Some NATO hard-liners have argued that this was nothing more than a small concession by the Soviets in hopes of putting NATO off guard. The NATO democracies are subject to public pressures. If there is a popular consensus that chemical weapons should be banned, then there will be little incentive to continue funding NATO chemical defense modernization. The Soviets used this type of maneuver to influence American efforts to deploy a new generation of chemical weapons in the early 1980s, with considerable success. Nevertheless, the Soviets may have come to realize that chemical weapons are more trouble than they are worth. It is questionable whether they could have a significant effect on a conventional battlefield so long as both sides are prepared.
Arms control agreements on chemical weapons, however, are extremely unlikely at the present. Verification would be next to impossible, short of a radical change in Soviet attitudes toward secrecy. Unlike nuclear weapons or missiles, chemicals are easy to conceal. Chemical projectiles look no different from other projectiles. They differ only in their contents. For NATO to verify that all chemical weapons had been destroyed, it would be necessary to allow inspection of virtually every Soviet military facility and every artillery and bomb stockpile. Important strides have been made in getting the USSR to accept intrusive verification, notably the 1987 INF Treaty. This is the first treaty to contain significant verification provisions, allowing American officials to inspect Soviet facilities for treaty violations. It allows the U.S. to visit several dozen facilities in the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. But a chemical arms control treaty would require inspections at virtually all Soviet military bases. It seems doubtful that the Kremlin or the KGB would stomach that, at least for now.
Although the fictional scenario presented here depicts the use of chemical weapons, other shock weapons might appear on the battlefield in the not-too-distant future. One of the more likely is laser weapons. They have received a lot of attention in the context of strategic defense and "Star Wars." But whereas the technology for Star Wars is probably a decade in the future, tactical laser weapons are practical today.
Lasers emit a beam of intense, coherent light. At the moment, they are used mainly for range finders and weapons designators. Current laser range finders and designators can blind a person if they happen to hit him in the eyes while the laser is operating. Armies are very careful with lasers during peacetime training.
It does not take a lot of imagination to calculate that lasers could be turned into weapons capable of blinding enemy troops. The existing lasers use very modest power sources. More powerful lasers could be expected to cause considerably more optical damage, and could be powerful enough to damage optical sights like the FLIR and passive night vision sights on tanks.
No army presently talks about developing weapons to blind enemy troops. The outcry from the public would be intense. But such weapons have been under development for at least fifteen years. Although the U.S. Army refuses to talk about laser weapons in any detail, some information on laser protective measures is available. The U.S. Army obviously expects the Soviet Union to be developing laser weapons, and has already begun developing countermeasures. The U.S. Army has spent about $30 million on research and $120 million on laser defensive systems, according to public testimony to the U.S. Congress in 1988. For example, the Stingray program is developing optical filtration and other systems to protect the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle from enemy lasers. For individual protection, filtered eyeglasses are being developed. Special laser hardening techniques are being developed for optical sights.
There may be the same inhibitions against using laser blinding weapons as against using chemical weapons. Both the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries may be unwilling to be the first to use such systems, since they will inevitably result in the other side retaliating. But there are also the same attractions in using laser weapons as there are in using chemical weapons. Lasers, like chemicals, are shock weapons. The first combat use of such a weapon would probably cause considerable panic among the troops. The affected troops would be defenseless. Lasers are likely to add a new horror to the already lethal modern battlefield.
CONCLUSION
The introduction to this book raised the question "How good is the Soviet Army?" The question has been addressed indirectly by depicting how Soviet units might perform in a future war in Europe. In the fictional scenario, Soviet units have managed to seize objectives significantly behind schedule, and have suffered losses much more severe than anticipated. But the important point is, they have seized their objectives.
Could the Soviet Army triumph in such a contest? This book has not attempted to answer such a difficult question. The fictional scenarios cover only the first week of fighting, with the outcome still very much uncertain. Since they have focused on the Soviet side, the deficiencies in the Soviet armed forces have been accented. A similar examination of the NATO side also would reveal deficiencies, though of a very different nature. It has not been the intention of this book to suggest which side holds the ultimate advantages in a future war, but rather to depict how one side is likely to fight. While there is no sufficient reason to conclude that the Soviets could not prevail, neither is there much certainty that their superior numbers would ensure a quick victory.
The Soviets pattern their tactics on lessons learned from World War II. They have meticulously studied the experience of the war and tried to draw scientific conclusions. Their planning for war often reflects the campaigns of 1944-45, when the Red Army stormed victoriously through Central Europe and smashed into Berlin. But NATO is not the emaciated Wehrmacht of 1945, nor is the current peacetime Soviet Army the battle-hardened Red Army, honed by four grueling years of warfare. Soviet estimates of attrition rates, rates of advance, rates of ammunition usage, and other assessments seem optimistic compared to more recent wars, like those in the Middle East.
All other things being equal, modern warfare tends to favor the defender. Offensive forces, unless they have significant advantages in technology, training, and operational skill, usually require two or three times the forces to overcome a stubborn defender. The question is not whether the Soviets are as good as NATO tank for tank, or rifleman for rifleman, but whether they have the skill to use their numerical advantages to overcome NATO defenses. Soviet operational planning accepts that their performance at the tactical level may not be up to par with opponents like NATO. But there is the conviction that at the operational level, Soviet numerical advantages and command skills will make tactical deficiencies less meaningful, as they did in the last year of fighting in World War II.
The conclusion of this book is that deficiencies at the tactical level have significant influence on the operational conduct of war. The Soviets have enough shortcomings at the tactical level that their operational plans could be seriously jeopardized. The Soviets have strapped themselves into a straitjacket with their enormous force structure. This oversized force may have value for intimidation, but it undercuts efforts at reform and modernization. The MiG-29 is a very good fighter, but its designers have been forced to adopt lower cost features, which compromise the interface between pilot and plane, and undercut its combat power. The T-80 is an excellent design, but too many tanks are needed to permit each T-80 to be fitted with a thermal imaging sight and advanced armor like their NATO counterparts. Soviet officer training is thorough and professional, but the Soviet Army neglects development of an adequate infrastructure of squad leaders such as sergeants.