With signals messages either failing to reach their destination or being garbled in transmission the Operations Department of Panzer Army, unable to warn Africa Corps of the dangerous situation around Tobruk and acting upon its own initiative ordered 21st Panzer Division to return to the Tobruk sector and directed 15th Panzer to attack the New Zealanders in the Bardia area. In its move 21st Panzer recrossed the rear of 4th Indian Division and left a trail of blazing vehicles. The division skirted the Halfaya garrison and passed through the surrounding mine-fields before going on to engage 5th New Zealand Brigade, while other divisional units linked with 15th Panzer and reached Bardia there to refuel, reprovision, and to re-arm. The creaky supply situation already overloaded, began to fail and not all units received their full quotas. The 115th Regiment was sent in to take Capuzzo and despite severe British defences and bitter hand-to-hand fighting the German infantry pushed forward until its leading sections were only half a mile from the place. But then a surprising order from Rommel halted the forward movement and brought the infantry back to the start line. Meanwhile, Ariete continued its slow move forward and had reached a point only 24 miles west of Bardia.
Rommel, not completely in touch with his headquarters, had halted the infantry attack upon Capuzzo and suddenly realised that 21st Panzer was not where he had believed it to be and could not, therefore, participate in a plan which he had worked out. Gradually he became aware that the reducing strength of the Africa Corps, the increased difficulties at Tobruk, the supply situation, and British air superiority were factors which would prevent his plans reaching fruition. One factor of which he was certainly unaware was that 8th Army had gained its second wind and was preparing to renew the battle not to break it off. The British in the area south of Sidi Rezegh had regrouped along the Trigh el Abd and had re-equipped their units with fresh supplies of tanks. A newly driven corridor through to Tobruk, although narrow was firm, and British pressure had forced the Axis units back; but in hand-to-hand fighting 90th Light Division on the northern wall of the corridor and Bottcher Group along the southern prevented the gap from being widened. [12]
The British received the news that 21st Panzer Division was swinging westward again; 30 Corps used 2nd New Zealand Division to guard its back against the panzer units now roaring towards it and took up a defensive posture in the Gambut-Gabr Saleh sector. The fighting which had flared up around Tobruk increased in intensity and threatened the German units with complete disintegration as British pressure began to roll up their flanks.
At dusk on 27 November the 21st Panzer Division moved from Bardia to Gambut and 15th Panzer Division, acting on its orders drove along the Trigh Capuzzo on the left flank of 21st Panzer, overrunning in its advance, 5th New Zealand Brigade headquarters, and capturing 500 men and 6 guns. The mass of 15th Panzer then reached the Trigh Capuzzo and headed for Tobruk against moderate opposition. But as the unit drew near the town opposition stiffened and the British tried everything to hold the Africa Corps' return from the Sollum front. The 4th and 22nd Armoured Brigades went in — part of 7th Armoured Division which had now been reinforced to a point where it was now nearly as strong as the panzer units of the whole Africa Corps - but in the event 15th Panzer proved strong enough to cope with the situation. By evening the panzer force had driven to the area west of Gabr el Arid and had laagered south of Sciasciuf, there to await the arrival of 21st Panzer. The Ariete Division lay south of the Trigh Capuzzo and the whole armoured might of the Axis army, extended across the desert south-west of Gambut. was facing the British.
To the west of Sidi Rezegh there was-the Bottcher Group and the Italian Divisions, to the north the 90th Light Division, while from the east there was the growing pressure of the two panzer and one Italian armoured divisions. But not until he contacted his headquarters did Rommel know that far from being beaten as he thought the British might still gain the upper hand through their better supply position for they were still able to renew their strength with fresh men and tanks while theAxis forces had reached the end of their tether.
During the period from 24 to 27 November the fortunes of the Panzer Group Africa can be seen to have changed alarmingly and by 27th the situation around Tobruk had become critical. The ring round the town had been split, the Axis forces driven back and at the end of their strength. The 30 Corps had been massively reinforced and was again posing a serious problem south-east of the town. The supply system, already bad, had become critical and there were grave doubts expressed whether Corps had the strength to restore the situation.
The rainy morning of 28 November saw 21st Panzer Division encountering heavy resistance around Zaafran but not only had part of it held the eastern pressure out of Tobruk but other elements made contact with 90th Light and. on the southern flank another column of the division passed Bir el Chleta and headed for Sidi Rezegh to which sector 15th Panzer Division was also heading. That formation put its main on the important high ground south of Belhamed and drove off the counter-attacks to the south which 8th Army had launched. During the day and despite the poor light a collaboration between 15th Panzer and Ariete Divisions encircled a number of British tank groups. The German commanders now were obtaining a clearer picture of the situation and their speedy regrouping allowed them to begin operations aimed at defeating the New Zealand and British forces.
One thing was very clear to the German command; although British material losses could be speedily replaced the restoration of confidence in the tanks and in the leadership would take much longer to build up. This point was borne out in Kippenberger's book Infantry Brigadier where he claimed that throughout the 8th Army there was a most intense distrust, almost a hatred of our, that is to say the British, armour. Suspecting this feeling Rommel reasoned that 8th Army must be beaten before it had fully recovered for he knew that already British forces were regrouping and reforming without let or hindrance along the Trigh el Abd, an area now empty of Axis troops.
The question which Rommel had to decide that day was whether to drive die British and Imperial forces, positioned around Sidi Rezegh, back into Tobruk or to cut them off from the town and to destroy them in the field. He decided on the latter course. The 21st Panzer Division held position and was involved in fierce fighting on both sides of the Trigh Capuzzo while 15th Panzer drove past the New Zealand flank to thrust back South African counter-attacks eventually to link up with the Bottcher Group and XXI Italian Corps. A short rest and then 15th Panzer swung northwards gaining in strength as it picked up other Axis fighting units from the area through which it passed before it went on to attack and to capture El Duda from the Tobruk garrison. So fast had been the pace of the advance that the infantry had become separated from the panzer spearhead and armoured personnel carriers had to halt their advance to go back and to porter the troops. The !osses suffered that day were more than usually heavy and regimental strength of one infantry regiment had been reduced to 150 men by the time that El Duda had been taken. At that place, determined in spirit but weak in number the Germans took up all round defence but strong British infantry assaults drove back the German infantry from their positions and in the fighting more than half of them were taken prisoners of war.