Cyrenaica was indefensible. Rommel recognised the truth of that thesis or, to qualify the thesis, it was indefensible with the forces which he had available. Wavell had been the first to prove and Rommel had gone on to show that the deserts which lay to the south of the great curve of the Gulf of Bomba presented no obstacle to the determined commander. Although he resolved not to give ground without a battle and was prepared to offer the most determined resistance whenever possible, Rommel's decision to withdraw from the province was completely misunderstood in Rome, Berlin, and, even by his superior, Bastico. This latter set his face absolutely against the evacuation of territory until Rommel offered him the alternative of either agreeing to give up ground or of trying to hold Cyrenaica without German troops, for Rommel was quite prepared to leave the Italians to fend for themselves if his plan was not followed. Kesselring, the Supreme Commander South, intervened and together with a number of German and Italian officers opposed Rommel's intention for they considered the loss of Cyrenaica would have political repercussions for Mussolini. Rommel dealt with their objections poim by point and convinced them that, in view of the continuing and omnipresent problems of insufficient men and supplies, there was no other choice.
A new British thrust on 16 December threatened the panzer force with encirclement but Rommel ordered that battle be avoided and that his troops break out. He knew the true weakness of his command and that if it were to stand and fight then its strength would be reduced to a point where Tripolitania could no longer be defended. Nothing but defeat could be gained from fighting.
The Axis forces flooded westward withdrawing past the fortress of Tobruk and giving ground in the face of 8th Army's pressure. By Christmas Benghasi had fallen, although at a high cost to the British in men and material, and still the rearward movement continued until the whole Axis army had moved back to take up the new battle line in the prepared positions which ran from Marada to Marsa el Brega. By 7 January this move had been carried out and. with a shorter line to defend, Rommel could now begin to build up strength again to mount an offensive which would capture Cyrenaica and drive forward to the Suez canal. Hundreds of miles to the east Halfaya still held out unsupported and without hope of reinforcement. It was to continue its resistance until 17 January but then when its water supply was cut the garrison surrendered.
Rommel's counter-offensive opened on 19 January and under cover of a sand storm the Panzer Army made a surprise thrust towards El Agheila. Two days later an infantry and a machine gun Battle Group Marcks, was led in person by the German commander-in-chief through the mine-fields east of Marsa el Brega while the main of Africa Corps moved south of the Via Balbia. Agedabia was captured and immediately the Stuka squadrons occupied the field and from this front line position came into action against British tank forces. If the offensive had shocked the British it had come as a complete surprise to Rommel's superiors in the OKW and in the Commando Supremo, for Rommel had allowed no word of his intentions to be known.
The advance continued on 24 January when 15th Panzer with the 21st Panzer Division on its left flank swung south from Antelat opening a broad front as the advance was made towards Maaten Giofer. The Battle Group Marcks and an Italian unit continued to drive eastward to close a ring around the British and by midday of 24th these had been cleared from the area south-east of Agedabia and had lost 117 of their tanks in the severe fighting. Some British units escaped through a corridor between the Marcks Group and 21st Panzer Division but the main was surrounded and destroyed. On the morning of 25 January the panzer group moved forward again and attacked Msus, the main British supply depot, from which the Axis troops obtained no less than 600 trucks, 127 guns, and 280 armoured fighting vehicles.
The next move was to regroup and to form four battle groups which were to move upon Mechili and on 25th, while the bulk of the Africa Corps rested in the Msus-Antelat area, reconnaissance detachments and motorised infantry carried the advance eastwards. The Marcks Group, which Rommel led in person and in pouring rain throughout the long cold night, brought the assault forward until in the grey dawn of 27 January he had reached El Regima. By the afternoon that place had fallen and with it the airport of Benghasi. An infantry battle group cut round behind the town to block the Via Balbia and to deal within the city the British troops still fighting there. Once again the booty captured served the Axis forces well for more than 1300 trucks were captured together with food, equipment, and petrol.
There was no time for rest and once Ariete had taken over security duties east of Benghasi and Trieste Division had begun to carry out the same tasks in the Gemines sector the German reconnaissance in force continued at a mad pace. The coastal towns along the Via Balbia were taken one after the other defeating or throwing back the mainly Indian garrisons until at last Derna was reached.
Then began the final stages of the German advance to the Gazala positions ind at first these were to be occupied by the reconnaissance detachments only while the bulk of the Africa Corps stayed in Benghasi. The Italian XXI Corps was ordered to move up to secure the area between Benghasi and Agedabia. The first new mine-fields were begun on 3 February, the start of belts of such defences which reached deep into the desert from the coast for a distance of over 150 miles.
In the relative peace which the efforts of the strenuous campaigning of the past months then forced upon both sides, the Germans and their Italian comrades strengthened and improved their positions. The Gialo Oasis was occupied and thereby the southern flank of the Axis line was secured. Behind the main Gazala mine-fields others less extensive in area but dominating important sectors were also laid and anti-tank gun positions sited. The nex: months were taken up with resting, training, and preparing the troops for the forthcoming offensives of the summer.
Strike at Gazala
Cyrenaica was now safe but the undefeated 8th Army lay just across the desert and the conviction that British resources were seemingly inexhaustible, revived Rommel's fear that thousands of British tanks would one day come storming out of the desert. He decided to strike a pre-emptive blow which would capture Tobruk and then go forward to the Nile delta. But the genesi; of the German summer offensive had been an OKW order issued on 30 June 1941, which laid out a grand strategy in which a southern pincer would drive through Egypt to link up with two northern arms, one of which woulc advance from Bulgaria through Turkey and the other from the Caucasus through Iran. The success of this giant pincer movement was predicated upon the capture of Tobruk for Hitler refused to seize the Tunisian ports through which the army could have been more easily reinforced and supplied.
Cavallero, of Commando Supremo, planned to establish a giant depot at Agedabia from which the Axis troops could be nourished during their advance, but as an undefeated Malta remained a base from which Axis convoys could be attacked then Malta would have to be taken out. Discussions at the highest level authorised Rommel to mount an attack upon Tobruk but added that he was to halt at the Egyptian frontier to allow the maximum support to be given to the Malta undertaking. The timetable for the operation was the end of May to mid-June and Rommel was directed that if Tobruk did not fall then a withdrawal back to Gazala must be made.
The strain of battle had reduced the unit strengths but not the confidence of the Africa Corps but then convoys arrived bringing across reinforcements and equipment to fill out the shrunken units and to rearm them.