Выбрать главу

It now appeared to Rear-Admiral Burnett that the mysterious radar contact must in all probability be stragglers from the convoy[79] and at 09.55 he ordered Force ‘R’ around to the south on a course of 170°, and in line ahead Sheffield and Jamaica worked up to their maximum 32 knots.

In some respects it does seem that Force ‘R’ might have made for the gunfire sooner. The mystery echo, a potential enemy, had to be checked; however the best part of an hour had been taken up with this endeavour. The confused situation on the day must of course be taken into consideration, particularly keeping in mind that the prime consideration was the safe arrival of the convoy, allied to Rear-Admiral Burnett’s belief that JW51B was 150 miles (277 km) or more east of the position from which the firing emanated.

—♦—

As Force ‘R’ headed southwards Admiral Hipper continued skirmishing with the British destroyers, running in to engage them with her secondary and anti-aircraft guns, while firing over them at the convoy with her main armament. Partly as a result of caution concerning torpedo attack and partly to try to draw the destroyers away from the convoy, with the range down to around 11,000 yards (10,000 m), Kummetz would swing away to the north, subsequently repeating the manoeuvre. Between the twilight visibility, snow squalls, and smoke laid by the British destroyers, the ‘fog of war’ had begun to take on a literal definition so whether Obedient and Obdurate were observed from the German flagship returning to the convoy is not certain. Perhaps Vice-Admiral Kummetz was aware that the convoy had turned away toward the Lützow squadron and he wished to be in at the kill, but whatever his reasoning, shortly after 10.00 he seems to have determined that as they would not be drawn away from the merchantmen, he would concentrate on the troublesome destroyers, and instructed Kapitän zur See Hartmann to clear them from his path once and for all.[80]

CHAPTER 5

‘THE WHOLE PLACE WAS ALIGHT’

Admiral Hipper’s first couple of salvos fell well over Onslow, which returned fire, and at 10.14 observers on the destroyers saw a faint flash on the cruiser amidships.[81] Hipper’s next salvo passed ‘uncomfortably close and over’ Onslow[82] followed in quick succession by two 150 yards over, and two more straddling the stern. The cruiser now had the range and the next salvo fell either side of the destroyer’s bridge, one shell exploding close to the port side, splinters peppering the torpedomen’s messdeck. At 10.18 Onslow was again straddled, one shell striking the top of the funnel. Both RDF sets and all her main radio telephone aerials were destroyed, and a hail of splinters sprayed across the bridge. Lieutenant-Commander Marchant remembered that ‘a splinter passed between me and Captain (D).’[83] The splinter hit Captain Sherbrooke in the face, badly wounding him and temporarily blinding his left eye. There was no let-up in the pounding as another salvo from Hipper immediately struck home with direct hits to the destroyer’s superstructure under ‘B’ turret, and the forecastle abreast ‘A’ turret.[84] Fires were now taking hold in the fore part of the stricken destroyer and Sherbrooke, refusing to leave the bridge until his ship was out of danger, ordered her to make smoke and turn to starboard. The turn upset Hipper’s gunnery and the next three salvos fell harmlessly some 30 yards (27 m) away. However Kummetz must have believed that the enemy flotilla leader was finished, as he shifted his fire to Orwell.

As the shells struck Onslow, Acting Stoker Walter Watkin had been making his way forward with Engineer Lieutenant Kevin Walton, both intending to assist the fire and repair party stationed in the after seamen’s messdeck located immediately below ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets. Lieutenant Walton broke the glass front of a locker holding a fire hose and handed the hose to Watkin. A standpipe containing sea water under pressure was located close to the funnel, and Watkin dashed back to connect the hose. As he did so he saw the wounded chief stoker lying on the deck and sliding under the guardrail as the ship heeled over to starboard. Grabbing the injured man he dragged him inboard and propped him up by the funnel, then connecting the hose to the standpipe he opened the valve and dragged the hose back to fight the fires in the seamen’s messdeck. He recalls that ‘the whole place was alight, with fires burning fiercely. The steel structure was a mass of twisted metal, and dead bodies [were] lying around.’[85] As the two men played water on the fire it must have been apparent to Watkin that the entire fire and repair party had been wiped out when their repair station received a direct hit. It might also have occurred to him, as it certainly did later when he had time to reflect, that had he received the promotion he had wanted, he would have been a member of that party.

