One of the officers expressed surprise that so little use was being made of other Warsaw Pact armies. Kucherenko related a popular joke to underline his lack of confidence in the use of the Warsaw Pact forces. "A Polish soldier stumbles across a magic lantern by the shores of the Vistula and the genie grants him three wishes. 'For my first wish,' says the soldier, 'I want the Chinese Army to invade Poland!' The genie complies. Months later, the invasion over, the genie asks the soldier for his second wish. He says again that he wishes the Chinese Army to invade Poland. The genie, a bit bewildered, complies with his wish. Several months later, the genie returns and asks the soldier for his third wish. The soldier asks again that the Chinese Army invade Poland. The genie, unable to restrain his curiosity any further, asks the Pole why he wished the Chinese to invade his country. Ah, but don't you see,' he said, for the Chinese to invade Poland three times, their army would have to pass through Russia six times!'"
It was a well-known tale, but the officers laughed anyway. The Poles and Czechs were being used in the overall operation, but in less critical areas, such as Denmark and Austria.
The meeting broke up into small groups as each front, army, and divisional staff group huddled together to discuss the plans and to prepare questions for Colonel Kucherenko. The briefing packet was not very explicit about the current disposition of NATO forces, but Kucherenko explained that additional details would become available over the next few days.
As the meeting broke up late in the afternoon, Kucherenko and his colleague, Colonel Burlatskiy, finally had a chance to chat. Buriatskiy would be with the staff of 1st Army in its attacks toward Nurnberg. Kucherenko asked Burlatskiy's opinion about the likely course of the war in his sector.
"So, Stepan Romanovich," Burlatskiy replied, "I see you've favored our 4th Army with a real plum assignment." It was all too obvious that Yevgeniy Burlatskiy was being sarcastic.
"Yevgeniy, you know that we don't have any additional forces ready for you since the bosses cut our forces in Czechoslovakia two years ago. I know the terrain is bad. But you people will have much more artillery than average, and more air support."
Burlatskiy was not satisfied. "Stepan, I do not mean to be rude. But you STAVKA boys with all your computer models of our Great Patriotic War battles forget one thing. It's not the 1940s. It's the 1990s. Your expectations for our advance through Germany are grossly unrealistic. We'll be lucky to fight our way out of those forests in a week."
Stepan Kucherenko was disturbed by his friend's pessimism, all the more so because he respected his judgment. Burlatskiy was no hack or careerist. He came from a long line of military officers and took great pride in his profession. Like many staff officers, Burlatskiy was an avid student of military history. His particular interest was the impact of technology on modern warfare. It was Burlatskiy's conviction that the general Soviet view of modern warfare was too heavily flavored by its Great Patriotic War experiences. There was too much of a tendency to regard the current battlefield as a repeat of the 1943-45 battlefield, just with more firepower.
Burlatskiy explained to Kucherenko that his opinion was quite different. He believed that the heavy diffusion of antiarmor weapons to the infantry and the artillery raised the specter of World War I rather than World War II. Artillery in World War I was the primary killing arm, and coupled with the machine gun, dominated the battlefield. The tank came along and eventually changed the balance on the battlefield. The tank could not be easily stopped by machine guns or artillery. The balance of power on the battlefield shifted from weapons like artillery and machine guns, which favored the defense, to mobile weapons like the tank, which favored maneuver and the offensive. This became very evident in World War II. But since then, the infantry had become very heavily armed with potent antitank weapons, especially guided antitank missiles. In World War H, artillery was almost useless against tanks in the traditional indirect fire mode. But now, with submunition ammunition and guided artillery rounds, the artillery also weighed in against the tank. The tank was far more threatened than in the past war. And if the tank and its other armored offspring were threatened, offensives were threatened. Burlatskiy suggested that the new NATO technologies might favor the tactical defender and drain much of the mobility and maneuver out of the vaunted Soviet tank armies. His opinions would prove to be all too accurate, much to the consternation of the Soviet Army.
Under what circumstances would the Soviet Union attack NATO forces in Central Europe? As this fictional account suggests, the most likely cause would be a global situation that posed a
direct threat to the USSR. A collapse of the Central European buffer states, especially East Germany, is one of the more plausible possibilities. The Soviets would fear that the collapse of East Germany could cause a domino effect in the other Northern Tier Warsaw Pact countries (East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia). The scenario also suggests that other forces could be at work in precipitating a Soviet decision. War is not always a rational affair. Distortions in intelligence, misperceptions about U.S. and NATO intentions, and internal troubles could bias Kremlin decision-makers into favoring war as a political option.
The decision to initiate a war with NATO would not be taken lightly. The Soviets would have to consider the very real likelihood that the war would spill over into unacceptable areas. Certainly, the possibility of the war escalating into a strategic nuclear exchange with the U.S. is a real impediment to any Soviet consideration of using conventional forces in Europe. But there are other concerns as well. How would British or French leaders respond to Soviet air attacks on their countries? Would they contemplate using nuclear weapons if their countries were threatened by invasion? Would the U.S. use its tactical nuclear weapons if the collapse of West Germany seemed imminent? What would the limits of a "conventional" war be? Would the war spread to a confrontation between U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the Pacific? Would the Soviet Union confront NATO conventional forces in the Balkans, or in Turkey? Is a regional war in Europe possible without the great risk of a global war like World War II?
Another source of anxiety for Soviet war planners is China. There is an old Russian joke from the 1970s: What two languages are taught in Soviet schools? Why Hebrew and Chinese, of course. Hebrew for those who are leaving, and Chinese for those who are staying. It must seem absurd to most Americans or Europeans that the Russians are fearful of Chinese ambitions against them. Yet concern over the Chinese threat has remained a staple of Soviet strategic thinking since the 1960s. The Russians regard the Chinese in much the same way that Americans regard the Russians — that is, a more primitive society, and therefore one more likely to resort to war since they have less to lose.
This thinking has a direct impact on any Soviet war plans for a confrontation with NATO. The enormous Soviet force structure is based on the notion that it should be adequate to deal with any combination of enemies. That is, it should be able to handle both China and NATO simultaneously. The Soviet Union has about eighty divisions in war-ready condition, and a further one hundred thirty divisions that could be brought up to strength in about a month. In contrast, the U.S. has eighteen war-ready divisions, and about ten divisions that could be brought up to strength in a relatively short period. The twenty-eight U.S. divisions have more troops than average Soviet divisions, but not that much more combat power.