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CHAPTER 4
FOG OF WAR
Kapitänleutnant Karl-Heinz Herschelb and U354 shadowed JW51B from the morning of 30 December, and shortly after noon reported the convoy to Admiral Commanding Northern Waters Otto Kluber at Narvik, as ‘6–10 steamers Qu 6394 AB, enemy on course 100°. Poorly secured convoy protected by several destroyers up to one light cruiser.’[52]
Later that afternoon Herschelb tried a torpedo attack, reporting: ‘Convoy in square AC 4189, widely spaced, large zigzags on a mean course of 080 degrees, about 10 steamships, several destroyers, 1 cruiser doubtful. Spread salvo of three missed on account of zigzagging. Weather is good apart from short snow squalls.’[53]
Covered by dark U354 surfaced on the starboard quarter of the convoy, tracking the merchant ships through hydrophones by the slow rhythmic churning of their propellers until another echo materialised, its source rapidly closing. This could only mean a destroyer approaching at high speed, and U354 slipped quickly beneath the waves.
By 00.45 on the 30th word had come through to Captain Sherbrooke that Vizalma and the freighter Chester Valley were together, but some distance to the north of the main body of the convoy, which was itself 13 miles (24 km), south of its anticipated position thanks to the gale of the previous night. At 11.30 ships were sighted on bearing 200° 9 miles (16.7 km) distant and Obdurate was sent to investigate, returning by 14.00 with two of the missing freighters. The noon position was 73°27’ N, 19°35’ E, and speed was reduced to 8 knots to allow the missing ships to catch up. At 20.20 the alarm was sounded as Obdurate sped to investigate a possible submarine on the surface. She was joined by Obedient and both hunted the elusive echo and dropped depth charges, but were not convinced that it had been a submarine after all. They were also unable to contact Hyderabad, which should have been in a good position to join the hunt.[54] This would be the first of a number of communications problems with the corvette over the ensuing twenty-four hours. Most worrying for Sherbrooke, Oribi had still not rejoined. She had in fact been struggling with a defective gyrocompass and after trying vainly to find the convoy proceeded on to Murmansk. She would be badly missed; the destroyer escort was now down to five.
Rear-Admiral Burnett, with Force ‘R’, proposed, for reasons similar to those expressed by Vice-Admiral Kummetz, to cross the convoy’s wake, take position to the north and shadow from some 40–50 miles (75–92 km) astern so that he would have the advantage of any available light[55] should an attack develop. Additionally, in that position his cruisers would be less likely to attract the attention of any air reconnaissance which might then be drawn on to the convoy. He had several problems to contend with in arriving at his intended covering position by 31 December, however. Rear-Admiral Burnett considered this to be the crucial time given the expected position of the convoy at that point, and the fact that any attacking German surface ships would almost certainly sortie from Altenfjord (see map, p. 52).
Since leaving the Kola Inlet the weather had been so overcast that it had not been possible to take sightings from the stars, obliging navigating officers to calculate their position using ‘dead reckoning’. To complicate matters further Rear-Admiral Burnett had no sightings of the convoy, the only report he had of its position being a message received from C-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Tovey, timed at 11.21 on 27 December. This estimated that JW51B would pass the longitude of Bear Island at 16.00 on the 29th, whereas in fact this point was passed at around 12.00 the following day, the convoy being some 150 miles (276 km) further west, and as already noted, some way south of its intended position (see map, p. 52).[56] Having no option but to assume that C-in-C Home Fleet’s message was accurate, at 18.00 on the 30th Rear-Admiral Burnett gave orders for Force ‘R’ to come around to course 320° and proceed so as to be in a covering position to the north and astern of the convoy by dawn. In fact, as can be seen from the map, the cruisers passed ahead of the convoy and by 08.30 on the 31st were some 30 miles (55 km) due north of the merchantmen.
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1 Kummetz, Vice-Admiral
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4 In latitude 73° N at this time of year, the sun at no time rises above 6° below the horizon (civil twilight). Nautical twilight (12° below horizon) starts at about 08.00 and ends about 14.50. In late December 1942 the moon (3rd quarter) set about 11.10. PRO. ADM 234/369.