At the frontier wire 5th Panzer Regiment halted and at 16:00hrs began to consolidate and to concentrate its units south of Trigh el Abd. The main of 21st Panzer Division pressed on eastwards into Egypt without the panzer regiment for it had run out of fuel and ammunition. The German wireless sets, already defective before the offensive had begun, had virtually ceased to function. Communications between the two panzer divisions had been lost and from Corps headquarters there was silence. Out of contact with its sister units and its main headquarters the armour of Africa Corps was moving blindly into the unknown. In an effort to establish the true picture, patrols were sent out by both panzer divisions to regain contact, a difficult task this as the last armoured car belonging to 33rd Reconnaissance Battalion had been destroyed that day by a Royal Air Force air attack. At 22:00hrs 15th Panzer patrols not only brushed with British armour 20 miles south of Sidi Omar but also found 5th Panzer Regiment. Then came the intelligence that Ariete had not advanced past Gabr Saleh.
Fortune favoured the British during the night when 8th Army's carefully camouflaged but otherwise unguarded main store depots lay within a few miles of 21st Panzer Division as it lay halted on the battlefield waiting for its supply trucks. The presence of strong German forces within a few minutes drive of the stores which, if captured, would enable Rommel to forge strongly ahead caused the British command many anxious hours for there were no troops which could have been sent out in time to protect the depots from assault and capture. But Rommel had his eyes fixed firmly on Maddalena and Mersa Matruh and it was upon these places that he was directing his forces. He was aware that his position was not a strong one. Although he stood deep in the British flank, was in touch with the garrison at Halfaya, and was athwart the British lines of communication, it was equally true that his troops were widely scattered, had no communication with each other, and thai British troops were across his lines of supply. To protect the soft-skinned vehicle convoys, prey to the roving bands of British armoured car patrols during the dangerous journey across the desert, Rommel ordered that they be escorted by any available fighting vehicles and this temporary expedient eventually became a standard battle procedure. Rommel's thrust eastwards was the turning point of the battle. German defensive tactics had proved themselves and the ring around Tobruk still held; 30 Corps had been badly mauled and the remnants of 7th Armoured Division were not at that time in a position to resume offensive operation. The New Zealand Division was isolated and should have been withdrawn back to its start lines.
Operational orders for 25 November commanded that the British forces in the Sollum—Sidi Omar areas be destroyed. In anticipation of the retreat which he was convinced 8th Army would have to make from the stricken battlefield of Sidi Rezegh, Rommel left his panzer divisions in a position to intercept the fleeing British columns. Ariete Division was out of the battle as it was stir engaged in fighting the South Africans around Gabr Saleh. The main interception was to be made by 21st Panzer Division south of Halfaya. To clear up the battlefield and to prepare it for another intercepting force 8th Panzer Regiment was ordered to attack across the Trigh el Abd, to drive along the left side of Sidi Omar, then to swing eastwards to cut off the garrison in that place while 5th Panzer Regiment attacked from the south-east and captured it The pincer operation failed for, soon after it started, it struck the main of 7th Indian Brigade and elements from 2nd New Zealand Division supported by tanks whose task it was to protect the positions around Capuzzo and Bardia. The 5th Panzer Regiment made no appreciable gain of ground and 8th Regiment came up against severe opposition and the growing strength of 8th Army. As the German panzer wedge rolled along to the west of Sidi Omar the British artillery opened upon it a drum fire under cover of which 7th Armoured Brigade was hurled against the flanks of the advance. But the British tank guns were outranged by the 7.5 and 5cm pieces with which the German vehicles were fitted and in one attack 8th Panzer Regiment destroyed all of a 16-tank wave which went in against it. The Royal Air Force struck repeatedly at the panzers as they stopped to refuel but failed to halt their forward movement so that by evening a spearhead had reached Trigh Capuzzo, west of Sidi Aziz and 15th Panzer Division had partly encircled both Sidi Omar and Capuzzo.
The 5th Panzer Regiment had, however, failed to capture British strong points south of Sidi Omar and suffered heavily in the bitter and close fighting which marked the course of the afternoon. A summary of the battle entries for 25 November is interesting.
