The issues of infantry squad command are typical of the quality-versus-quantity debate in the Soviet Army, which tends to favor quantity over quality as compared to NATO armies. Even though squad for squad, the Soviet forces may be somewhat inferior, two or three Soviet squads will confront every single NATO squad.
This dilemma of quantity versus quality also affects infantry mechanization. The fictional account of the skirmish of Demchenko's platoon was a best-case scenario with a well-equipped unit. Not all Soviet motor rifle units are lucky enough to be equipped with the BMP-2 Yozh. The majority of units are equipped with the older BMP-1, or with wheeled infantry transporters such as the BTR-60, BTR-70, or BTR-80.
The BMP-1 has nearly the same chassis as the BMP-2, but has a different turret and one or two more squad members. The BMP-1 Korshun turret uses a 73 mm low-pressure gun instead of the 30mm autocannon of the BMP-2. This is a peculiar hybrid system, designed mainly to fight tanks. These days, however, the warhead is too small to be very effective against tanks. The real problem is that the system has a very poor effective range (700 meters), less than a common
NATO antitank missile such as the Milan, which is effective to about 1,500 meters. In the scenario, the BMP-2s were able to sit back, beyond Milan range, and provide fire support, since their 30mm autocannons were effective to about 2,000 meters in this role. In the case of the BMP-1, that would be impossible. The BMP-1s would have the option of either staying in the rear and not providing fire support, or moving forward behind the infantry and risking destruction by enemy antitank missiles.
The other disadvantage of the BMP-1 is the placement of the squad commander. In the BMP-2, the commander is in the turret next to the gunner. He has access to the powerful sighting equipment in the turret and so he can obtain a very good picture of the battlefield confronting his troops. In the BMP-1, the commander sits in the alleyway behind the driver. He has a simple periscopic sight, and does not have the field of view of a squad leader in a BMP-2. When the squad dismounts, the squad leader is apt to be less prepared than is the case with the BMP-2 squad. These problems stem from the fact that the BMP-1 was designed to fight on a different battlefield than the conventional battlefield depicted in the scenario. The BMP-1 was designed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when Soviet doctrine presumed that tactical nuclear weapons would be used. It was assumed that infantry would have to fight on radioactively contaminated battlefields, mounted inside the vehicle. This was also in the days before the advent of highly accurate wire antitank guided missiles (ATGMs). It didn't matter that the gun could not outrange ATGMs, because they weren't very common, and it was expected that the infantry would be fighting from inside the vehicle anyway.
In the 1970s, it became apparent that the war might take place under purely conventional conditions. Under these circumstances and in the presence of ATGMs, mounted attack became very risky. Soviet tactical doctrine suggests that in the presence of ATGMs, as in the scenario here, the attack be conducted with the infantry dismounted and fighting on foot. The squad would attack from a mounted position only if the enemy was disorganized or not equipped with antitank weapons.
In spite of its limitations, the BMP-1 is superior to the other alternative, the wheeled armored infantry transporters. The BTRs are all very similar in appearance. They have eight wheels and a sharply angled hull. The wheeled suspension gives them better mobility on roads than BMPs, and they are a good deal faster. They are also less complicated than BMPs and are easy to maintain. But they have many drawbacks. They are more poorly armed than BMPs: Their only armament is a 14.5mm heavy machine gun, which is less destructive than either the 30mm autocannon or the 73 mm gun of the BMPs. They are more lightly armored. In Afghanistan, the mujihadeen found that they were vulnerable to close-range heavy machine gun fire against certain parts of the side. They are less mobile in rough country. They tend to get bogged down in deep mud or snow, and have a harder time traversing obstacles than tracked vehicles.
The older vehicles, like BTR-60PBs, were gasoline powered, which made them especially vulnerable to fires. Gasoline propulsion for combat vehicles is a bad idea. Once the fuel starts to burn, there is little chance to save the vehicle. Afghanistan is littered with their burned-out hulls. The BTR-60 was nicknamed the "wheeled coffin" by Soviet troops. The BTR-70 went to diesel fuel, but retained the peculiar two-engine configuration of the BTR-60, which causes a lot of maintenance headaches, since it means there are two transmissions to worry about. The reason for this layout is purely economic. The Soviet Union has a limited supply of large truck engines, and it was cheaper to use two cheap light truck engines than one scarce and expensive truck engine. The BTR-80 finally did away with both of these problems by adopting both a single engine and diesel propulsion.
The oddest feature of the BTRs is their hull shape. Exit and entrance are through side hull doors. It helps if you are an acrobat to get in and out of them. The BTR-60PB is the worst, but the BTR-70 and BTR-80 are only marginally better. This is not very important if the squad dismounts or loads on board outside the range of enemy fire. But it makes the process of exiting and entering the vehicle very dangerous if under enemy fire. The BTR-60 was viewed so skeptically by the Czechoslovak and Polish armies that they decided to develop their own BTR equivalent, the OT-64 SKOT, which has a single diesel engine and spacious rear doors for easy access.
Why is the BTR so bad a design? It has more to do with economics than technology. Soviet armored vehicle designers are talented, but were tightly constrained in the design of the BTRs. The Soviet Army wanted a top-of-the-line infantry vehicle for its forward deployed troops facing NATO. These units got the BMP. But the Soviets could not afford to equip all their divisions with that vehicle. The cost of wheeled infantry vehicles like the BTRs was about one-seventh that of a BMP, and the BTR was designed to be light, simple to manufacture, and cheap to maintain.
The BTR option is an example of the Soviet tendency for a high-low mix. The Soviets cannot afford to equip their whole army up to NATO standards. So they equip part of the army with top-notch hardware like the BMP, and the rest of the army with low-grade equipment like the BTR. This is not unknown in NATO. For example, the British Army has been adopting the Warrior, which is a counterpart to the U.S. Bradley and the Soviet BMP-2. But to flesh out other units, they are also adopting the Saxon, which is worse than the BTR-80 in many respects. But this is less common in NATO than in the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. Army is currently acquiring only the high-tech M2 Bradley, even though the older and simpler M113 APC remains in service as well.
Like the country from which it springs, the Soviet Army is very diverse. The motor rifle divisions in interior military districts such as the Urals are apt to be equipped with troop carriers, artillery, and small arms from the 1960s. They do not necessarily share much in common with the high-grade units in the Group of Soviet Forces-Germany or the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia. As a result, it is easy to misjudge the quality of the Soviet armed forces. An assessment that considers the "average" Soviet unit is apt to underestimate the quality of the Soviet forces opposite NATO. An assessment that acts as though all Soviet units are up to the standards of the units feeing NATO can exaggerate the overall quality of Soviet forces. An appreciation for the diversity of the Soviet Army is essential in making a balanced assessment of their effectiveness.