| Built: | Launched Devonport Naval Dockyard 12 July 1938 |
| Dimensions: | 230 ft 0 in (70.1 m) × 33 ft 6 in (10.2 m) × 7 ft 3 in (2.21 m) |
| Displacement: | 875 tons (889 tonnes) |
| Armament: | 2 × 4 in (101 mm) |
| 5 machine-guns | |
| Machinery: | 2 × 3-cylinder compound steam engines |
| Twin-screw | |
| 2 Admiralty 3-drum boilers | |
| 7150 IHP, giving 17 knots | |
| Complement: | 80 |
| Built: | Cochrane, 1936 |
| Dimensions: | 173 ft 3 in (52.8 m) × 28 ft 8 in (8.63 m) × 12 ft 6 in (3.81 m) |
| Gross Register Tonnage: | 655 |
| Machinery: | Triple expansion |
| 1100 IHP, giving 12.5 knots |
Britain’s economy between the wars depended on her vital trade routes with the empire, and her many other overseas trading partners, the Royal Navy’s mainstay for the defence of these trade routes being the cruiser. At the Washington conference of November 1921, pressure was applied to the British delegation, principally by the United States (whose strategic considerations were wholly different from those of Britain), to restrict the number of cruisers in commission. Britain refused but put forward a proposal – which was accepted – that cruisers should not exceed 10,000 tons, and mount guns 8 in (200 mm). The principal concern at this time was not the navy of Germany, but that of Japan, which had undergone major expansion and modernisation and threatened the balance of power in the Pacific.
At the Geneva conference of 1927, a further attempt to limit the potentially damaging naval arms race between the major powers disbanded without agreement, primarily due to Britain’s inability to accept restrictions on cruiser strength again proposed by the United States. January 1930 saw a third conference, this time in London, at which Britain finally allowed itself to be persuaded by the United States to accept a reduction in cruiser strength from seventy units to fifty, with a maximum new build programme of no more than 91,000 tons by December 1936. This reluctant agreement was in no small part brought about by the dire economic circumstances in which Britain and most of the industrialised nations of the world found themselves during the 1930s, nevertheless it was to have serious consequences for the outbreak of war in 1939, by which time the Royal Navy would have only sixty-two cruisers to carry out world wide-trade protection and fleet commitments.[183]
The Southampton class cruisers, (later known as Town class), were designed and built to counter the new cruisers of the Japanese navy, and much thought and debate went into the pros and cons of the 6 in (150 mm) gun against the larger 8 in (200 mm) option. The weight of the 6 in shell was, at 100 lb (45.3 kg), less than half that of the 8 in which tipped the scales at 250 lb (113.4 kg). To balance this, twelve 6 in could be mounted against eight 8 in, and a more rapid rate of fire achieved with the smaller gun, giving the 6 in cruiser a superiority in weight of broadside of nearly three to one – 7200 lb (3266 kg) per minute, against the 2500 lb (1481 kg) of its bigger-gunned rival.[184] Despite these advantages the smaller gun could be outranged, requiring the 6 in cruiser to close the enemy as rapidly as possible while having improved armour protection to withstand hits while it manoeuvred into a firing position. Inevitably, higher speed and heavier armour are impossible to equate on a restricted budget, therefore the Southamptons were provided with heavier armour and their speed held at 32 knots.[185] An engagement at night or in poor visibility (dependent upon the efficiency or otherwise of the protagonists’ radar equipment) was expected to favour the smaller-gunned ship. The Battle of the Barents Sea falls nicely into this scenario, as Sheffield and Jamaica were able to close on the larger-gunned Admiral Hipper and open fire from comparatively short range.
Sheffield had the distinction of being only the second Royal Navy warship to be equipped with the fledgling radar (or ‘radio location’ as it was initially known), being fitted with the Type 79 RDF in November 1938. The first vessel so equipped was the battleship Rodney in August of that year.
Sheffield had a busy war, and a career which amply illustrates the dual cruiser roles of keeping open Britain’s supply routes, plus fleet duties. On 7 April 1940 she accompanied a Home Fleet battle group sent north for the abortive Norwegian campaign, and later that year was transferred to Admiral Sir James Somerville’s Force ‘H’ stationed at Gibraltar. Here she took part in a complicated series of operations designated Hats, Coat and Collar, which aimed at reinforcing Admiral Cunningham’s fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, while passing merchant ships through to supply Malta. As already noted (see Appendix I), Sheffield accompanied the Excess convoy on the western Mediterranean leg of its trip from Gibraltar to Malta and Greece in early January 1941.
In May 1941 Bismarck broke out into the Atlantic, and Force ‘H’, including the carrier Ark Royal, was ordered north from Gibraltar to strengthen the escort of a convoy of five troopships bound for the Middle East. Subsequently brought directly into the hunt, Admiral Somerville detached Sheffield to shadow Bismarck, and ordered Ark Royal to prepare and launch an air strike. Unfortunately the Fleet Air Arm pilots were not notified that Sheffield would be in the same area as their target, and attacked the British cruiser. Luckily for Sheffield the aircraft used torpedoes fitted with new magnetic detonators, which proved faulty. Of the eleven torpedoes launched, six exploded on impact with the water, and the cruiser managed to dodge the remainder. Ironically this potentially catastrophic case of mistaken identity may have been a blessing in disguise. The torpedo detonators were changed to the old contact type for Ark Royal’s next attack, which damaged Bismarck enough for a Home Fleet battle group to catch and sink her.
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10 Watts, Anthony J. (1999)