3. The reconnaissance formation has to cover the most probable voyage speeds of between 7 and approximately 11 nm, and the most probable courses between 85 to approximately 110°.
4. I want to run into the escort convoy with… favourable lookout conditions and the enemy… visible against the light horizon as dawn breaks. I therefore put up with the unfavourable torpedo tactic situation.[63]
At 05.00 Hipper picked up a radio message dispatched by U354 to Narvik which read, ‘From 20.30 forced under water, bombed. Last location escort Qu. 4513 AC, [course] around 120° 13 nm, weather conditions very good, advancing…’[64]
This showed a more southerly course for the convoy than anticipated, and although he was sceptical of its accuracy, Kummetz could not afford to ignore it since if his target now held to 120° he would miss it completely if he made no adjustment. He therefore shifted the destroyer screen 20 miles (37 km) to the south. Being less sure of the enemy position, and despite the possibility that the transmissions might betray the battle group’s location, Kummetz ordered that from 06.00 onwards, whenever visibility dropped below 6 miles (11.5 km), all ships should use FuMG radar every ten minutes for two minutes at a time in order to avoid running into the convoy unexpectedly.
Bearing in mind that this was Kapitän zur See Stange’s first operational command, the higher echelons of German naval authority had prepared something of a surprise for him and Lützow at this late stage in the proceedings. At 05.45 he received the following from Admiral Kluber in Narvik (copied to Hipper):
FT 01.53 from North Sea Commander SSD to B.d.K and Lützow:
After completion Regenbogen intending to release Lützow within the North Sea northwards 70 degrees north between 5 degrees east and 35 degrees east.
Mission: cruiser-war, detect enemy shipping traffic, attack single cruisers and poorly secured escorts. Cue for release Aurora…
Development of Regenbogen is crucial for release… Proceed only if Lützow has at least half of artillery and torpedo ammunition left.
Break off Lützow’s being at sea independently as soon as enemy units can be recognised from heavy cruiser upwards or after collection of enemy forces becomes probable following considerable success… Further information later.[65]
It is probably fair to say that Rudolf Stange was not the most resourceful captain in the Kriegsmarine, but it is not difficult to understand his consternation on receipt of this radio communication on the point of engaging the convoy, particularly as the message contains its fair share of ‘ifs’, ‘buts’, and ‘maybes’. As Stange himself commented: ‘The receipt of this FT creates a new situation for me in so far as contrary to the original plans… it is now no longer possible to talk the operation through with B.d.K in detail, neither can I request documents about the enemy from him…’[66]
Whether Vice-Admiral Kummetz knew that this operation within an operation was in the wind is open to question, but, crucially, it appears that Stange did not, which may go some way towards explaining his performance in the engagement which followed.
At 07.18 two shadows bearing 060° were sighted by Admiral Hipper, and Friedrich Eckholdt was sent to investigate. At 07.47 a large shadow was sighted and Hipper turned towards it on course 110°. This may have been one of the tankers straggling astern of the convoy, and may initially have been mistaken for a cruiser by the approaching German force. As Kummetz and Kapitän zur See Hartmann considered their options six more shadows were identified, and both officers were now certain that this must be the convoy. By 08.00 Lützow was in position and reporting a moderate swell, clouds and occasional snow showers. In Kapitän zur See Stange’s estimation the convoy was some 80 miles (148 km) to the north, caught between the jaws of the German ‘pincers’ – which he now prepared to close.
Despite the apparent complexities of his plan Vice-Admiral Kummetz had placed his forces perfectly, and at 07.58 he signalled his sighting to the battle group: ‘Alarm Square 4395.’[67]
As darkness struggled toward twilight that 31 December, JW51B consisted of twelve merchantmen (two stragglers still absent), accompanied by five destroyers, two corvettes and a trawler. The convoy’s course was easterly, position approximately 220 miles (408 km) north-west of the Kola Inlet. Some 45 miles (82 km) to the north the trawler Vizalma with the freighter Chester Valley in company attempted to rejoin the main body, while some 15 miles (28 km) to the north-east the minesweeper Bramble still looked for stragglers. Rear-Admiral Burnett with Force ‘R’ was approximately 30 miles (55 km) north of the convoy and 15 miles south of Vizalma. None of these four groups had any idea of the positions of the others, and there was also another straggler somewhere in the area.[68]
The weather was for the most part clear, the twilight visibility being around 7 miles (13 km) to the north, 10 miles (18.5 km) to the south. At intervals however, visibility was much reduced by snow squalls. There was low cloud cover, wind west-north-west force 3, sea slight, 16 degrees of frost, and ice on all ships.[69]
At about 08.20 Hyderabad, astern the convoy on the starboard wing (see diagram, p. 58), sighted two unidentified ships crossing the convoy’s wake. She had previously picked up a coded radio message notifying the convoy to expect two Russian aircraft, an incorrect decode unfortunately substituting ‘destroyers’ for ‘aircraft’. The corvette took these to be the Russian ships, and did not pass the information on. At 08.30 Obdurate, on the convoy’s starboard beam, reported to Onslow: ‘Bearing 210 2 destroyers.’[70]
It was at first considered that these might be Oribi and Bramble, but Obdurate was sent to investigate. A sixth sense seems to have warned Captain Sherbrooke that this might be trouble, for as Obdurate commenced her sweep astern of the convoy he ordered Onslow’s complement sent to breakfast and to change into clean underwear – a naval tradition dating back to the days of the wooden wall sailing ships to help guard against infection in the event of wounding. A tense hour passed, until at 09.29 gun flashes were seen by Onslow in the direction taken by Obdurate. Sherbrooke ordered Orwell and Obedient to join him, the latter having to come around and astern of the convoy. The two destroyers spotted by Obdurate turned out to be three, and were in fact Friedrich Eckholdt, Richard Beitzen and Z29, the three destroyers which completed Hipper’s squadron, opening from Lützow’s group to the south. The three German destroyers turned to the north-west away from Obdurate, but when she closed to 8000 yds (7300 m), Eckholdt opened fire. The British destroyer turned away to rejoin the convoy, while the German trio continued on to the north-west to close on Hipper.
65
14 Stange,