“To what end, General?” Foreign Minister Hamarat asked. “We send in thousands of troops to root out a few thousand PKK rebels? Do you propose we occupy Iraqi territory?”
“I propose a buffer zone, sir,” Guzlev said. “The Americans helped Israel set up a buffer zone in southern Lebanon that was effective in keeping Hezbollah fighters out of Israel. We should do the same.”
Hirsiz looked at his defense minister, silently hoping for another voice of opposition. “Hasan?”
“It’s possible, Mr. President,” the defense minister said, “but it would not be a secret and it would be hugely expensive. The operation would take a fourth of our entire military force, perhaps up to a third, and it would certainly entail calling up the reserve forces. It would take months. Our actions would be seen by all—first of all by the Americans. Whether we are successful depends on how the Americans react.”
“General Sahin?”
“The Americans are in the process of an extended drawdown of forces throughout Iraq,” the secretary-general of the Turkish National Security Council said. “Because it is relatively quiet and the Kurdish autonomous government is better organized than the central government in Baghdad, northern Iraq has perhaps twenty thousand American troops still in the region, assisting in guarding oil pipelines and facilities. They are scheduled to go down to just two combat brigades within a year.”
“Two combat brigades—for all of northern Iraq? That doesn’t seem realistic.”
“The Stryker brigades are very potent weapon systems, sir, very fast and agile—they should not be underestimated,” Sahin warned. “However, sir, we expect the Americans to employ private contractors to supply most of the surveillance, security, and support services. This falls in line with President Joseph Gardner’s new policy of resting and restoring ground forces while he increases the size and power of their Navy.”
“Then it is possible, sir,” Defense Minister Cizek said. “The Iraqi Kurds’ peshmerga forces have the equivalent of two infantry divisions and one mechanized division, centered on Mosul, Irbil, and the Kirkuk oil fields—a third of the size of our forces that are within marching distance of the border. Even if the PKK has the equivalent of a full infantry division, and the United States throws their entire ground forces against us, we are still at parity—and, as Suntzu wrote, if your forces are of equal strength: attack. We can do this, Mr. President.”
“We can mobilize our forces within three months, with ozel tim scouting enemy positions and preparing to disrupt the private contractors performing surveillance on the border region,” General Ozek added. “The mercenaries hired by the Americans are there only to earn money. If a fight is brewing, they will run for cover and hide behind regular military forces.”
“And what if the Americans stand and fight to help the Kurds?”
“We push south and crush the rebel camps and Kurdish opposition forces until the Americans threaten action, then pull back in contact and set up our buffer zone,” Ozek said. “We have no desire to fight the Americans, but we will not allow them to dictate the terms of our sovereignty and security.” He turned to Foreign Minister Hamarat. “We convince them a no-fly, no-drive buffer zone, patrolled by the United Nations, will enhance security for all parties. Gardner doesn’t want a ground war, and he certainly doesn’t care about the Kurds. He’ll agree to anything as long as it stops the fighting.”
“That may be true, but Gardner will never admit that publicly,” Hamarat said. “He will openly condemn us and demand a full withdrawal from Iraq.”
“Then we stall for time while we root out all the PKK rat’s nests and wire the border region for sound,” Ozek said. “With six divisions in northern Iraq, we can scour the place clean in just a few months while we promise to leave. We can decimate the PKK enough so they’ll be ineffectual for a generation.”
“And we look like butchers.”
“I don’t care what others may call me as long as I don’t have to worry about my innocent sons or daughters being killed in a damned playground by an aircraft downed by the PKK,” Defense Minister Cizak said bitterly. “It is time to act.”
“It is not just the PKK we need to address, sir, but the security situation with the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline,” military chief of staff Guzlev added. “The Iraqi peshmerga are still not trained or equipped well enough to protect the pipeline on their side of the border. We invested billions of lira on that pipeline, and the Iraqis still can’t adequately protect their portion, and won’t allow any outside forces except the Americans to assist. We can earn three times the amount we receive in flowage fees if we can convince the oil producers in northern Iraq—including our own companies—to increase production, but they won’t do it because the pipeline is too vulnerable to attack.”
President Hirsiz stabbed out his cigarette in the ornate ashtray on his desk, then returned to his seat. He was quiet for a few long moments, lost in thought. It was rare that the national security staff was so divided, especially when it came to the PKK and their brutal insurgent attacks. The unexpected appearance of Besir Ozek in his office just hours after surviving the crash should have united their determination to stamp out the PKK once and for all.
But the national security staff—and he himself, Hirsiz had to admit—were conflicted and divided, with the civilian military leadership desiring a peaceful, diplomatic solution as opposed to a call for direct action by the uniformed commanders. Opposing the Americans and world public opinion with a divided council was not a smart move.
Kurzat Hirsiz got to his feet again and stood straight, almost at attention. “General Ozek, thank you for coming here and addressing me and the national security staff,” he said formally. “We will discuss these options very carefully.”
“Sir…” Ozek lurched forward from shock, forgetting his injuries and wincing in pain as he struggled for balance. “Sir, respectfully, you must act swiftly and decisively. The PKK—no, the world—must know that this government takes these attacks seriously. Every moment we delay only shows that we are not committed to our internal security.”
“I agree, General,” Hirsiz said, “but we must act deliberately and carefully, and in close consultation with our international allies. I will instruct General Sahin to put together a plan for the Special Teams to hunt down and capture or kill the PKK operatives who might have planned and led this attack, and to aggressively investigate the possibility of spies in the Jandarma.
“I will further instruct Foreign Minister Hamarat to consult with his American, NATO, and European counterparts and inform them of this council’s outrage at this attack and a demand for cooperation and assistance in tracking down the perpetrators.” He inwardly winced at General Ozek’s incredulous expression, which only served to accentuate his weak, shaky stance. “We will act, General,” Hirsiz quickly added, “but we will do it wisely and as a member of the world community. This will further isolate and marginalize the PKK. If we act rashly, we will be seen as no better than the terrorists.”
“The…world…community?” Ozek murmured bitterly.
“What did you say, General?” Hirsiz snapped. “Do you have something you would like to tell me?”
The wounded Jandarma officer briefly yet openly scowled at the president of the Republic of Turkey, but quickly straightened himself as best he could, assumed a stern but neutral expression, and said, “No, sir.”
“Then you are dismissed, General, with the national security council’s and the Turkish people’s sincere thanks and relief that you are alive following this treacherous and dastardly attack,” Hirsiz said, his acidic tone definitely not matching his words.