Admiral Kluber in Narvik passed U354’s sightings to Vice-Admiral Kummetz on 30 December, and ordered him to bring his battle group to three-hour stand-by. Consequently early that afternoon Kummetz summoned his captains aboard Admiral Hipper to outline his plan of attack; those present represented Hipper (Kapitän zur See Hans Hartmann), Lützow, (Kapitän zur See Rudolf Stange) and the destroyers Friedrich Eckholdt (Capt. Alfred Schemmel, Commander 5th Destroyer Flotilla, doubling as captain of Eckholdt as her own captain, Lt-Cdr Lutz Gerstung, had died a few days earlier), Richard Beitzen (Lt-Cdr Hans von Davidson), Theodor Riedel (Lt-Cdr Walter Riede), Z29 (Lt-Cdr Curt Rechel), Z30 (Lt-Cdr Heinrich Kaiser) and Z31 (Lt-Cdr Hermann Alberts).
Having ensured that his senior officers fully understood his strategy, Vice-Admiral Kummetz closed the meeting with a summary of his intended battle tactics:
At night I cannot attack the convoy… for on principle our own ships should not be exposed to nocturnal attack from destroyers… The only thing left is to make use of the few hours of polar twilight that in these latitudes count for daylight… By dawn we should have closed the enemy. The main objective then is first the destruction of the security force, and after that the merchantmen, with special emphasis on immobilising as many as possible by gunfire in the shortest possible time…[57]
At 14.10 that afternoon Kummetz received a radio message from Narvik requesting the time of departure of the battle group and giving the estimated position of ‘PQ20 ’ (German intelligence had not yet picked up the prefix switch from PQ to JW), the following day. Paragraph 4 of this message reads:
A. Bringing in of single steamers very desirable.
B. No loss of time due to rescuing… enemy crews.
C. Only some prisoner captains and crew for interrogation of value.
D. Rescue of enemy crews by enemy forces not desirable.[58]
Neither Allied or Axis ships would stop for rescue missions, of friend or foe, if it was thought that by so doing they would put themselves in danger; however an order not to rescue enemy crews under any circumstances highlights the low value placed on human life by the Nazi High Command, ultimately that of their own population as well as those of their enemies.
By 30 December U626 (Oberleutnant Hans-Helmuth Bugs) had also made contact with JW51B and good intelligence as to the convoy’s movements was therefore anticipated. In fact at this time Kummetz almost certainly had a better idea of the convoy’s location than Rear-Admiral Burnett; however to compensate for this to some degree Burnett’s cruisers had still not been located, the balance of probability for the German command being that they were homeward-bound with convoy RA51.
With the German battle group making preparations for sea, down the chain of command came the first note of caution, contained in a radio message from Narvik: ‘Conduct towards the enemy: Avoid superior enemy, otherwise destroy if in [advantageous] tactical situation.’[59]
The German chain of command for most naval operations was cumbersome in the extreme, and for Regenbogen comprised the following, who were all directly involved:
Adolf Hitler at Wolfschanze to:
the Kriegsmarine representative at Führer Headquarters Admiral
Theodore Krancke to:
Grand Admiral Raeder, Berlin, to:
Admiral Rolf Carls, C-in-C Gruppe Nord, Kiel, to:
Admiral Otto Kluber, Admiral Commanding Northern Waters,
Narvik to:
Vice-Admiral Oskar Kummetz at Altenfjord.
With the estimated time of departure for the battle group initially set at 17.00, Admiral Hipper’s perennial engine problems (see Appendix I), struck again when a flange on the starboard condenser pump was found to be blowing, risking failure of the starboard engine should it worsen. Following an inspection Kummetz decided that repairs would be possible while at sea (their estimated duration was twelve hours), and a departure time of 18.00 was fixed.
At 16.37 U354 had reported to Narvik: ‘Convoy Qu. 4189 AC has spread out, large jags [zigzags] around 80°, approximately 10 steamers, several destroyers, 1 cruiser doubtful… Weather good except for short squalls of snow.’[60]
This information was passed to Vice-Admiral Kummetz, followed at 16.48 by another exhortation to exercise caution from Admiral Kluber: ‘Commander: Contrary to op.-command [see message above] conduct towards the enemy: Exercise restraint even when enemy is equally matched as cruisers should not take big risks.’[61]
If the German high command had deliberately set out to hamstring Vice-Admiral Kummetz they could not have done a better job – and they were not finished yet! The battle group departed Altenfjord via Lopphavet Sound and set course to clear the coast, and British submarine patrols,[62] at 24 knots, the maximum speed of Lützow. A short time into the voyage mechanical problems struck again as destroyer Z31 developed a fault with her port engine, and speed was reduced to 18 knots to enable her to maintain contact. By 22.55 the battle group had reached position 71°01’ N, 21°25’ E, and course was altered to 060° to intercept the convoy. Shortly thereafter Z31 reported her engine problem solved, and speed increased to 24 knots.
By 02.00 on New Year’s Eve dead reckoning placed the German battle group at 71°36’ N, 24°38’ E, at which point Kummetz deployed his attack formation (see diagram p. 32). His reconnaissance screen of six destroyers was to sweep eastwards 15 miles (28 km) apart, with Hipper 15 miles astern the northern wing destroyer, and Lützow 15 miles astern the southern wing destroyer. Lützow had orders to be 75 miles (138 km) and 180° from Hipper at 08.00, by which time the flagship would be at position 73°40’ N, 28° E.
The vice-admiral’s appreciation of the position at this point was as follows:
1. I consider the most recent location report of the submarine in contact at 16.37 to be reliable, as it can easily be connected to the previous location reports. I therefore take it as a starting point for the approach to the reconnaissance formation.
2. The escort convoy is fast but moves jaggedly, so I assume general course to be no faster than approx. 8 nm [knots]. If the enemy goes in a straight line for a longer period of time, their advancing speed will increase accordingly. I reckon the enemy is trying to gain space to the east. I also have to take a slow rotation into a southern direction into account. I think, though, that due to his respect for the German air force he will not get too close to the coastline. He will try to shake off the covering submarines by going jaggedly, supported by the weather conditions, which are unfavourable for submarines.
62
11 There were four British submarines at that time off the northern coast of Norway: