The situation at last light on 28th was that the Africa Corps was sr£ surrounded and that strong British forces were driving along the Trigh Capuzzo towards the trapped divisions. On the Bir Harmat front the 90th Light was slowly giving ground and XX Corps had sent forward the Trieste Division to gain touch with Africa Corps in response to the urging of the Army Commander. There was a slight improvement in the supply positicr when a number of lorries and tanks which had been dispersed by Britis' attacks rejoined the main body. Then, too, Rommel had made his ow» I reconnaissance and had found a route which his supply columns might use without much difficulty during the following day.
British commentators on this battle describe the 28 May as a quiet day ba it is more accurate to describe it as a day of wasted opportunities. The 8th Army had expected Rommel to maintain his northward progress and bar gathered strength to take the panzers in flank but the comparative inactivity and the inaction of the British units had allowed Rommel to continue with gapping the mine-fields and to reconnoitre routes for his supply trucks.
The battle order for 29 May was 'The Africa Corps will take Acroma in an attack to begin at 09:00hrs' and in an effort to draw the British attention from this drive the Italian Corps on the western Gazala front were ordered to demonstrate. The Africa Corps called in its outlying reconnaissance battalions and these formed a shield on the eastern flank. The number of' “kills” reported for the 28th -241 tanks and armoured cars, 46 guns including anti-tank weapons — gave a hope that there would be a successful outcome to the battle. The destruction of so many 8th Army's tanks was slowly reducing the numerical superiority which the British had enjoyed at the start of the fighting and these 'kills' were the result of the piecemeal and unsupported charges which the British tanks still made against the gun and panzer lines.
At 02:00hrs on 29 May Africa Corps cancelled the order to advance upon Acroma and instead directed that the divisions were to take up a defensive posture. The 21st Panzer was to consolidate on Point 209, the 15th Panzer was to protect the northern flank against the thrusts of 7th Armoured Division, while 90th Light was to stand on the defensive south-east of Bir el Harmat But on the western flank a small ray of hope was visible: Trieste Division had gapped the mine-field in two places — at about the level of the Trigh Capuzzo and the Trigh el Abd. Rommel had, meanwhile, led a convoy along the route he had found and brought it forward to where the vehicles of 15th Panzer lay stranded. His arrival was timely for 2nd Armoured Brigade advancing from Knightsbridge was seeking to drive a wedge between the panzer divisions to the north of and the Ariete Division south of the Trigh Capuzzo. Rommel called up a battle group from 21st Panzer to strengthen the 15th Panzer and then Ariete Division came up. The British advance then came up against the three Axis armoured divisions and from wireless intercepts it was clear that the British brigade had suffered heavily. A second armoured brigade, the 22nd, moved up to stiffen the attack by 2nd Armoured Brigade, and then a third Brigade, 4th Armoured, was drawn into the battle. The 7th Royal Tank Regiment fell victim to the lure of weak panzer forces and was enticed into range of a gun line hidden in the dust of the khamsin.
Then 15th Panzer Division moved forward to the Trigh Capuzzo where it gained touch with Ariete and had thereby cut off large numbers of 8th Army troops. Many of these made desperate efforts to escape under cover of the sandstorm and one group of 40 tanks and 200 lorries made repeated attempts to smash the encircling ring and escape to the east. Artillery fire drove back the British convoy. Although there had been a slight improvement in the supply situation it was still critical and seemed likely to remain so. Accordingly, Africa Corps commander proposed that the troops east of the British mine-fields should move westward through the newly created gaps and thus regain their start line area. Rommel proposed another alternative; he would reverse his front, giving ground as he moved slowly back towards the gaps through which the convoys of lorries would come. Once refuelled and rearmed he would then regroup and renew the attack.
At 02.00hrs the Africa Corps began its westward withdrawal protected by rear guards against a possible British move. Despite some losses in the minefields, Corps reached Bir Sidi Muftah at 06.00hrs where they surprised and were surprised by British troops. Corps had run head on into a 'box', held in strength by 150th Brigade from 50th Division, positioned between, and thus dominating, the two mine-field gaps. The first attack by the panzer division was halted at the edge of the mine-field and then driven back by anti-tank guns. The order was issued that the box must be taken quickly for by 11.30hrs the situation had deteriorated alarmingly and fresh crises were at hand. The 90th Light was being pressed by 1st Tank Brigade at Bir Harmat. there was heavy fighting along the Trigh Capuzzo where 22nd Armoured Brigade was trying to outflank Corps; 21st Panzer was wincing under a bombardment of unusual ferocity coming out of Gazala and the Royal Air Force was attacking every enemy column.
Victory now seemed certain for 8th Army; Rommel's forces, constricted within a small area bounded by the Trigh Bir Hachim, Trigh Capuzzo, and Trigh el Abd, were being pressed on to the British mine-fields. The two gaps which the Axis engineers had managed to create were so narrow that movement was slow; they were dominated by British artillery and movement only by night was possible. The whole determination of Africa Corps was centred upon holding off the British in the east while consolidating in the west, but this was impossible so long as the 150th Brigade box remained.
But if Rommel had his hours of anxiety the British, too, had had their moments of concern. The attacks by 2nd and 22nd Armoured Brigades had been crushed by the anti-tank gun screen and Guards Brigade had been hit while making a sortie from the Knightsbridge box and had been driven back with heavy loss.
Rommel's luck did not, however, desert him for during the night of 30/31 st supply trucks reached Corps concentration area and, when in the morning both panzer divisions reported themselves ready for action, army headquarters ordered them to expand their fronts and to take out the box at Got el Ualeb - the 150th Brigade position. The first unprepared and hastily organised assaults were driven back by the determined defenders supported by the remnants of a tank regiment.
The 8th Army, unaware that Rommel's supply position had been eased still optimistically believed that the Panzer Army was withdrawing from battle through the mine-field gaps and considered that the German loss of 371 tanks represented a more damaging blow to the Africa Corps than its own loss of 384 vehicles meant to it.
German attacks against the 150th Brigade box at Got el Ualeb came in during the day and one which captured Point 174 enabled the panzer division's artillery observation post (OP) to direct the fire of his guns with devastating effect The concentration of the whole effort of Africa Corps to take out the box dominated 1 June. At 07.30hrs, 30 panzer from 15th Division and a battalion of 104th Regiment, together with the Corps battle group struck down from the north, while from the south came 90th Light and then from the south-east elements from Trieste Division. Within the perimeter of the box the last five tanks of 44th Royal Tank Regiment formed line and went out to fight an unequal duel. In the great silence which, for a few minutes, hung over the stricken field the only noise was the creaking of the tracks as the armoured fighting vehicles moved towards the anti-tank gun line. Only one returned. Still resistance was being offered and Rommel led an abortive attack by 5th Panzer Regiment thrusting westwards through the northern lane intending to swing this assault through the mine-field and to attack 150th Brigade from the west. Uncleared mines destroyed 12 of his tanks and the assault was called off. Under cover of almost continuous Stuka dive-bomber assaults the German infantry supported by tanks beat their way through the British opposition until they had linked with the spearhead of the Italian division. Other German units on the eastern flank held off the weak and unco-ordinated attacks aimed at relieving the trapped brigade but by midday it was all over.