1. Should the three aircraft carriers which were planned, be retained? Should other ships be converted into aircraft carriers? Are Hipper and Prinz Eugen, because of their great speed, more suited than Lützow or Scheer, which have a more extensive operating radius? If the latter were lengthened, could they develop greater speed and could they be given a larger landing deck?
2. Where would the heavy guns of these ships best be mounted on land?
3. In which order should the ships be decommissioned? Probably Gneisenau would be first, since she will not be ready for active duty until the end of 1944. Next would probably be the ships which are now due for overhauling and repairs. Personnel of these ships will remain with the navy.
9. Can the submarine programme be extended and speeded up if the large ships are eliminated?[144]
Enduring the tirade in more or less silence, the aristocratic Raeder believed that this had been an attempt to humiliate him personally, and accordingly ‘considered it beneath my dignity to refute his statements’.[145] The Grand Admiral now requested a private talk with Hitler, and Keitel and the stenographers left. Raeder was a sound strategist who, in the years leading up to 1939, had warned Hitler of the particular problems to be faced on entering military conflict with a naval power such as Britain. Following the outbreak of war he further warned Hitler against the military adventure into Russia, at least until Britain had been defeated. Now, however, he felt that it was time for the Führer and himself to part company, and offered his resignation as C-in-C of the Kriegsmarine. He was, after all, he said, almost sixty-seven years old and there were younger admirals, now with the necessary war experience, to take his place.
Hitler immediately began to back-pedal, insisting that he had not intended to criticise the navy as a whole, only the big ships. Furthermore Germany was sustaining heavy losses in Russia, and the Führer believed there was much criticism of him for dismissing too many generals. It would be highly embarrassing should Raeder now resign as well. Nevertheless, Raeder was adamant, but in order that no criticism should fall on Hitler personally, the admiral suggested that he be given an honorary title, indicating that he was still involved with the navy and that his decision to resign as C-in-C had been amicably agreed. Hitler reluctantly acceded to the request, and the date for Admiral Raeder’s stand down was set at 30 January 1943, the tenth anniversary of Hitler’s rise to power.[146] Hitler also requested the names of two officers who, in Raeder’s opinion, would be suitable successors. Raeder’s first choice was Admiral Rolf Karls, his second the C-in-C of the U-boat arm, Admiral Karl Doenitz. Hitler had always stressed the importance of the U-boat campaign, and so appointed Doenitz.
By 15 January Raeder, in conjunction with the naval general staff, had completed and handed in the lengthy memorandum required by Hitler, including what amounted to an ‘idiot’s guide’ to the necessity of retaining battleships and cruisers. The principle of the ‘Fleet in Being’ demanded that Britain keep substantial units of her fleet at Scapa Flow to cover Tirpitz and the other German capital ships, even if they did no more than swing at anchor in the Norwegian fjords. Raeder forcefully maintained that if, as a result of the Battle of the Barents Sea, the battleships and cruisers were scrapped, it would be the cheapest victory that the Royal Navy had ever won. Britain would interpret the scrapping of the ships as a sign of weakness, and of Germany’s complete ignorance of the immense importance of naval warfare. Britain, he maintained, whose entire warfare depended upon her dominance of the sea-lanes, would consider the war won if Germany destroyed its ships.[147] However his efforts were to no avail, and Hitler refused to change his mind.
His resignation becoming final, Raeder was given the title Admiral Inspector of the Navy but, as suggested by Raeder himself, this did not involve any further active role.
To welcome the Kriegsmarine’s new Commander-in-Chief to his post, on around 30 January Hitler presented Admiral Doenitz with a memorandum outlining his intentions for the German fleet:
1. All construction and conversion of heavy ships is to cease with immediate effect.
2. Battleships, pocket battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers to be paid off, except where they are required for training purposes.
3. The resultant dockyard capacity, workmen, seamen, and weapons (mainly anti-aircraft), rendered available to be applied to an intensification of U-boat repair and U-boat construction.[148]
Admiral Doenitz’s initial response was acceptance of this memorandum, particularly with regard to item 3, his specialist area.
As he was quickly to discover however, the crisis for the German navy went much deeper than the proposed scrapping of all its big ships. At this time serious consideration was being given to the idea that much, if not all, of the navy should be transferred to army command. Having just been appointed C-in-C of the navy Doenitz was naturally opposed to the notion, and at the Führer conference on sea power held at Wolfschanze on 8 February made a special plea for the U-boat branch, together with all ancillary surface vessels, to remain the province of the navy. Hitler promised to consider the proposal seriously, but indicated that he would need to have further discussions with Field Marshal Keitel before making a final decision.[149] At the same conference, Doenitz submitted his proposals for decommissioning the capital ships. The programme in essence maintained that Tirpitz, Lützow, and Nurnberg should remain operational in Norwegian waters until August 1943, plus Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen in the Baltic, following which they would be progressively decommissioned. Prinz Eugen, Scheer, Leipzig and Emden would have minimal repair and maintenance works carried out, to enable them to be used as training ships. Dates for decommissioning definitely proposed were:
Cruisers Admiral Hipper and Köln – 1 March 1943
Battleship Schleswig-Holstein – 1 April 1943
Battleship Schlesen – 1 May 1943
Battlecruiser Scharnhorst – 1 July 1943
Battleship Tirpitz – autumn 1943.[150]
This would release 250 officers, 92 of whom could transfer to the U-boat service, and 8000 petty officers and men, who would be dispersed to the U-boat service, coastal and flak batteries, and replacements for the remaining surface ships. It was estimated that 1300 dockyard workers would also become available for work on the smaller surface ships (destroyers etc.), and for U-boat repairs. Hitler approved the plan.
Having assisted with the drawing up of plans for what amounted to the destruction of the German navy, Admiral Doenitz began to have second thoughts. A submarine specialist through and through, he had a somewhat myopic view of sea power, but he was nobody’s fool, and on becoming Commander-in-Chief began to see the bigger picture and appreciate the value of the ‘Fleet in Being’. He was also (unlike Raeder) a political animal perfectly prepared to play power politics at the Nazi court. At this he proved to be extremely adept, successfully fending of the army’s attempts to take control of the navy. He also determined to try to save some of the capital ships, and at the next conference on sea power, at Vinnitsa on 26 February 1942, broached the matter with Hitler, skilfully opening the discussion by using one of the Führer’s complaints to support his case. The Führer, Doenitz maintained, had correctly decided that Germany could not afford to have her big ships lying idle. As a result Hipper, Leipzig and Köln had been decommissioned, to be followed shortly by further ships. Doenitz went on to explain that he considered the Allies’ Russia convoys to be excellent targets for the big ships, and considered it his duty, in view of the desperate fighting on the eastern front (comparing the eastern front to the efforts of the navy was another Hitler hobby horse), to exploit the possibilities to their fullest extent. The admiral therefore proposed to strengthen the naval forces in Norway by transferring Scharnhorst from the Baltic, which, combined with Tirpitz, Lützow and the destroyers already there, would make a powerful task force. Hitler was not to be easily persuaded however, and retorted that he was strongly opposed to any further operations by the surface ships. Since the sinking of Graf Spee one defeat had followed another. Large ships, he maintained, were a thing of the past, and he would prefer to have the steel and nickel contained in them than sanction their use again.[151]