The great three-day Sollum tank battle was at an end and like all the battles in the desert it had been a melee having no properly defined front lines or rear areas, but had been a confusion of noise and destruction. It had, however, been the mightiest armoured engagement to date in the African theatre of operations. More than 200 British tanks were left behind on the battlefield and 7th Armoured Division went back across the wire with only 24 runners. The 15th Panzer Division lost 15 of its tanks and 5th Light had 10 of its vehicles destroyed. But strength returns for Africa Corps on 20 June reported the figure of 136 vehicles. The recovery and repair sections had once again shown their ability.
The losses in men from the start of the campaign to 5 June were reported by Africa Corps to be 513 killed in action, 1689 wounded, and 1015 missing. During the period from 15 to 20 June the numbers lost, including the figures for the Tobruk front, were 95 dead, 355 wounded, and 235 missing.
The results of the Sollum battle confirmed the suspicion which most Germans had had in their minds from the very first days, namely that they were no longer just supporting the Italians — the Africa Corps was the only Axis fighting force in Libya. The defects in the Italian Army did not allow it to stand against the British and if 8th Army made simultaneous attacks on the eastern front, then to withdraw more contingents of German troops from around Tobruk would invite the aggressive garrison there to smash the Italian troops investing the town. It was, therefore, essential that the number of German divisions in Africa be raised if North Africa was not to be lost by default. The German High Command had already appreciated the point and was preparing to send reinforcements. The only difficulty lay in the supply position which had begun badly and which had never improved. The fuel supply was so inadequate that on occasions staff officers had been unable to undertake journeys to the front. Vital supplies, including the heavy artillery which the Africa Corps needed, were held in Tripoli for lack of petrol and trucks to bring it forward. There were whole units without their lorries and others for whom only the most basic equipment and transport was available. The Italian Navy, to whom German ships were subordinate, was not prepared to sail into those North African harbours close behind the Axis front even though the use of such ports would have reduced the long road haul and the consequent waste of valuable fuel. The most important harbour, so far as the Italians were concerned, was Tripoli nearly 800 miles away from the front line. [8]
The Axis armies and their leaders underwent yet another reorganisation as a result of which Gariboldi was replaced as Italian commander-in-chief by Bastico. A Panzer Group Rommel was formed out of the amalgamation of the old 5th Light, 15th Panzer, and an Africa Division, a conglomeration of units serving in North Africa. An Italian Corps also came under command of Panzer Group Rommel.
The attack upon Tobruk which the German commander-in-chief had been pressing to undertake and which had been proposed for August was then postponed until November but Rommel, who had been warned by his Italian superiors to be cautious, was determined to keep the operational initiative in his hands for, if he did not, then the British would grow in strength and their offensive operations would become more numerous and heavy. But in September patrol activity gave no indication of a British build-up for an offensive and secure in this knowledge Rommel increased the tempo of his preparations to reduce Tobruk. As a result of the knowledge which he had gained from personal reconnaissance and with the experiences of earlier battles upon which to draw he changed the plan of attack. The new thrust line would be from the south-east and to distract the attention of the garrison while the main attack went in, 'Chinese' assaults (decoy attacks) would be launched. Two German and two Italian divisions were to carry out the actual attack and this was to be supported by 200 guns. The supply situation deteriorated again and this was one of the excuses advanced by Commando Supremo which caused the date of the opening of the Tobruk offensive to be postponed. The non-arrival of an Italian motorised division was the principal reason given for the postponement but Rommel decided to make his attack with or without the promised Italian support. He knew that his own units were under-strength and that the Luftwaffe^ forced by Hitler's direct order to protect the merchant marine convoys, could not spare aeroplanes to carry out air bombardments of the town but nevertheless he was determined to go ahead. [9]
As examples of the shortages which he was facing one division of the Africa Corps was 4000 men short of its war establishment and for the whole Corps no less than 11,000 men were needed to bring the units up to strength. Losses to convoys were enormous and losses of 50 per cent were not uncommon. It is not surprising, therefore, that the artillery establishment of Africa Corps was 66 per cent of its total and that reinforcements were not reaching the combat units. In one two-month period only 7640 men were disembarked, of whom 2640 came by air.
Determined to reduce Tobruk, Rommel then put his troops through a period of intensive training and by mid-November the preparations had been completed. The heaviest concentration of Axis artillery seen in the desert to that time, no less than 461 guns of all calibres, were in position around the town. With the troops trained and the battle plan drawn up, the artillery fired-in, and the tanks fuelled the Africa Corps and its Italian allies waited in the cold winds and rainy days of November 1941 for the attack to open.
Meanwhile, to the east Rommel's greatest fear had been realised; 8th Army had prepared itself for battle and had struck the first blow. Auchinleck, successor to Wavell as Commander-in-Chief had opened Operation Crusader. [10]
Crusader 1942
It was the plan of General Cunningham, commander of 8th Army, to recapture Cyrenaica and thereby to raise the siege of Tobruk. This operation, codenamed Crusader was to be carried out by 30 and 13 Corps. The task of the former, the westernmost placed, was to advance from south of the Trigh e. Abd in a north-westerly direction towards Tobruk, while 13 Corps, on the east, was to skirt the Halfaya Pass, Sollum, and Bardia, to cut off the Axis forces and then to engage them in battle. A third British force, 29th Indiar Brigade, was to swing wide on the deep southern flank, advancing across the desert towards Gialo to drive behind Panzer Group Africa and to threaten its rear and its lines of communication.
The British line from east to west had 4th Indian Division south of Halfaya and investing that place. In reserve on that sector lay 1st Army Tank Brigade, south of Sidi Omar. South-west of the Army Tank Brigade was 1st New Zealand Division, whose principal .task it was to ascend to the line of the Via Balbia and then to move along that highway towards Tobruk. These units constituted 13 Corps.
The most important division of 30 Corps was 7th Armoured which was held in position around Gabr Saleh. Farther to the south of the armour was 1st South African Division and even deeper in the desert was the Indiar Brigade. The British reserve forces were 2nd South African Brigade, 22nd Guards Brigade, and 4th Indian Brigade. Inside beleagured Tobruk there was a garrison made up of a whole division plus two brigades.
The 8th Army's approach march began on 12 November and continued until D-Day for the operation, 18 November. Cunningham's force drove westward in stormy and rainy weather which produced the uncalculated advantage that low cloud prevented Luftwaffe reconnaissance and the British build-up went undetected so that the attack when it came, although expected and although defensive preparations had been made to meet it, was as a tactical surprise.