and the prospect of the predominance of the peasant family farm in Russian
agriculture.[38]
In the legal sphere, the isolation of the peasant estate that was preserved by the statutes of 19 February was overcome to a degree through the implementation of the zemstvo and judicial reforms. The proportion of peasant deputies in the zemstva was significant, although it was exceeded by noble representation (38 and 43 per cent, respectively). In some regions (central- industrial, southern-steppe, and southeastern) representation tended toward predominance by peasants, specifically peasant landowners. Peasant representation was also significant in juries - in the provinces it was even predominant (over 50 per cent). At the same time, the existence of the volost' peasant-estate court created a dualism in the court system, preserving peasant isolation in this respect. This does not, however, justify the general conclusion that the peasant reform retarded the integration of the peasantry into civic life and fortified the schism in Russia between 'traditional' and 'westernized' society.[39] Separate peasant self-administration and the separate volost' court were introduced in the 1861 reform in connection with the termination of the hereditary power of the gentry landowner, which explains their expediency. They were not the final goal of the legislators, only a temporary, inevitable structure on the road to unitary citizenship.
Such an important measure as the abolition of the recruitment system for manning the army militated in the same direction of integrating the peasantry into the new, unitary organisation of Russian society. This last of Alexander II's reforms (the Statute of 1 January 1874) was considerably influenced by the international situation and the experience of European wars. The personal role of Alexander II was great in this reform: he stuck to his decision in the face of strong pressure from the opposition. In all other spheres of state life, reform activity from the 1860s onward continued by inertia, without the previous energy.
Alexander II's own disillusionment with the reforms and a major shift in his own personal state of mind occurred almost simultaneously and for a number of reasons. After the successful introduction of the reforms, the victorious conclusion in 1864 of the half-century war in the Caucasus, the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1863-4 and the carrying out of the radical agrarian and other transformations in the Polish Kingdom, the establishment of the Sejm (assembly) and of the constitutional order in Finland in 1863, the Tsar- liberator came up against some unexpected difficulties and deep personal traumas. The Polish revolutionary response to his efforts at liberalisation was no doubt itself a disappointment. Much more important for Alexander, the Russian nobility, discontented with the emancipation of the serfs, voiced its claims for political rights. The zemstvo assemblies which had just been opened, especially the Petersburg zemstvo, showed a degree of independence which the government disliked.[40] In April 1865 the heir to the throne, Tsarevich Nicholas Alexandrovich, unexpectedly died at the age of twenty-one. A year later Dmitrii Karakozov shot at Alexander II near the gates of the Summer Garden. The news that Karakozov was a Russian shook Alexander II more than the attack itself. The enthusiasm and inspiration which had sustained the emperor in the first, most unclouded and fruitful ten years of his reign was dissipated.
In this depressed state, Alexander II gave in to the pressure from conservative forces. The decree of 13 May 1866 bears witness to the shift towards a conservative course. Karakozov's shot, as one of his contemporaries put it, 'favoured reaction'.[41] In the government the most influential figure became Count Petr Shuvalov, who was appointed head of the gendarmes and given overall responsibility for internal security straight after the attack. Shuvalov was an opponent of the liberal bureaucracy and the reforms carried out by it. The year 1866 was also a turning point in the personal life of the emperor. He was consumed by his passion for the young Princess Ekaterina Dolgorukov, which became stronger over time, often distracting him from affairs of state and at the same time weighing him down with the burden of a double life.[42]
In the Editing Commissions, the reformers had acknowledged that the current legislation would require further development. They hoped that this task would be carried out by an 'enterprising monarchy'. Their hopes were not realised.[43]
Though he accepted the legacy of Nikolai Miliutin in terms of the realisation of the peasant reforms and the preparation and implementation of the zemstvo reform, as minister of internal affairs, P. A. Valuev (Miliutin's irreconcilable opponent) immediately led the attack on the liberal peace mediators - a most important link in the peasant reform.[44] While it was not within his powers to infringe the Statutes of i9 February about the irremoveability and independence of the peace mediators, he began to reduce their number. Valuev's policy transformed the position of peace mediator: from an honourable post, which attracted intelligent and thoughtful people, into a mediocre administrative function. The same phenomenon was observed with the introduction of other institutions created by the reforms - the zemstva and the new courts. From the first independent steps of the zemstva, the government displayed its distrust in them. D. A. Miliutin wrote, 'It was as if the government itself, having just established socially inclusive (vsesoslovnoe) self-government, had a sudden rethink - hadn't it taken a rather imprudent step. From the very beginning of the implementation of the new legislation it was considered necessary to follow the new institutions vigilantly, to hold them in check, so to speak.' Already by the end of 1865 in government policy 'instead of the gradual development and broadening ofthe zemstva, a systematic squeezing and restraining of them began'.[45]
Even more importantly, the peasant question, which demanded special attention and the development of the foundations which had been created in the 1861 reform, found itselfby the end ofthe 1870s on the fringes of government policy. Serious problems which had emerged were not addressed. Already in the middle of the 1860s, M. Kh. Reutern in his reports drew attention to the burden of the dues and redemption payments for the emancipated peasants. But neither the minister of finance himself, nor the government as a whole took any measures to resolve the difficulties that had arisen in the course of the implementation of the peasant reform and to achieve the final goal of the reform - the creation of an independent small peasant economy. The issue of the obshchina was raised but not resolved. After quite a lengthy discussion of the problems of peasant land-ownership the ministers of internal affairs, finance and justice were entrusted with working out a set of measures to ease the departure of peasants from the obshchina, that is the broadening of article 165 of the Statutes of 19 February. The minutes of the Council of Ministers to this effect were approved on 9 March 1874, but the matter was put on hold.[46]
38
See S. G. Kashchenko, 'Nekotorye voprosy metodiki izucheniia realizatsii reformy i9 fevralia i86ig. v issedovaniiakh P. A. Zaionchkovskogo',
39
W Pintner, 'Reformability in the Age ofReform and Counter-reform', in
40
I. A. Khristoforov,
42
L. G. Zakharova, Alexander II i mesto Rossii v mire',
43
See O. Trubetskaia, Materialy dliabiografii kn. V A.Cherkasskogo. vol. I. book 2, part 3.
44
M. F. Ust'iantseva, 'Institut mirovykh posrednikov vkrest'ianskoi reforme', in Zakharova, Eklof and Bushnell,
46
V G. Chernukha,