Doenitz shifted his ground while still attempting to use Hitler’s arguments against him, maintaining that the big ships were severely hampered by the restrictions imposed that they must not be damaged or sacrificed. Hitler declared that he had never issued such an order (which was correct – he had, nevertheless, made his feelings clear on the subject many times, which in Nazi Germany amounted to the same thing as an order). Hitler went on to state that if in contact with the enemy, ships must go into action, but in any event he no longer valued their effectiveness. Mounting his hobby horse, he bemoaned the sacrifices made by the men on the eastern front while the strength of the Russians was constantly increased by the convoys, the most recent of which comprising twenty-five ships (JW53), had just reached its destination. Doenitz seized on this to press his case, declaring that instead of decommissioning Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, he considered it his duty to send them into action whenever possible for as long as suitable targets could be found.[152]
Hitler reluctantly agreed to despatch Scharnhorst to Norway and asked how long it would be before a suitable target could be found. Doenitz replied that he thought it would be within the next three months, to which Hitler taunted, ‘Even if it should require six months, you will then return and be forced to admit that I was right.’[153]
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
That the Battle of the Barents Sea had been a significant victory for the Royal Navy was recognised by both sides. For the Kriegsmarine, Vice-Admiral Weichert later commented that their lack of success had been ‘due to poor visibility and the problems inherent in a night action, but primarily the Germans were paralysed by the stringency of their operational orders’.[154]
Vice-Admiral Kummetz’s plan had been a good one and came close to being successful (had Force ‘R’ arrived any later, the problems for the defending destroyers would have been acute), but the German forces were indeed hamstrung by the crippling restrictions placed upon them, and also by the confusion of purpose, and perhaps consequent confusion of mind, which resulted from springing Operation Aurora on Kapitän zur See Stange and Lützow a matter of hours before engaging JW51B.
By contrast, Captain Sherbrooke, and subsequently Commander Kinloch, both had a clear grasp of their objective, which was in all cases the safety of the convoy. The tactics laid down by Captain Sherbrooke were aggressive and played upon the known caution displayed by commanders of German heavy ships when faced with torpedo attacks. The fate of the battleship Bismarck in 1941 undoubtedly underlined this caution. When in a position to make her escape to one of the French Atlantic ports, she suffered a hit to her rudder from a torpedo launched by a Swordfish aircraft. Unable to manoeuvre she was caught and sunk by units of the Home Fleet.
An essential element of Sherbrooke’s defence, and the one which as much as anything foiled Kummetz’s attack, was the refusal of the escort to be drawn away from the convoy. Despite facing a heavy cruiser and her consorts, Captain Sherbrooke split his own small force of four destroyers by despatching two back to the convoy as he could not pinpoint the whereabouts of the German destroyers, and feared that they might attack the merchantmen. At all times, therefore, and regardless of all difficulties, the safety of the convoy was the prime objective. Commander Kinloch displayed this same singleness of purpose on taking command from the wounded Sherbrooke, and as each attack by German forces was driven off, the British destroyers would fall back to cover the convoy. The contrast with the relative inaction of the German destroyers is stark, and mystified Commander Kinloch, who stated in his report: ‘The inactivity of the German destroyers is inexplicable. They made no attack on the convoy and in two engagements were following astern of their cruiser without taking any part.’[155]
Vice-Admiral Kummetz’s reasons for not giving them a more active role have some validity, but come firmly under the heading ‘playing safe’. That Kapitän zur See Stange held the same views was possibly even more damaging to the fortunes of the German operation. Napoleon had been a great believer in luck, and it was undoubtedly a significant piece of luck for the Allies that a snow squall should obscure the convoy at around 10.45, just as the Lützow squadron moved into position to attack. However, had Kapitän zur See Stange taken the opportunity to launch his destroyers at the merchantmen at that time they must have achieved significant success, as only two corvettes and the badly damaged Onslow were available to oppose them at the head of the convoy.
Unaware of the crisis that the battle had caused within the German navy, the Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, Admiral Tovey, nevertheless felt that it was a job well done, stating in a memorandum dated 25 January 1943:
The conduct of all officers and men of the escort and covering forces throughout this successful action against greatly superior forces was in accordance with the traditions of the service. That an enemy force of at least one pocket battleship, one heavy cruiser and six destroyers, with all the advantage of surprise and concentration, should be held off for four hours by five destroyers and driven from the area by two 6” cruisers, without any loss to the convoy, is most creditable and satisfactory.[156]
Underlining the fact that his handling of the close escort had not been an isolated piece of good luck, Captain Sherbrooke continued his career with the Royal Navy, subsequently achieving the rank of Rear-Admiral.