next, you need to assess the foreigner’s vulnerability. Where will you be able to grab him, and when? To answer these questions, you need to follow the target around. If he’s punctual, a creature of habit, if he likes to travel the same route to work at the same times of day, you are going to start to feel encouraged.
But what if instead, during the assessment stage, you watch the target go out to his car and carefully check it for improvised explosive devices. Your immediate thought will be: hard target. Security conscious. Too difficult-kidnap someone else. As the potential target, your display of security consciousness becomes the outermost layer of your security.
But suppose the would-be kidnapper wants to assess a bit further. Now he learns that you never travel the same route to work. You never come and go at the same times. He can’t get a fix on your where and when. How is he going to plan a kidnapping now?
Note that, by putting yourself in the opposition’s shoes, you have identified a behavior pattern in which he must engage before carrying out his crime: surveillance. Before you are kidnapped, you will be assessed. Assessment entails surveillance. Now you know what preincident behavior to look for. If you were trying to follow you, how would you go about it? That’s what to look for.
Perhaps the would-be kidnapper will discover choke points-a certain bridge, for example-that you have to cross every day on your way to the office. This would be a good place for him to try to lay an ambush. But, because you know this, too, you will be unusually alert as you approach potential choke points. As he watches your “choke point” behavior, he realizes again that you are security conscious, and thus a poor target. Again, deterrence. If he is rash and acts at this point anyway, the possible inner layers of your security-locked and armored vehicles; defensive driving tactics; presence of a bodyguard; access to a firearm; again, most of all, preparing yourself mentally and emotionally for danger and possible violence-all have time to come into play.
Other examples: If you needed fast cash, where would you look to rob someone? Maybe on the victim’s way from an ATM? If so, what kind of ATM would you pick? Where would you wait? What about if you wanted to steal a car? Assuming you’re not a pro who can pick locks and hotwire ignitions, where would you go? Maybe outside a video store, or a dry cleaner, somewhere people leave the keys in the ignition because they’ll “only be gone for a minute”? Now, armed with a better understanding of the criminal’s goals and tactics, how should you behave to better protect yourself?
One common element you might see in all of this is the vital need for alertness, for situational awareness. Understanding where threats are likely to come from and how they are likely to materialize will help you properly tune your alertness. If you are not properly alert to a threat, you almost certainly will be unable to defend yourself against it when it materializes.
Notice that so far the discussion has been devoid of any mention of martial arts. This is because martial arts, self-defense, fighting, and combat, while related subjects, are not identical. The relationship and differences between these areas is outside the scope of this article; for more, check the suggestions for further reading below, especially http://www.nononsenseselfdefense.com. For now, suffice to say that martial arts can be thought of as an inner layer of self-defense. If you are called upon to use your martial arts moves, then almost certainly some outer layer of your security has been breached and you are in a worse position than you would have been had the outer layers held fast.
To put it another way: