PQ17 first made contact with enemy forces on 1 July, when escorting destroyers attacked two German U-boats which were discovered on the surface. The U-boats dived unharmed but later that day a reconnaissance aircraft circled the convoy, followed by the first of a number of aircraft attacks, which continued for several days. Losses were suffered but for the most part these attacks were successfully beaten off.
Putting Rosselsprung into action, Raeder ordered Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper north from Trondheim, and Admiral Scheer and Lützow north from Narvik, all bound for Altenfjord. Lützow grounded, but Tirpitz, Hipper, and Scheer arrived at their destination on 3 July; on that afternoon British aircraft reconnaissance reported Tirpitz and Hipper missing from Trondheim.
On receiving this report, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound became concerned that Tirpitz was out and heading for PQ17; his apprehension mounted during the ensuing hours as no confirmation of Tirpitz’s whereabouts was received. As the hours passed Ultra[13] decrypts of German radio traffic pointed towards a concentration of heavy ships, probably including Tirpitz, at Altenfjord, but gave no indication that a battle group was at sea bound for the convoy; nor did the standard warnings to U-boats in the area materialise, advising them to be on the lookout for approaching friendly surface units. Despite the lack of supporting evidence, Admiral Pound’s conviction grew that Tirpitz was on her way to intercept PQ17 and, by-passing Admiral Tovey (who was at sea with the Home Fleet distant covering force), despatched three signals direct to the convoy escort which would have disastrous results. The first of these reached Rear-Admiral Hamilton, in command of the accompanying cruiser squadron, at approximately 21.20 on 4 July and read: ‘Most Immediate. Cruiser force to withdraw westward at high speed. (2111B/4).’
This first message, despatched as a result of reported U-boat activity in the area, was followed in quick succession by two further urgent transmissions, the first arriving with Rear-Admiral Hamilton at approximately 22.00: ‘Immediate. Owing to threat from surface ships, convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports. (2123B/4).’ And finally: ‘Most immediate. My 2123/4, convoy is to scatter. (2136/4).[14]
Rear-Admiral Hamilton’s understanding (and that of the other senior officers of the escort) was that a ‘convoy is to scatter’ signal would only be sent if the Admiralty had definite information that an attack by powerful surface ships was imminent. As a consequence he expected to see Tirpitz and a battle group steaming over the horizon at any moment. The ‘scatter’ signal was passed to the convoy at 22.15, followed by much disbelief, repeats and confirmations. Finally the port columns of merchant ships peeled slowly off to the left, starboard columns to the right, while the centre columns carried straight on.
Rear-Admiral Hamilton ordered the destroyer escort to close on his cruisers and at 22.30 the combined force turned westward, steering to pass south of the dispersing merchant ships (i.e. between the merchantmen and the supposed German surface units). As ordered, the remainder of the close escort also ‘scattered’, leaving the merchantmen to their fate. Only one of the escorts continued to offer any protection, the trawler Ayreshire succeeding in shepherding three freighters as far as Novaya Zemlya by 10 July.
His orders being unequivocal, Hamilton kept on westward at 25 knots, keeping the destroyers with him, reasoning that when the convoy scattered the enemy would attack it with U-boats and aircraft, and send their surface units after him. This being the case, he might be able to draw them onto Victorious’s aircraft and possibly the Home Fleet battle group itself.[15]
In the Barents Sea the situation in which the defenceless merchant ships found themselves quickly descended into tragedy. On 5 July six vessels were sunk by air attack and six torpedoed by U-boats. One ship was bombed on the 6th, and between the evening of the 6th and the early morning of the 8th four more were torpedoed. Two more were sunk on the night of the 9th/10th.[16]
As for Tirpitz, Hitler’s permission to launch an attack by the battle group was finally obtained on the forenoon of 5 July, and the executive order to proceed to sea given at 11.37, by which time Hamilton’s cruiser force was known to be heading westward, and Admiral Tovey’s covering force to be some 450 miles (832 km) from the convoy and the North Cape alike. During the day German intelligence intercepted messages from Allied ships from which it was calculated that Admiral Tovey’s battle group would be able to close sufficiently to launch an air attack by 01.00 on the 6th. As reports of the many sinkings by U-boat and air attack came through, it became apparent that sending the battle group after the stragglers was simply not worth the risk. Consequently at 21.32 on the 5th Tirpitz and her consorts were ordered to abandon the operation and twenty minutes later altered course for Altenfjord.[17] The German battleship had delivered a major victory without having fired a shot.
The final tally was thirteen ships destroyed by air attack, and ten sunk by submarines, for the loss of six German aircraft. Quite apart from the priceless loss of life (153 merchant seamen lost their lives), the Red Army was deprived of 430 tanks, 210 aircraft and 3350 vehicles,[18] equivalent to the destruction which might be expected from a major land battle.
The tactical problem of fighting a convoy through against a powerful surface battle group plus U-boats and aircraft was a difficult one. The standard tactic for defence of a convoy against powerful surface units was to scatter, but for fighting off U-boat or aircraft attack the best defence was to remain together. As I have mentioned, Admiral Tovey was not in agreement with the ‘scatter’ approach even in the event of attack by Tirpitz. One reason may be the belief held by some that the Barents Sea gave too little room for the effective dispersal of a large convoy. Had the convoy not scattered, Tirpitz and consorts would certainly have attacked, no doubt causing substantial losses. Probably the only safe, but temporary, alternative at the time Tirpitz was discovered to have left her home port was to reverse the convoy’s course and await developments, perhaps trying to draw the German surface units after the merchant ships onto Victorious’s aircraft or the Home Fleet battle group – much as Rear-Admiral Hamilton had hoped to do with his cruisers. However, given Hitler’s paranoia concerning damage to his heavy ships (a factor unknown to the Allies), it is doubtful that he would have sanctioned a chase far enough to the west for this to have been possible – and at some point the convoy had to be fought through, one way or another. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound found himself confronted by several extremely difficult options, but it is reasonable to suggest that instead of issuing peremptory orders he might have been better advised to keep Tovey and Hamilton apprised of precisely what was known of enemy surface ship movements, and leave decisions on the best course of action to the officers on the spot. Rear-Admiral Hamilton alone knew the prevailing weather conditions, which during the course of the voyage varied from very good visibility to thick fog, flat calm to full gale, and was in the best position to evaluate the prospects for evasion or defence. It has been suggested that a contributing factor to Sir Dudley Pound’s decision may have been the inclusion of US Navy ships with the escort, and the repercussions which might ensue should one or more of them be sunk while under British command. This may have been a factor, but what must be said is that those who have never had to hold such a post at such a time, can only guess at the pressure and stress which must be endured.
13
12 The name given to decodes of German radio traffic, sent by operators using the Enigma coding machine. Believed by the Germans to be unbreakable, but cracked by British codebreakers at Bletchley Park. The German