'... the enemy in the defensive line opened a terrific fire. The regiment charged this line of guns and after hard fighting silenced two batteries and six anti-tank guns. We... lost five Panzer III. More enemy batteries and anti-tank guns on the left flank of regiment now entered the fight and we lost another Panzer II and two Panzer III. The regiment then tried to bypass the enemy on the right... (but he) brought up anti-tank and field guns ... and extended his line. The regiment was now running short of ammunition and was forced to deploy to the right and to move away south to break off the action. By 12.30hrs attempts to regain wireless contact with division had still been unsuccessful. The regiment, now in position 8 kilometres north-east of Gasr el Abd had only nine tank guns in action. At about 13.00hrs the C-in-C ordered an attack upon the enemy columns south of the frontier to break through on a wide front and to halt in sight of the frontier wire. The regiment had been reduced to the strength of a reinforced company and had little petrol or ammunition. Three immobilised Panzer III and IV were taken in tow to increase the fire power.
'Regiment then met enemy tanks and eventually clashed with enemy forces which were occupying position about 12km wide along the frontier. It was fired upon and five of our tanks were knocked out, two of them on fire. Regiment then turned west and opened fire upon the enemy to its front and on its left flank. Two more Panzer III were set on fire. Orders to turn south, regroup, and stop could not be passed because shellfire had shot away the aerials on many tanks, including those on the regimental commander's vehicle. The 2nd Battalion thereupon carried on through the wire south of Sidi Omar. Wireless contact with that battalion was not restored until 27 November.
'The rest of regiment now had only 3 Panzer II, 5 Panzer III, and 2 Panzer IV; only three of which had their guns in working order. On 27
November one of the Panzer IV had to be cannibalised to make the other tank battleworthy. During the night of 25 November further attempts were made to establish contact by wireless, or by any other means, with a higher HQ or some German unit, but without success. The regiment also received no supplies of petrol or ammunition because a higher HQ had directed our trucks to another unit in order to stimulate an attack.
'In the attacks of 25 November - carried out with no artillery or AA (anti-aircraft) support — the regiment lost 9 Panzer III and 1 Panzer II as total losses. Hit and, therefore, abandoned were 1 Panzer II, 1 Panzer III, and 1 Panzer IV. Two tanks fell out and were abandoned: a Panzer II and 1 Panzer III.'
In that dramatic report can be seen the steady draining of strength which marked the battle from the German side and 8th Panzer Regiment had only 53 runners during the afternoon of 25 November. Once again the wide dispersion of German units across the length and breadth of the desert and the failure of wireless communication led to a situation where lorried convoys ranged far and wide and search parties from battle-exhausted units had to go out to locate and to guide in the supply and fuel columns.
Still convinced that the British around Sidi Rezegh no longer posed a threat Rommel concentrated on clearing up the eastern flank and ordered that the attacks from the south of Halfaya and Sollum were to continue with the objective of reaching Bardia. Rommel ignored the threat presented by the New Zealand brigades, although these were moving steadily but very slowly along the Via Balbia, presenting the danger of his being outflanked from the north and, more immediately, that of their linking up with the defenders in Tobruk. During 25th attacks had come in from the garrison in the town and on either side of Belhamed, from New Zealanders supported by tanks, against defenders who were seriously short of anti-tank weapons. Only the intervention of the Luftwaffe slowed down the assault. There had been an increasing build-up of British strength south-east of Tobruk but because of the failure of signals communication this dangerous state could not be brought immediately to RommePs attention. When, at last, the intelligence reached the commander-in-chief he realised how vital was the need to reduce Sidi Omar and Capuzzo before he could strike westward once again and prevent a break-out from Tobruk. On that sector New Zealand forces captured Belhamed during the night of 25/26th and the Tobruk garrisornnade a sortie shortly after first light which captured El Duda. A corridor which had been driven, against all the efforts of the Bottcher Group to contain it, had been closed by the Germans and a Bersaglieri Battalion during the evening and in savage fighting losses to the British cost them a further 26 tanks. Attacks were carried on all through the night to smash a corridor through to Tobruk.