Combat support is not the only area where Soviet thinking has changed very slowly. The Soviet incorporation of novel technologies is another example. Helicopters add considerably to the combat power of land forces. They are useful for scouting, the transport of raiding parties, rapid resupply of forward units, and antitank fighting. The Soviets have recognized the usefulness of helicopters, especially after the experience of Afghanistan. Yet they have been slow to integrate helicopters into their tank and motor rifle divisions. Divisions are supposed to have a helicopter unit, but over the past few years, the Soviets have been tending to pull the helicopters out of divisions and consolidate them in special helicopter units at the call of army and front commanders. Undoubtedly, army and front commanders can put helicopters to good use, but so can divisional commanders. A divisional helicopter reconnaissance unit can fulfill a vital role in a fast-paced battle. The Soviets still rely on ground vehicles for this role, whereas their American counterparts have an extensive assortment of helicopters, which is much more effective.
To some extent, these shortcomings are not purely an issue of doctrine. The Soviets have real economic constraints on the type and quantity of equipment they can incorporate into their divisions. When you have two hundred ten divisions, even a small program such as adding another two dozen recovery vehicles to the divisional tables of equipment becomes a major, and expensive, program. The Soviets would probably like to add squadrons of helicopters to their divisions. But building up an inventory of helicopters large enough to satisfy the requirements of a large force structure takes years to accomplish. For example, at the current rate of acquisition, it takes the Soviet Union more than two decades to replace all of its tanks with new models. Any major change in doctrine that requires the adoption of new equipment takes decades to accomplish, even given the prodigious production rate of the USSR's massive military industries. The Soviets may excel in novel tactical concepts, but it is often difficult to translate these into practice due to the sheer size of the Soviet military establishment.
The operational plan depicted in the fictional scenario illustrates current tendencies in Soviet operational planning. Needless to say, the Soviets don't publish their actual plans for operations in Central Europe. But careful reading of open-source Soviet military literature can provide a close approximation of Soviet plans. The scenario is based on an unclassified study prepared by the U.S. Army's Soviet Army Studies Office, based on open Soviet sources.[7]
The plan depends on mass and speed to overcome the NATO defenses. Students of World War II military history will not find it terribly different from campaigns of 1944-45, even though the tools of the trade have changed in fifty years. An important ingredient in the plan is an attempt to mask Soviet formations, so that opposing NATO forces are uncertain of how large a force they face, and where it is concentrated.
The Soviets' plan would be to concentrate three or more divisions against a single NATO division. Once a breach in the NATO defenses is secured, a mobile force would be inserted into the breach to exploit it before NATO could react. Soviet operational plans stress the use of fire and maneuver. Artillery, air attacks, and direct mechanized attack shatter the defender with fire. Once the fire has sufficiently weakened the opponent, or should the opponent leave a position weakly defended, the highly mechanized Soviet forces would use their mobility to pour into the breach. Fire acts to shatter the enemy where he is; maneuver aims to exploit the points where the enemy no longer is, or no longer is strong.
Modern defensive doctrine aims to minimize the damage caused by the breach by having mobile forces available to counterattack the rupture. The Soviet forces must not only be able to defeat the initial forward defenses of NATO, but to shatter any defenses erected behind the initial defensive positions.
For this reason, the Soviets place great stress on forces used to exploit the breach and fend off counterattacks. In recent years, this type of force has come to be called an operational maneuver group, or OMG. The OMGs are not a specific type of unit, such as a tank division or motor rifle regiment. Rather, they are forces used for the exploitation role at different levels of tactical combat. For example, when a Soviet motor rifle division confronts a NATO unit, it might use an independent tank regiment as its maneuver force. In the case of an army, the OMG might be a tank division or an independent tank regiment reinforced with other units. At the level of a front, the OMG might be a formation tailored to front exploitation, like one of the new Unified Army Corps.
In the era of glasnost and perestroika, Plan Buran may seem to some readers to be a throwback to the neolithic age of the cold war.[8]
Surely, Soviet pronouncements of a new defensive doctrine have heralded an end to the sort of offensive operational planning illustrated by Plan Buran?
At the time this book was written, the effects of perestroika have been very modest. The Soviets have indeed proclaimed an interest in a new defensive doctrine. However, the Soviets have publicly announced a defensive doctrine for decades, while the Soviet military has continued basing its strategy and operational art around offensive operational planning and tactics. "Defensive doctrine" seems to be a case of political semantics, not military policy.
Soviet claims about a defensive restructuring lack credibility because the Soviets have not provided any evidence of what type of actions they are undertaking under the rubric of perestroika. For example, they have not provided copies of current staff training, showing a new defensive orientation compared to past training. They have provided no indications that they plan to trim back the production of weapons such as tanks and self-propelled artillery. There is no evidence that the tank and motor rifle divisions are being reorganized to make them more "defensive."
There have been cosmetic changes, which sometimes can create a false impression of real change. The Soviets' pathological obsession with military secrecy appears to be slowly easing.
7
This scenario is heavily based on the study "The Soviet Conduct of War," prepared by the Soviet Army Studies Office of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, in March 1987. The study's principal author is Col. David Glantz.
8