One fire in particular was proving difficult to get at. Handing the hose to another rating, Lieutenant Walton and Walter Watkin made their way to the main deck forward, where Walton believed he could get at the fire by going down through the shell hole in the forecastle. Dense smoke billowed from the hole and he had no way of knowing whether the deck below had been shot away. Nevertheless, with a handkerchief tied over his nose and mouth he lashed a rope around his chest and handed it to Watkin, who lowered him down. He had two hoses fed down to him and fought the fires there for twenty minutes before being relieved.

With Walton out of the forecastle, Watkin heard a shout that fires had spread to the engine room artificers’ (ERAs’) messdeck beneath the captain’s sea cabin and the bridge. Going back to the area he arranged for a bucket party to fill buckets from a lavatory and pass them to him as he stood at the top of a ladder and threw water over the bulkhead of the ERAs’ pantry, which blistered with heat from the fire on the other side. An ERA arrived with a fire hose, and opening the door to the messdeck played water on the red-hot bulkheads. Watkin was subsequently instructed to go below and take over watch-keeping duties in No.1 boiler room.[86]

—♦—

Having received damage reports and ensured that Onslow was out of immediate danger, Captain Sherbrooke transferred command of the 17th Destroyer Flotilla to Commander Kinloch of Obedient, remaining on the bridge until an acknowledgement was obtained confirming that his order had been received and was being acted upon. For his actions in command of the close escort, and remaining at his post despite his serious wound, he was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross.

The situation facing Commander Kinloch as he took command at 10.35 was far from clear, (see map, below). The convoy now steered 180° (due south), with Obedient and Obdurate some 3 miles (5.5 km) to the north and overhauling the merchantmen. Orwell closed from somewhat to the north-east, while Onslow made her way toward the head of the convoy from where she could ‘home’ Force ‘R’ using the fleet waveband. As the flotilla leader passed close to Obedient, Paddy Donovan, in the gunnery director up behind the bridge, had a grandstand view of the fires raging aboard Onslow and remembered Obedient’s crew cheering the battered destroyer as she steered to the head of the convoy.[87] Achates remained on station astern of the convoy, a little to the west of Obedient and still laying smoke, while Hipper continued eastwards at 31 knots, although as a heavy snow squall now covered the area Kinloch had no real idea where the German cruiser was. To add to his problems Rhododendron, on the port quarter of the convoy, reported smoke to the south-west followed ten minutes later by a report of a large vessel bearing 160°, only 2 miles (3.2 km) off and steering north-east.[88] This was Lützow’s squadron, and had also been spotted by Lieutenant-Commander Marchant, now commanding Onslow:

вернуться

79

28 It was in fact Vizalma and Chester Valley, who had altered course to the east having also seen the gunfire.

вернуться

80

29 While Vice-Admiral Kummetz was in overall command, much of the actual fighting of the German flagship would have been handled by Kapitän zur See Hartmann (much the same relationship would have existed between Rear-Admiral Burnett and Captain Storey aboard Sheffield). Hartmann for one seems to have favoured a more aggressive approach than the one inflicted on them by the high command, Kummetz reporting that he had to ‘hold him back’ during the course of the battle.

вернуться

81

1 PRO. ADM 234/492. Observers on the destroyers reported up to three hits on Hipper during this exchange, but there are no reports of hits at this time in the German records.

вернуться

82

2 Ibid.

вернуться

83

3 From a transcript of an interview taped by Lieutenant-Commander Marchant for the 17th Destroyer Flotilla Association, and used with the kind permission of Mrs Pamela Marchant.

вернуться

84

4 PRO. ADM 234/492.

вернуться

85

5 Leading Stoker Walter Watkin, in correspondence with the author.

вернуться

86

6 Ibid.

вернуться

87

7 Lieutenant-Commander Donovan in conversation with the author.

вернуться

88

8 Hyderabad, stationed on the starboard side of the convoy, had previously noticed two destroyers and a large ship crossing ahead from west to east, but again made no report.