With its precious cargo of 2046 vehicles, 202 tanks, 87 crated fighter aircraft, 33 crated bombers, 11,500 tons (11,684 tonnes) of fuel oil, 12,650 tons (12,852 tonnes) of aviation spirit, and 54,321 tons (55,190 tonnes) of general cargo (foodstuffs etc.),[46] JW51B slipped out of Loch Ewe late on 21 December into a crisp, clear night. Under the protective wing of Western Escort Group destroyers Blankney, Chiddingfold, Ledbury, and the minesweeper Circe, course was set for Seidisfjord on the eastern coast of Iceland, and the convoy was joined en route by elements of the close escort which would take it through to Murmansk – the corvettes Hyderabad and Rhododendron, the minesweeper Bramble and the trawlers Vizalma and Northern Gem. The 17th Destroyer Flotilla would join at Seidisfjord, where the Western Escort ships would depart.
22 December saw JW51B at sea, the five ‘O’ class destroyers fuelling at Seidisfjord, and Achates, in company with Bulldog,[47] en route to Iceland. It was now that the good weather, and good luck, which had accompanied JW51A began to desert JW51B. The two Clyde Special Escort Force destroyers, maintaining a good 16 knots in order to arrive by the 23rd, were hit by a southerly gale, force 12 (wind velocity in excess of 60 knots), forcing Achates to heave to (slow right down and lie in the most comfortable and safe position), to ride out the storm. Bulldog also lay hove-to for several hours, but she had a new commanding officer – new to the ship and new to the Arctic – who, believing that the storm was abating, announced his intention to proceed. On Bulldog’s bridge, navigating officer Eric Rhead, together with the first lieutenant, advised against attempting to continue in the existing conditions, particularly as the course to Seidisfjord lay across a very fierce sea. The commanding officer was adamant, however, and gave orders for the change of course and increased speed. Eric Rhead described the consequences:
The inevitable happened and Bulldog charged into the gale… Most small ships have a breakwater on the forecastle as they normally ship a lot of water in bad weather at speed, and the breakwater just guides the water sideways back into the ocean. In our case the sea was too big, the speed to fast, with the result that the breakwater was just swept back, taking some five feet [1.52 m] of the forecastle deck with it, rather like opening a sardine tin. The crews quarters were swamped and indeed the ship was unsafe…[48]
As a result of this incident Bulldog was forced to return to the UK, and the small destroyer escort for JW51B was down to six.
JW51B found itself caught up in the same storm, which proved to be the last straw for Dover Hill, and she turned for home with weather damage and boiler trouble. The gale more or less blew itself out by the 24th and the weather cleared sufficiently for the Luftwaffe to launch reconnaissance missions that day. It is probable that this was the first inkling the Germans had of the convoy’s existence, as a patrolling Focke-Wulf 200 Condor long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft may well have spotted the ships at around 13.15 passing to the south of Iceland. Despite the unceasing efforts of her engine room personnel, Empire Archer proved to be an exceptionally bad ‘smoker’, which may have assisted the reconnaissance aircraft, and later U354, to home onto the convoy.
Achates arrived at Seidisfjord at 11.30 on the 24th with a catalogue of thankfully minor storm damages, and berthed alongside an oiler to top up with fuel. At 23.00 the same day the six ships of the 17th Destroyer Flotilla weighed anchor and followed Onslow out of the fjord to join JW51B. With the storm now past, weaving strands of aurora borealis flickered across the clear sky and as Christmas Day dawned, the destroyers formed up in line abreast and set course to rendezvous with the convoy some 150 miles (276 km) to the east.[49]
At 13.30 on Christmas Day the convoy was sighted, spread out in four columns and steering 320°. The 17th Destroyer Flotilla ships hurried stragglers into line, then took up their positions in the defensive screen, assisted by the Western Escort Group until nightfall when they were detached to Seidisfjord. By noon on the 26th the convoy was at 68°23’ N 6°32’ W, heading northward and crossing into the Arctic Circle at a steady 8½ knots. At these speeds destroyers encountered problems maintaining adequate steerage way, so would hold a speed some 2–3 knots faster but zigzag to an agreed pattern to maintain station with the merchantmen (and hopefully disrupt sightings by shadowing U-boats).
Noon on the 27th saw the convoy at 70°48’ N, 00°22’ W, making 8 knots. The weather was calm but bitterly cold, and as the ships pressed further north into the Arctic the hours of daylight became less and less. Also on the 27th Force ‘R’ sailed from the Kola Inlet going as far west as 11° E by the 29th and overlapping the patrol line of the Home Fleet battle group (battleship Anson and heavy cruiser Cumberland, plus destroyers) which, this being the limit of their patrol area, had turned back at 04.00 that same day. Force ‘R’ arrived some hours later (see map A, p. 144), despatching the two destroyers homeward while Sheffield and Jamaica turned east once again, Admiral Burnett setting a course well to the south of the convoy route.[50] The departure of Force ‘R’ from Kola was picked up by German intelligence and the information passed to Vice-Admiral Kummetz, but once out into the Barents Sea the British ships were missed by reconnaissance patrols, and Kummetz believed that they might be positioning themselves to escort homeward-bound convoy RA51 which was then preparing to leave the inlet.
By noon on the 28th JW51B was in position 72°35’ N, 4°20’ E, course 071°. During the night the wind had increased to force 7 from the north-west, icing up was becoming a problem and heavy rolling seas had reduced the convoy’s speed to 6½ knots. During the following night, the 28th/29th, the convoy was again struck by gale-force winds, now from north-north-west, and the ships experienced very heavy rolling. Several of the merchantmen encountered problems and Jefferson Myers was forced to heave to when her deck cargo came adrift (although Commodore Melhuish later stated that in his opinion to heave to and thus fall out of line was unnecessary, the problem, if anything, being inadequate stowage of deck cargo).[51] It was a problem which would recur, and as the gale continued into the morning of the 29th deck cargo also broke loose on Daldorch. Between 01.00 and 12.00 that morning visibility swung from three cables (600 yd/548 m), to 1½ miles (2.77 km). The noon position was 73°19’ N, 11°45’ E, and by that afternoon the gale had at last begun to abate and visibility had increased to 10 miles (18 km). Only nine merchant ships could be seen in company, in ragged order, and the trawler Vizalma and destroyer Oribi had also become detached from the main body during the night. As the weather continued to improve, Bramble, which had better radar equipment than most of the escort, was sent in search of stragglers and the speed of the convoy reduced to 6 knots to enable them to catch up. At 23.59 on the 29th course was altered to 090°, due east.
47
5 While part of the escort for Atlantic convoy
48
6 Rhead, Cdr Eric Bertrand, DSC,
49
7 Memoir (unpublished) of Commander Loftus Peyton-Jones, supplied to the author. As a first lieutenant, Commander Peyton-Jones served aboard HMS