Pressure and stress were also getting to the political leadership. Winston Churchill now had to try to explain the loss of so much valuable matériel to Stalin, against a background of complicated and mistrustful relations with the Soviet Union. Despite pacts and public reassurances of mutual support by and between the three principal allies in the European war, Churchill and Roosevelt feared that if Russia’s horrendous losses continued to mount Stalin might conclude a separate peace with Hitler. At the same time Stalin entertained suspicions that Britain and the United States might change sides and join Germany’s war against Russia; there being, after all, no enthusiasm for Bolshevism whatsoever in the governments of the Western democracies.
Churchill tried to soften the twin blows of the fate of PQ17 and the resultant cancellation of the next summer convoy, PQ18, by alluding to the build-up of troops for a second front (for which Stalin had long been pressing). Stalin, however, had German armies racing across his country and was in no mood to be mollified.
To escape the advancing Germans, most Soviet government departments were sent eastwards to Kuibyshev. Stalin, however, remained in Moscow, which was where Winston Churchill visited him in August. Churchill was subjected to another lambasting over PQ17 and made acutely aware of the seriousness of the military position. On his return to London the British prime minister, convinced that a convoy should be pushed through to Murmansk in September to maintain vital Anglo-Russian cooperation, notified the Admiralty that despite their sound military reasoning against a further summer enterprise, a convoy and escort should be assembled and despatched at the earliest possible opportunity.
PQ18 sailed from Loch Ewe on 2 September 1942, and consisted of thirty-nine merchant ships joined by a further six in Iceland. Escorting this convoy, something of an armada had been assembled by the Admiralty. By drawing warships away from other duties a Home Fleet battle group comprising two battleships, a cruiser and four destroyers maintained position to the north-west of Jan Mayen Island, while from Western Approaches Command six destroyers and five trawlers accompanied the convoy as far as Iceland. Taking the convoy on to Murmansk the close escort comprised two anti-aircraft ships, two destroyers, four corvettes, three minesweepers and four trawlers. An additional fighting destroyer escort of sixteen ships plus a light cruiser joined two days out from Iceland, and for the first time an escort aircraft carrier accompanied an Arctic convoy into the Barents Sea, itself escorted by two further destroyers. Also in the area were three cruisers supporting homebound convoy QP14, and two cruisers and a destroyer operating a regular relief trip for the garrison at Spitzbergen. Covering the convoy’s southern flank and on the lookout for German surface units operating from northern Norway were up to ten submarines. Determined to keep tight control of the situation and in close touch with the Admiralty to avoid any chance of a repetition of the PQ17 débâcle, Admiral Tovey remained at Scapa Flow while his Home Fleet second-in-command, Vice-Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, took command at sea.
Those in the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe who should have put two and two together appear not to have realised that their success against PQ17 had been the result of an unintentional combined operation between surface ships, U-boats and aircraft. The consequence of this, and Hitler’s reluctance to commit his big ships, was that attacks on PQ18 were left to U-boats and the Luftwaffe. Commencing on 13 September and lasting nine days, a stream of ferocious attacks was launched against the convoy. Thirteen of the forty-five merchant ships were lost, at a cost to the Luftwaffe of forty-one aircraft, and three priceless U-boats to the Kriegsmarine. Following the PQ17 débâcle, fighting thirty-two ships through was a considerable relief to the Allies, but the loss of thirteen was a substantial price to pay; and the huge escort required put a severe strain on the Royal Navy, particularly in the number of destroyers required. Also caught up in the attacks, the homeward-bound convoy QP14 lost three merchant ships out of fifteen, plus a destroyer, a minesweeper, and an oiler.
Almost from the moment Germany invaded Russia, Stalin had pressed for a second front in Europe. This proved impractical in the early stages, but Churchill and Roosevelt did agree on Operation Torch, an Anglo-American landing in North Africa. Torch drew all available escorts from convoy and other duties, and warship cover for the Atlantic convoys was so weakened that losses increased sharply. Churchill again faced the prospect of having to advise Stalin that convoys to Russia would have to be cancelled, in all probability until January 1943.
He attempted to obtain escort reinforcement in the shape of twelve US destroyers, but Roosevelt had to decline owing to the requirements of Torch and other commitments. The Admiralty also hoped that ships might be obtained from the Mediterranean to escort a Russia convoy, but instead of giving them up, Admiral Cunningham, C-in-C Mediterranean, asked for more. The problem was outlined by the Admiralty in a minute to the Prime Minister dated 22 November 1942, which stated essentially that:
• The situation in the North Atlantic is severe and cannot be allowed to continue. The Minister of War Transport fears that if convoys continue to be knocked about in the Atlantic as at present the signs are that merchant seamen may refuse to sail.
• Long-range aircraft for the Atlantic have been approved but it will be some time before they are operational, also weather conditions greatly reduce the number of days on which they can operate.
• Proposals made to the United States and Canada to temporarily augment escorts over the western portion [of the Atlantic] mid-voyage have been agreed, although this weakens their escorts on the run west of Newfoundland and would have to be cancelled if U-boats return in strength.
• To deal with the eastern portion of the mid voyage [not covered by air support], we must provide two reinforcing groups. One can be scraped together from ships returning from ‘Torch’, and it may be possible to obtain US agreement to releasing British ships working on the convoy route from Guantanamo to New York.