The average Soviet infantry squad differs in many respects from NATO infantry, especially from American infantry. The Soviet Army is a conscript force, not a volunteer force like the U.S. Army. But many NATO armies also use the draft, notably the West Germans. The differences are due to other reasons.
To begin with, the Soviet Army is the last of the great European imperial armies. It is made up of many nationalities, speaking many languages. There are well over a hundred different nationalities in the USSR, and more than a dozen major language groups. The Soviet Union is far more diverse than most other countries. Portions of the country, such as the Baltic republics and parts of European Russia, are not that different from Central Europe. Other areas, such as Azerbaijan or Turkestan, have more in common with Iran or Pakistan than with Europe. And in the Far East, the nomadic peoples of Siberia share kinship with the goatherders of Mongolia or the Eskimos of Alaska. The training and recruitment policies of the Soviet Army have more in common with the other old imperial armies, such as that of the Austro-Hungarian Army of World War I. Imagine, for a moment, if the United States conquered Mexico and Canada, and drafted Mexicans and French Canadians in large numbers into the army. This does not even begin to compare to the Soviet predicament, since the recruits speak dozens of alien languages.
Ironically, the Tsarist army did not have the recruitment problems faced by the modern Soviet Army. The Tsarist army recruited mainly from the major Slavic ethnic groups: the Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Byelorussians, which make up about 70 percent of the population. They didn't bother to recruit heavily from the Muslim peoples of Central Asia, nor from the nomadic tribes of the Far East. The languages spoken by the Ukrainians and Byelorussians are not identical to Russian, but they share the same roots. The other Slavic groups were culturally similar to the Russians. Most belonged to the Orthodox church, and most came from similar peasant backgrounds.
The Soviet Union has a different rationale for military recruitment. To begin with, it no longer has the luxury of exempting the ethnic minorities from military service. The large size of the Soviet armed forces demands a large annual intake of new recruits. But also, the Soviets view military service as a national duty, in the broad sense of the term. Army duty is intended to homogenize this polyglot and diverse country. Recruits are forced to use Russian. They are subjected to vigorous political indoctrination. And they learn very quickly who is boss in the USSR.
In spite of all the efforts at Russification, and education and political indoctrination in secondary schools, many recruits are barely literate in Russian. Many are barely literate in any language. And there are substantial cultural differences. Muslims now make up more than 25 percent of the annual intake of draftees, and the percentage is rising. The Soviet Army accepts its role in Russification to a point. It is not organizationally prepared for extensive language training. Recruits least able to get along in Russian are siphoned off into paramilitary construction battalions, since the army combat branches really don't want to bother with them.
There is a distinct pecking order among the five arms of the Soviet armed forces. Highest priority goes to the Strategic Missile Force, which controls Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. Draftees are expected to be fluent in Russian. This is not the only criterion. The Strategic Missile Force also favors draftees with clean political records, since loyalty to the Soviet state is viewed as essential to this most sensitive service. The Strategic Missile Force tends to recruit out of the Slavic regions. Minorities are least common in this branch. Three other services are also technically demanding: the Air Defense Force, the Navy, and the Air Force. These forces also have a certain amount of priority in the recruitment of technically adept young men, and they also favor Slavs.
The Ground Forces, the largest element of the Soviet armed forces, tends to receive the highest number of recruits. On average, they are of mediocre quality compared to the other services. The reasons are quite simple. It is the assumption of the military leadership that motor rifle troops, and to a lesser extent tank, artillery, and other specialized troops, need not be as able as the troops going to the other more intellectually demanding services. Soviet Ground Forces training and weapon design are based on the assumption that the enlisted troops in its units will not be capable of sophisticated training or sophisticated maintenance. There is an old saying: "If a weapon is stupid, and it works, it isn't stupid." Soviet weapons have to be simple enough to be handled by troops who do not speak the native language of Russia, and whose grasp of technology may be closer to the seventeenth century than the twentieth century.
Recruitment and training are helped along by the pervasive militarization of Soviet society. The average Soviet citizen has more knowledge of the military than his American, or even European, counterpart. As Soviet children pass through the school system, they are encouraged to join state-sponsored youth groups. The state youth groups somewhat resemble Western organizations such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, but with a heavier dose of political indoctrination. At the age of nine, youth can join the "Young Pioneers, which tries to instill a sense of pride in the Soviet armed forces through films, comic books, and lectures. Heroic tales of the Great Patriotic War are a staple of this indoctrination. Memorialization of Russian sacrifices during the war is another example of the ties that are formed between youth groups and the military. Young Pioneers are selected to perform honorary guard duty at local war memorials, each youth in uniform and armed with an (unloaded) assault rifle. Although much of this can be dismissed as ordinary patriotic education, aspects of Young Pioneer activities are blatantly military. Summer youth camps frequently include junior league war games, in which the young boys are allowed to play alongside armored troop carriers, and inspect standard Soviet weapons.
The militarization of Soviet society is also rooted in the considerable pride that the country takes in its performance in World War n. The Communist party likes to boast about its considerable achievements in the economy, education, and health care. These boasts ring hollow in the ears of most Soviet citizens facing the daily reality of food and medical shortages. However, few will deny the accomplishments of the military, especially during the war. Military affairs is the only aspect of modern Soviet society where the USSR stands as an equal with the West.
At the age of fourteen, when teenagers are likely to enter secondary school, they can transition to the Komsomol. Like the Young Pioneers, the Komsomol has its paramilitary aspects; there are war games at summer camp, and heavy doses of political and promilitary propaganda. But Komsomol is more than a youth group. It is the first step toward Communist party membership, which is encouraged by school and community leaders for the most able students, gifted sportsmen, musicians, and other student leaders. Komsomol membership helps at recruitment time; members are more likely to be chosen for prestige services, for officer or NCO school, or for plum assignments. Komsomol membership is a sign of loyalty to the regime. Ambitious students flock to the Komsomol naturally; less enthusiastic students are subjected to a bit of societal pressure by school and community leaders. A teenager such as the fictional Demchenko is unlikely to be a Komsomol member because of his family background, but his commander, Lieutenant Bobrov, almost certainly would be in the Komsomol. The majority of young Soviet officers also belong to the organization.