At a range of about 6000 yards [5486 m], on a bearing of green 40 [off the destroyer’s starboard bow], silently slid into view the huge silhouette of the German pocket battleship Lützow. She was steering NNE. If, in our predicament, we could see her, surely she could see us and the… ships with us. So we simply stopped breathing and waited for the first broadside. But nothing happened! As quietly as she came into view she slid out – a ghost ship if ever there was. Many prayers winged aloft during those charged and tense minutes.[89]
A sudden desire for quiet prayer and contemplation seems also to have gripped the crew of Rhododendron at this point – a feeling which apparently did not extend to her captain, Lieutenant-Commander Sayers who apparently, so the scuttlebutt goes, ordered her single 4 in (101 mm) gun to open fire! The first lieutenant is said to have quickly checked the order and had a quiet word with the captain to the effect that they might be biting off a bit more than they could chew! In the event Rhododendron did not open fire and Lützow disappeared quietly back into the murk. While one cannot help but admire Sayers’s spirit, it seems certain that letting sleeping battleships lie constituted the better part of valour on that occasion.
That morning Lützow and her three destroyers, Theodor Riedel, Z30, and Z31, made good progress north-eastwards toward the convoy. The pocket battleship made a better-than-expected 26 knots, Kapitän zur See Stange having authorised the temporary circumvention of the engines’ operating limits.[90] At 09.30 muzzle flashes were seen from below the visible horizon, indicating the opening of Admiral Hipper’s attack, whereupon Stange considered launching the ship’s aircraft for reconnaissance but decided against it, since much time would be lost recovering it. During the course of the morning Lieutenant-Commander Kaiser and Z30, in company with Z31, had been despatched in an attempt to locate the convoy but without success, and by 10.35 they had rejoined Lützow. At 10.42 a ship believed to be an enemy was in sight to port but was almost immediately obscured by the snow squall, which also blotted Hipper off from Commander Kinloch’s view. By 10.45 Lützow’s radar picked up several targets within the snow squall, but still nothing was visible. Kapitän zur See Stange was now confronted by several problems. He presumed that the contacts in the squall would be the enemy convoy, but was not sure. Since he had no wish to get caught in the southward-moving squall himself it was necessary for him to manoeuvre his squadron into the best position to confirm the identity of the radar contacts, and if they turned out to be the merchantmen, make his attack. Stange opted to continue north-eastwards, pass ahead of the weather front, reduce speed to 15 knots and turn to run south eastwards along its edge, hoping for it to clear sufficiently to allow positive identification of the targets. As he manoeuvred for an attack position, in the back of his mind must have been the morning’s message detailing Lützow to a further solo mission on completion of the attack on the convoy. This mission could only take place if the pocket battleship had at least half her ammunition and torpedoes available; therefore Stange would not have wished to waste either on indistinct targets. He could despatch one or more of his consorts to close on what he suspected would be the convoy, but decided against this course of action believing that an attack by Lützow would be jeopardised should his destroyers be intermingled with the enemy (to the north Vice-Admiral Kummetz kept his destroyers in close contact with Hipper for much the same reason).
Little had been heard from Bramble since departing the convoy on the 29th to search for stragglers, but she now made a dramatic but short-lived reappearance. Having no doubt seen the gunfire and set course for the convoy, she now approached from the north-east and at 10.39 sent her last message (received by Hyderabad only, and not passed on to the senior officer of the escort until some days later): ‘One cruiser bearing 300°.’[91]
After disengaging from Onslow, Admiral Hipper continued eastwards before swinging in an arc to starboard to bring her back into contact with the convoy. At 10.42 as she came around to the south-west a ship appeared out of the gloom to port and was identified as a destroyer or corvette (see map B, p. 146). Since no German ship could be approaching from that direction Hipper opened fire on what was in fact the unfortunate Bramble. Having crippled the minesweeper Kummetz despatched Friedrich Eckholdt to finish her off. Little is known of this episode, except that Obedient noted an engagement between a small ship firing a single gun and a much larger ship, away to the north-east. Bramble was sunk with all hands, and evidently went down fighting.
Approaching 11.00 Lützow was steering 120° at 12 knots[92] and was spotted by Obedient, in company with Obdurate and Orwell, as the destroyers passed southward down the port side of the convoy (see map B, p. 146). As the destroyers conformed to the enemy’s course and speed to keep themselves between the convoy and the pocket battleship, Commander Kinloch ordered Achates to join them. However, on being advised that Achates’ speed was reduced to 20 knots by previously inflicted battle damage, he rescinded the order and signalled her to ‘proceed to the head of the convoy and take Onslow under your orders.’[93] At 11.06 firing was heard and it was thought that Lützow had opened her attack, but no fall of shot could be seen. This was in fact Hipper racing back to the convoy at 31 knots on a course of 190° and a bearing almost exactly the same as Lützow, her approach therefore hidden from the British destroyers. What she had been firing at is something of a mystery as Kummetz reports her bombarding two destroyers to port,[94] yet there were no British ships in that area at the time. The only explanation appears to be that it may have been the luckless Bramble again, limping southwards.