After thirteen minutes it became necessary to shut down the boilers and abandon No. 3 boiler room, but temporary repairs were effected, the fire brought under control and the room pumped out. Despite the efforts of the damage-control parties, working in extremely difficult conditions, water and oil continued to enter and the room was again abandoned, necessitating the shutting down of the starboard main engine. At 12.18 the level of water and oil in No. 3 boiler room reached approximately 6 ft (1.83 m), and began to flood the adjacent No. 2 boiler room through leaks around the bulkhead glands for the interconnecting piping system between the two rooms. Desperate efforts were made to keep No. 2 boiler room in operation but water entered the boilers, causing cracks in the superheater tubes, and as a result fires in the boilers were extinguished, necessitating the shutting down of the port main engine – and a consequent reduction in speed to 15 knots. Engineers worked on in No. 2 boiler room and shortly after 18.00 their efforts were rewarded when sufficient pressure was raised on one boiler for speed to be increased to 18 knots, and maintained for the remainder of the voyage to Altenfjord.
The situation in the boiler rooms having been stabilised, the surrounding area was ventilated for three hours to enable those off watch to rest and get some sleep in nearby rooms. Despite the ventilation a number of crewmen suffered cramps, vomiting and shortness of breath, some coughing up a bloody foam, some becoming unconscious. Dr Martin Goeder, the ship’s medical officer, diagnosed poisoning from Ardexin fumes, which proved to be extremely persistent despite the ventilation. This may have been due to leaking storage units (although they had been thoroughly checked), damaged as a result of vibration from the shell explosion, or from the firing of Hipper’s own guns. For the affected crewmen Dr Goeder prescribed medication for blood circulation, plus oxygen to be administered as required for breathing difficulties. In a number of cases further treatment, requiring bleeding of 100 to 250 ccm, followed by the infusion of a physiological salt solution of 500 to 1000 ccm with a 100 ccm glucose solution, was used. In one case chloral hydrate as a clyster was administered, dissolved in glucose.[134]
Narvik ordered U-boats in the battle area to search for wreckage, and in particular to attempt to locate Friedrich Eckholdt. At 18.52 U354 reported ‘heavy artillery fire’ at a distance of 10 miles (18.4 km), which, as the action was by then over, seems in all probability to have been ammunition aboard the German destroyer exploding as she tore herself apart.
At 02.45 on the morning of 1 January Kummetz received the following message from Kluber in Narvik, which gives some hint of the pressure for news of the operation emanating from much higher up the German chain of command: ‘Emergency. Request brief preliminary survey by w/t of successes and situation, even before sending short report.’[135]
Kummetz coded his reply while at sea but declined to send it until the battle group had entered Lopphavet Sound, in order not to give any clues as to which route would be used for their return. As it was, Hipper was spotted by the British submarine Graph shortly after 01.00 on the 1st, but she was too far away to make an attack (see map D, p. 148). (Some three hours later Graph reported unsuccessfully attacking two enemy destroyers, one apparently in tow of the other, although there are no indications of serious battle damage to any of the remaining five German destroyers from the Barents Sea action, and Vice-Admiral Kummetz makes no mention of any problems in his report.) By 04.10, with the battle group safely in the fjords the Vice-Admiral despatched his message:
31.12 from 0230 hours onwards 5-Fl [5th Flotilla] reconnaissance strip Qu.4196 AC to 4939, cruisers behind it. Hipper convoy 0740hrs Qu.4395 sighted. Alarm. Eckholdt contact holder. Artillery battle Hipper with guarding destroyers, in the end cruisers, at first not recognised as such though. Hipper, 3 destroyers north, Lützow, 3 destroyers south, convoy. Lützow and various destroyers also in artillery battles. Hipper damaged 3 destroyers, 1 further probably sunk. Eckholdt was hit by cruiser artillery during sinking of this destroyer. Due to difficult enemy position and onset of darkness, assistance [to Eckholdt] no longer possible without a high risk to the formation. Formation withdrawn westwards. At first enemy contact holders on both sides. Hipper suffered one full blow to K.3 from cruiser artillery. Due to overflow K.2 shut down… One blow to hangar, fire extinguished. One blind hit, personnel loss.[136]
This is a necessarily brief but accurate account of the battle; however truth and accuracy were not what was required in the fevered atmosphere of a Nazi high command which had much higher expectations.
At 19.30 on the 1st Kummetz was summoned to the telex connection to Narvik for a conversation with Admiral Kluber. The conversation opened with a quote from Narvik of a message for Kummetz which had been received from C-in-C Gruppe Nord, Admiral Karls in Kiel, and read:
To BdK and Lützow Commander.
Request an immediate detailed coherent report on Regenbogen. This is required urgently for report to a superior department. BdK to comment in detail on the battle group Lützow, especially concerning reaction, battle distance, success. Approve formation withdrawal once enemy cruiser resistance identified.[137]
There were at this point communications glitches at various stages along the German chain of command, resulting in Kummetz receiving increasingly strident requests for detailed information from several sources, including some passed via the cruiser Köln anchored nearby. After clarifying what Admiral Kluber had or had not received by way of reply, Kummetz went on to state his position again, particularly concerning reports not sent by himself as the commander at sea, and his use (or lack of use) of the battle group destroyers:
1. Initially I would like to establish that I cannot understand how the impression of a great success could arise at home. If there is no success I will not report it. It did not occur to me to specifically report that there is no success. If an impression arose as a result of a submarine commander’s report stating that he saw crimson, this is not my responsibility. I could no longer correct this impression as I was in retreat [and maintaining radio silence].
2. I think one does not appreciate the difficulties connected with the task given. I had no doubts about them at any time. Experience gained during exercises and at war have shown that it takes a considerable length of time to fight down guarding armed forces, even if they are only destroyers and they act skilfully. Only on rare occasions does one succeed in getting to the steamers within a convoy before the guarding armed forces have been fought down.
3. The time which was available to me was very limited. There are virtually only two hours of rifle light [twilight] in this latitude per day… My last advance onto the convoy at approximately 11.00 hours with the Hipper and Lützow groups, in loose tactical connection with increasing darkness, already involved a risk that I could only take heavy-heartedly in view of the instructions given to me…