4. Therefore undivided attention had to be given to torpedo risk during these light conditions. I considered it to be wrong to approach closer because of torpedo risk. I slowed Hipper commander down on one occasion and approve of Lützow’s conduct during his battles.
5. It was necessary to keep the groups together, meaning the destroyers with the cruisers, as otherwise any control would have been lost. I only once managed to set the Eckholdt group on an immobilised destroyer [Bramble]. This task was taken on by Eckholdt single-handedly. He took quite some time with it. As he was about to connect he met an enemy cruiser group… It appears that he believed he had connected with Hipper whilst it was in fact English cruisers… This instantly highlights the difficulties which existed in recognising friends, enemies and types. What is more this was a very reliable, experienced and exceptionally efficient flotilla commander. It would therefore have been wrong to release the destroyers, as control would have been lost and it would have been virtually impossible to get back together…[138]
Kummetz had evidently heard of the message of 11.45 on the 31st despatched by Kapitänleutnant Herschelb of U354, and the interpretation of great success which had been put upon it by a German high command which, accordingly, had anticipated his confirmation of the destruction of the convoy with heady anticipation. While his explanation puts his point of view clearly, it is also apparent that he is becoming rattled and irritated by the impression that a witch-hunt is in progress higher up the chain of command concerning the unexpected lack of any positive results. He is also naturally concerned that if scapegoats are required, neither Kapitän zur See Stange (whom he loyally supports) nor himself, should be blamed for carrying out their instructions not to risk the heavy ships.
In a later report Kummetz stated candidly his opinion concerning the lack of results – ‘The operation’s objective could possibly have been achieved if the imposed commitments had been ignored. On the other hand this would always have involved high risks for the cruisers. A radio message, which I received whilst already at sea, placed particular emphasis on avoiding high risks.’[139]
Vice-Admiral Kummetz’s explanations were considered, logical and reasonable, but it is difficult to escape the conclusion drawn by Kapitän zur See Stange that this engagement had been a missed opportunity: ‘When our vessels leave the battle area it is with the uneasy feeling that, despite the overall situation, which seemed so favourable to begin with, we have not succeeded in getting close to the convoy, neither did we achieve any success at all.’[140]
New Year’s Eve at Wolfschanze (Wolf’s Lair), Hitler’s headquarters in the forest close to Rastenburg, East Prussia, was turning out to be an unexpectedly jovial occasion. As 1942 drew to a close it appeared that military operations had taken a significant turn for the worse, particularly on the eastern front where General von Paulus’ Sixth Army stood in danger of being surrounded at Stalingrad. Nevertheless, as the Führer greeted his guests he bubbled with excitement at the news that an Arctic convoy had been destroyed – a message had been received from a U-boat observing the battle, and he expected details imminently. Instructions were given to issue a grand announcement to the media on New Year’s Day.
As the evening wore on Hitler became increasingly edgy and constantly quizzed Admiral Krancke for news. Krancke in turn contacted Berlin, who contacted Gruppe Nord, who contacted Kluber in Narvik, who could get no reply from Vice-Admiral Kummetz as he steadfastly maintained radio silence until the battle group was safely out of harm’s way. Explanations were forwarded that bad weather had delayed the battle group’s arrival, the telex link from Norway to Berlin had broken, etc., but by the morning of 1 January Hitler’s mood had turned to fury. With impeccable timing, it was at this point that his information bureau brought him a transcript of a BBC news broadcast which claimed that units of the Royal Navy, escorting a convoy in the Barents Sea, had put to flight a superior German force on New Year’s Eve – the convoy having escaped unscathed. Hitler boiled over, condemning the German navy for not fighting the action through to a finish (despite his own strictures against taking risks), and declaring that the defeat spelt the end for the German High Seas Fleet. Capital ships, he raged, were a waste of men and matériel and served no purpose other than to tie up other much needed forces for their defence. In a towering fury he ordered Berlin to contact the battle group immediately and get news of what had happened. Despite this, by 17.00 on the 1st there was still no word (the telephone and telex links still not having been reestablished), and Hitler again sent for Admiral Krancke. Raging at the unfortunate admiral that the failure to produce a report was an affront to his person as the Führer of the Reich, Hitler declared: ‘I have made the following decision, and order you forthwith to inform the Admiralty that it is my unalterable resolve. The heavy ships are a needless drain on men and materials. They will accordingly be paid off and reduced to scrap. Their guns will be mounted on land for coastal defence.’[141]
In the face of this onslaught Admiral Krancke courageously attempted to dissuade the Führer, but Hitler was not to be placated and issued instructions for Grand Admiral Raeder to report to him immediately in person. Staff at the Admiralty in Berlin warned Raeder that trouble was brewing, and made an excuse that he was unwell and would be unable to travel to Wolfschanze for a day or two. Thus granted a few days’ respite Raeder was able to prepare himself for the conference, but the time was also used by his old sparring partner, Reichsmarschall Goering, to poison the atmosphere further by complaining to Hitler that Luftwaffe squadrons were being ‘wasted’ guarding the big ships, and reinforcing the notion that they should be scrapped. It is sometimes difficult to believe that Goering and Raeder were on the same side. It is even more difficult to believe that Hitler put up with Goering’s bluster for as long as he did.
The meeting between Grand Admiral Raeder and Hitler finally took place at Wolfschanze on the evening of 6 January 1943. Also present were Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of Staff Armed Forces High Command, and two stenographers. Without giving Raeder a chance to put his case, Hitler launched into a 1½-hour tirade against the German navy from its inception to the existing hostilities. Again ignoring the fact that it was his own reluctance to risk the capital ships which prevented them from being used more often, he complained that in the present situation ‘where all fighting power, all personnel, and all matériel must be brought into action, we cannot permit our large ships to ride idly at anchor for months’.[142] Forging on he repeated Goering’s belief that Luftwaffe squadrons were wasted protecting the big ships, and continued by displaying his total lack of understanding of naval warfare, declaring that ‘until now light naval forces have been doing most of the fighting. Whenever the larger ships put to sea, light forces have to accompany them. It is not the large ships which protect the small, but rather the reverse is true.’[143] Finally coming to the point Hitler reiterated his belief that the heavy ships should be paid off and scrapped, and instructed Raeder to prepare a memorandum covering the following points:
139
10 Ibid. It is possible that the ‘radio message’ which Vice-Admiral Kummetz mentions here is the three word morse message which German accounts refer to, but is more likely to be the message sent by Admiral Kluber at 11.45 and received by Vice-Admiral Kummetz at 12.55 (see p. 100).