Ariete and 15th Panzer Division then came under a series of heavy but unco-ordinated attacks launched by 7th Armoured Division and 1st South African Division on the southern flank trying to break through to the New Zealand Division but on 21st Panzer Division's sector the aggressive defence put up by the New Zealanders forced the Germans to commit its last few reserves. During the afternoon an attack by 4th Armoured Brigade hit the Bottcher Group but was deflected while the 15th Panzer Division swung through the intervals in the Axis line and struck north towards El Duda. The Africa Corps battle report recorded the destruction of 20 British tanks from a group of 100 which had begun an attack and these severe losses forced 8th Army's leaders to order a withdrawal south.
On the far northern flank of the battle 90th Light made strenuous efforts to close the narrow corridor but despite its struggle and the intervention of an anti-tank company no firm link had been made with 15th Panzer by that evening. Panzer Group had now concentrated and surrounded the main of the New Zealand and elements of 7th Armoured Division. The corridor was narrowing in width, British attacks on the southern front were weakening and were being beaten off, only on the far eastern Sollum front had there been defeats. The garrisons at Bardia, Sollum, and Halfaya were once again surrounded and cut off. The decisive attack against the New Zealand Division went in on 30 November but it was not co-ordinated because 15th Panzer Division arrived late at its start line, for as a result of false orders it had beer, given its units had had to spend the night in a fruitless desert march. To hide the direction of the main Axis thrust feint assaults were made against a number of points, particularly at Sidi Rezegh. Although the German assaults began well the Royal Air Force attacks soon halted the forward movement for the British High-Command, realising the desperate situation, had brought every arm to bear to aid the encircled troops who were defending themselves with the utmost tenacity. Particularly did the strength of the British artillery distinguish itself during the fighting and the panzer forces gained a healthy respect for its accuracy and its punch.
In the early afternoon 15th Panzer Division, having rested after its night drive, came roaring up, made its first strike to the north, swung wide of Sidi Rezegh and then turned east to encircle the main British force from the west This now had the 90th Light to the north, 21st Panzer to the east, Battle Group Mickl, a new formation chiefly artillery in composition, and Ariete to the south-east.
When the German units were in position Mickl Group, supported by a machine gun battalion and 8th Panzer Regiment, began to exert pressure upon the New Zealanders. Then the British corridor into Tobruk came under fire. Fresh, unsupported, and unsuccessful British attacks to rescue the trapped colonial troops were made from the south but these were thrown back by the combined strengths of Mickl Group, Ariete Division, and the left wing of 21st Panzer Division. British armour then probed for a weak spot in the German ring and Axis reconnaissance units reported that enemy forces were in movement from Bir el Gobi in the west. The 21st Panzer came under pressure from British forces outside the encirclement. During the night of 30 November/1 December, the South Africans made an unsuccessful assault to break the German noose and the New Zealanders were then ordered to break out south-eastwards.
In the foggy light of 1 December the 15th Panzer made its killing thrust from the north of Sidi Rezegh. The battle group was made up of 8th Panzer Regiment with elements from 90th Light, 200th Regiment, a machine gun battalion, 15th Motor Cycle Battalion, and two battalions from 33rd Artillery Regiment as well as a 21cm howitzer battery. Heavy resistance by 8th Army at first delayed the advance but by 10.40hrs the encircled Imperial troops had been captured while outside the ring 4th Tank Brigade and other British units mounted a series of fierce assaults on Mickl Group and 21st Panzer Division to ease the pressure upon the trapped New Zealanders.
By late afternoon of 1 December it was nearly all over. The 15th Panzer and 90th Light Divisions had overcome the British defences and by linking hands had cut Tobruk off again, although the garrison of the town had lengthened the perimeter by a further 8 miles and held the strategic height which dominated the Axis supply route.
As the December daylight faded the remaining New Zealand units were destroyed one by one and by 2 December, after five bitter days of battle the fighting died away. Two thousand prisoners had been taken, together with more than 40 guns and a mass of equipment. The last two days had truly been a battle of attrition and at the close of the fighting foe and friend alike sank exhausted to the ground. Operation Crusader had ended.
Although 2 December marked the end of the Crusader offensive the campaign continued and the immediate post-battle interlude was used by both sides to regroup their forces. Each side had at least one division which was still ready for action. For the British this was 4th Indian which in the days after Crusader sealed off once again and even more strongly the Axis garrisons in Bardia, Sollum, and Halfaya.
On the German side 15th Panzer was still fit for action but the strength return of that formation gives an indication of how hard had been the battle. On the evening of 1 December only 11 Panzer II, 24 Panzer III, and 3 Panzer IV remained. The Africa Corps report for 3 December stated that more than 167 of its tanks and armoured cars were a total loss. The Italians had lost more than 90 of their armoured fighting vehicles but the British had suffered the destruction of over 800 machines. In personnel the German casualties were 600 killed, 1900 wounded, and 2200 missing. The Italians suffered less as the bulk of their forces were not so deeply involved. The British and Imperial forces had lost heavily and more than 9000 of 8th Army had been taken prisoner.
Most battles have a tactical and a strategic outcome. Strategically the British won the day for they wece able continually to reinforce their Army and go on to push the Axis forces out of Cyrenaica. The Germans had gained a tactical success and had used mobility, the speed of attack, and the greater range of their tank guns to reduce the numerical superiority of their British opponents. When attacking they struck at the weakest part or element of the 8th Army line with the strongest possible force and, when forced on to the defensive had fought aggressively. Their intention had been to destroy the British force; mere possession of ground they saw was unimportant and could under certain conditions be a burden. They had, therefore, been prepared to give ground temporarily to conserve strength in order that, at the appropriate time, strength would be available for them to make a counterstroke and to regain the territory which had been lost.
Against the new British attack which opened on 8 December and which had come up from Bir el Gobi the Germans had no more strength and as the Italian motorised Corps could not be ready in time to take up its defensive position, panzer group ordered the withdrawal to begin. The Axis troops fell back upon the Gazala line but so closely did the British pursue them that they reached the Gazala positions at the same time as the Italians.