Krylov tried to reach the 65th GTR, but was unable to do so. Finally he connected with a divisional radio net. The 65th GTR had been roughly treated as well. Krylov was told to maintain his position and prepare to attack the objective again. He told the divisional staff in no uncertain terms that his unit was unable to do so, and would be hard-pressed to hold the two forms against a NATO counterattack. In the late afternoon, some motor rifle troops in their BMPs arrived to set up defensive positions. It had been a miserable day. Krylov was told again to prepare a counterattack for 1600.
Discussions about the conventional balance of power in Europe almost always begin with the issue of Soviet numerical superiority in tanks and other weapons. As this fictional scenario suggests, numbers alone are not a complete indicator of combat power. The quality of the weapon systems is an important factor, as is the situation in which they are used, the training of the crews, and the leadership of the units. The scenario described here — a Soviet tank battalion attacking a prepared defensive position across open terrain — is a situation that favors the NATO defender. But as the fictional account suggests, factors relating to the quality of the opposing weapons had a decisive effect on the outcome. The Soviet tankers were expecting to encounter a force equipped with equivalent or inferior tanks, but in fact faced a force with qualitatively superior tanks.
This raises several questions. How do Warsaw Pact and NATO tanks compare? Do NATO tanks have any decisive advantages over Warsaw Pact tanks? Why do they have these technical differences? This discussion will focus on two specific tanks, the Soviet T-80M and the American M1A2, in an effort to come to grips with these questions.
The most immediate impression one would get from seeing these two tanks side by side is their difference in size. Although both tanks are about the same width and length, the M1A2 is fitted with a massive, boxy turret. The T-80M is squatter, and its turret is a good deal smaller. The
M1A2 tips the scales at more than sixty-five tons. The T-80M is a good deal lighter, weighing in at a bit over forty-five tons.
Why the great difference in weight? There is a popular notion that Soviet designers build their tanks small to make them smaller targets. This seems to make sense, but misses the real reason. As mentioned in the first chapter, the Soviets are intent on maintaining a large armed forces, capable of handling any combination of enemies. A large army inevitably means a need for a great many tanks to equip the two hundred or so Soviet divisions. Indeed, to fully equip its divisions, the Soviet Ground Forces require in excess of 55,000 tanks. And with technology rapidly advancing, tanks have to be replaced every decade or so with new designs incorporating the latest improvements. This costs a lot of rubles.
The larger the tank, the heavier it is. The heavier it is, the larger an engine it must have. The larger an engine, the more fuel it must carry. The more fuel it must carry, the heavier the tank. This is the vicious cycle that drives up the cost of tanks. The bigger, heavier, and more complicated the tank is, the more rubles it costs. The Soviets have attempted to put a ceiling on tank costs by placing tight weight and size constraints on their design; therefore, Soviet tanks have traditionally been smaller and lighter than comparable NATO designs. When NATO tanks were in the fifty-ton range in the 1950s, Soviet tanks were in the thirty-five-ton range. In the 1970s, the Soviet tanks weighed in around forty tons, with NATO tanks around sixty tons. Yet the Soviets are not content simply to have smaller tanks. They also want tanks that are as well armed, as well protected, and as mobile as their NATO counterparts. What kinds of miracles do Soviet designers conjure up to combine good combat qualities with size and cost constraints?
The Soviets have accepted design compromises that would be unacceptable to any NATO army. To begin with, Soviet tanks are incredibly cramped. The U.S. standard is to design vehicles for the "95th percentile" soldier. In other words, tanks have to be big enough to accept 95 percent of today's soldiers, including those a bit over six feet tall. Soviet tanks are so small, they are usually crewed by troops under a height of about five feet six. Our fictional Soviet tankers, Pavel Krylov and his men, would be shorter than average NATO tankers. This might not seem like that much of a sacrifice, but in older tanks, these small tankers were expected to load fifty-five-pound projectiles into the breech of the gun. While this is possible, it is not surprising that the main gun on a Soviet tank is loaded at a slower rate on average than that on a NATO tank, and so it is fired less often. On newer tanks, the T-80M, the loading problem became so serious that an automatic loader was introduced. Indeed, the Soviets are the first to make widespread use of automatic loaders on main battle tanks. The automatic loaders add to the complexity of the tank, but they keep down the size of the tank and indirectly contribute to keeping down its cost.
Other compromises have been more extreme. Soviet tanks store a good deal of their fuel in external fuel cells over the track. Soviet tanks are mostly diesel powered, and diesel fuel is not as flammable as gasoline. But it does burn. The external tanks are protected with only enough armor to prevent penetration by small arms fire. The NATO tanks store all then-fuel within the protective main armor of the tank.
The proximity of all this fuel and ammunition also leads to a propensity to serious fires if the Soviet tank is hit. A tank like the T-80 has fuel and ammunition stored in the front of the hull, followed by a large ammunition carousel on the floor, with more fuel and ammunition behind the carousel. The propellant casing for the ammunition is semiconsumable, making it more prone to rupture than the older style brass or aluminum casings. Ammunition propellant is probably the greatest single fire hazard on board the tank. It contains its own chemical oxidant, so that once it ignites, it is difficult, if not impossible, to stop the fire. In contrast, most of the ammunition in the
Ml Abrams is stored in a locker at the rear of the turret, separated from the crew by blastproof doors. If the ammunition begins to burn, the fire is contained to the turret rear, away from the crew. The American tank is also fitted with an automatic Halon fire extinguishing system. This elaborate compartmentalization is impossible on Soviet tanks, since every last cubic inch of space must be filled with some bit of machinery or stowage.
Israeli tankers have found from combat experience that Soviet-designed tanks have a greater likelihood of catastrophic fires after being hit than most other tanks. The Israelis have operated American, British, and their own designs, and have singled out the vulnerability of Soviet tanks in this regard. Aside from the immediate effect of leading to heavier tank losses, this vulnerability has long-term effects as well. The Israelis have found that modern tank warfare is enormously destructive of equipment. Of the 450 tanks in service with frontline Israeli tank units at the beginning of the 1973 war, 75 percent were lost in the first eighteen hours. Many of these losses were due to minor damage that could be quickly repaired. But tanks that suffer serious internal fires are less likely to be repairable, and are less likely to be capable of being returned to combat service. For example, in the 1982 war, of the 1,000 Israeli tanks participating, about 300 were knocked out by combat damage; of this number only about 75 were too badly damaged for repair.