The scenario depicted here presents the fictional Soviet squads with a straightforward objective. This is a "best-case" scenario. The Soviets considerably outnumber the Germans, and by sheer mass and firepower, they overcome the enemy. The young assistant squad leader is a competent individual with a certain amount of initiative. His troops perform well in their first battle in spite of their lack of experience. They run low on ammunition, but have enough to accomplish their task.
But this scenario could have been written in a very different fashion. Suppose the Germans had used light machine guns instead of assault rifles. How would a standard Soviet infantry attack hold up against that? Soviet training does not include realistic interplay between attackers and defenders. The standard training presumes that the infantry attack overruns the enemy positions without preparing the squad leaders for the possibility that they will endure such high losses that the mission will fail.
The configuration of Soviet infantry teams is also a bit odd. For example, the inclusion of a sniper in each platoon is curious. The sniper is a lingering aftereffect of Soviet experiences in World War II. The bulk of Soviet combat actions in this war were defensive, static holding actions. Snipers played an important role, since Soviet rifle training was often inadequate. The Soviets favored massed fire from submachine guns, which had considerable shock value and didn't require much marksmanship. This mentality still prevails. At long ranges, during static defensive operations, the snipers could provide much needed long-range firepower. But on a mechanized battlefield, it is hard to see how a sniper will fit in. The SVD sniper rifle does not have the rate of fire of the assault rifle, and the sniper seldom has a specialized role in assault tactics. The size of Soviet rifle squads continues to diminish, and the sniper seems to add less firepower to the platoon than an ordinary rifleman in many tactical settings.
Other Soviet infantry equipment is also curious. One of the most awkward examples is the matter of fire support from the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle. The BMP-2 is extremely low to the ground, so low, in fact, that the gun is not much higher than the height of an average soldier. This means there is a considerable risk that troops advancing in front of the BMP-2 can be hit by friendly fire unless the gunner is extremely careful; this was suggested in the unfortunate fate of Sergeant Yermakov's squad in the fictional account. This problem has led to peculiar Soviet infantry tactics that stress keeping open an avenue of fire for the BMP-2. This works well on training grounds where the targets can be carefully positioned, but on a fluid battlefield, this is likely to be a significant hindrance. Ironically, the American equivalent of the BMP, the M2 Bradley IFV, has been roundly criticized in the U.S. press for being too high! The press has never bothered to consider the effects of having an infantry vehicle with a gun positioned so low that it threatens its own dismounted troops.
The Afghanistan experience has forced Soviet tacticians out of their complacency. The Soviet Ground Forces are now beginning to examine what changes will be necessary to correct deficiencies found in the fighting. There has been considerable criticism of the fact that units, which passed their peacetime training exercises with flying colors, performed miserably in combat. There have been two tentative steps in reform over the past few years — more realistic training and more capable NCOs. The Soviets are experimenting with a less rigid and predictable training syllabus in an attempt to make training more realistic. It is unclear if these attempts can overcome deeply ingrained traits of Soviet military culture.
The current system has been configured over the years to favor a sort of "grade inflation." There is little risk that a unit will feil its major tests unless the squad, platoon, company, or battalion commanders are monumentally incompetent. Scoring is predicated on the assumption that the majority of units should pass. This complacent attitude to training is probably most strongly rooted in the desire of the officers to avoid embarrassing failures.
The Soviet military officer class is much like the rest of Soviet society. It is a bureaucratic institution, with a rigidly equalitarian frame of mind. There is little attempt to foster a competitive spirit among officers. The military culture fosters an amiable degree of complacent mediocrity. Difficult training tests for the troops carry the risk that an officer's performance will be called into question. It is more comfortable for all concerned to have a lax training norm so that most units will pass. War seems unlikely, so peacetime garrison duty may as well not be career threatening. This kind of corruption and decay is common in many peacetime armies. But it was found to be deeply wanting in Afghanistan.
Many of the new-generation Soviet Army leaders, such as Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and Marshal Dmitri \azov, have decried these tendencies. Yazov made his reputation within the Ground Forces by introducing novel training techniques. Ogarkov made his reputation by insisting that the Soviet Army try to match the qualitative advantages of NATO. It has yet to be seen whether the criticisms of sloppy training that have become commonplace in Soviet military journals will actually result in fundamental changes in the nature of Soviet garrison life.
The same applies to the matter of improved sergeants. The real problem with the existing system is that sergeants remain in the Soviet armed forces for too short a period to develop any expertise. Unless the army plans to introduce radical reforms in matters such as pay and family support for NCOs, it is doubtful that the exhortations about improving NCO training will matter that much. The Soviet Army has begun tentative steps to address the problem through a program of warrant officers (praporshchik). But this is halfhearted at best, and not radical enough to provide sufficient qualified combat leaders. The creation of a large, skilled NCO class is unlikely for a variety of reasons. It would require a major infusion of rubles to pay for new base housing for professional NCOs and their families. It would place a large drain on the state defense budget, since it would require a major increase in pay for the professional NCOs. And it would deprive the civilian work force of a significant body of able men with leadership abilities.
So long as the Soviet armed forces maintain their bloated force structure, it will be difficult to enact substantial reforms of the command structure. The current effort appears to be aimed at giving sergeants greater responsibility and autonomy, but without a commensurate increase in pay or other inducements. It is the cheap approach to reform, expecting productivity growth without capital investment. And its chances for success are very limited.