This enforced rest was the first break from battle that the German troops had had since Gazala four months before and not only was the opportunity taken to carry out maintenance on the vehicles and to care for the artillery but refresher courses were run and the army settled down. They would not have been soldiers if they had not grumbled and their complaints were very much those of front line soldiers everywhere. The German troops in Africa felt that they were being neglected by the artistes of the front-line theatres in favour of rear echelon units and the Luftwaffe, who had more comfortable quarters and better food. It was a well-known secret that Luftwaffe planes flew between Africa and Europe bringing back fresh vegetables and delicacies unobtainable in the southern Mediterranean.
In order to pass the time more pleasantly, regimental officers tried to obtain sports gear but found that this would have to be indented for from Italy. Entertainments at regimental level and from regimental sources were organised and the group of comedians from 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment were very popular. Army reported that there were 12 speakers available who could talk amusingly on many subjects and issued 1200 sets of games among the troops. The 21st Panzer received musical encouragement in the shape of 8 piano accordians and among the visits received by division were the bands of 5th Panzer Regiment and 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Copies of the soldiers' newspapers printed in the Mediterranean theatre of operations — Die Oase, Adler von Hellas, and Kolonie und Heimat -were distributed as well as guides to historic Africa and various books written by divisional officers.
During this period there were certain ceremonies for which there had been no time while on active service. The 5th Panzer Regiment received a certificate for its 500th “kill”, the Panzer Artillery Regiment No 155 for its 80,000th round fired, and the divisional bakery company for its four millionth loaf baked.
Naturally there had been planning at high level and alternatives were drawn up to the main defence plan in the event of a British breakthrough at the south or the north. The growing realisation that Italian troops were now completely unreliable produced the scheme under which the Axis forces were intermingled so that each major Italian formation had a stiffener of German troops either with or near it. For all the fact that they were an unreliable element the amount of shipping space taken by the Italians was out of all proportion for no less than 77,000 men of that army's total strength of 146,000 was engaged in security or in administrative duties and the allocation of space in the convoys was computed upon Italian requirements and not upon the demands of the front line. Thus the ridiculous situation arose in which Italian rear units were up to establishment in trucks while German lorries for fighting units were waiting for space on docks in Italian harbours. Not once during the first seven months of 1942 did the amount of supplies received by the Africa Corps come up to the indent figures and less than 50 per cent of the minimum requirements of 30,000 tons of fuel was received. By adopting the most draconian measures, including cutting the bread ration, the Africa Corps was able to find shipping space to bring in the battle equipment it so desperately needed. One indent for 2400 tons of fuel produced a supply — 100 tons. But not all these shortages were attributable to Italian selfishness. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, had combined to strangle the armies in Africa by cutting off supplies and had had such success in sinkings that the total number of ships available to the Axis forces was 4 fast and 7 slow steamers. Even the fast ships could only make one journey each month and the slow ships had to wait for a convoy.
The despair of the senior officers of Panzer Army was best summed up in the words of Stumme who commanded while Rommel was in Germany, 'We stop one hole only to tear another hole open. Freedom of manoeuvre is for the Army an absolute necessity.' As if to underline the complete misunderstanding of the situation facing Panzer Army which was held by OKH, an order was sent that all men who had served in Africa for longer than a year were to be returned to Germany. Then, the Malta [16] operation having been cancelled, the Ramcke Parachute Brigade, all of them specialists in parachute operations, were put into the line as ordinary infantry.
Throughout the long weeks of waiting British air supremacy kept the Germans in ignorance of the tremendous build-up of 8th Army strength but then came the first night of Alamein. A British force of 177,000 men, 2180 guns, 1110 tanks, and 700 aircraft faced an Axis force of 93,000 men, 1400 guns, 500 tanks, and 700 aircraft. The Panzer Army's 15th Panzer Division had only 3840 men, the 164th Division only 6343, 21st Panzer only 3972. and the 90th Light Division 2827 men. There were 24,173 men in the forward zone, including artillery and the flak division. Also in the front line sectors were 230 panzers with the Africa Corps and 300 with the Italians. There was no mobile reserve because there were neither troops, tanks, nor fuel to provide one.
The area of the 8th Army's assault and its power surprised Stumme and Rommel, who flew back from Germany immediately news came through, realised that it was too late to alter the situation. By the fourth day of battle the southern sector had to be robbed of men to fill out the northern flank and by 26 October the number of tanks with 15th Panzer had shrunk to 39 and to 98 with the 21st Panzer Division. Being less involved in the fighting the Italian tank losses had been correspondingly lighter. These figures were further reduced and on 27 October the Africa Corps had only 114 runners and the Italians 206. The losses in armour to 8th Army had been 215 machines.
The crisis in supplies was renewed and in desperation Rommel signalled to Hitler that the Army after 10 days of hard fighting against an overwhelmingly numerically superior enemy was exhausted. Shortage of petrol would condemn the non-motorised units to annihilation and even the mobile units had insufficient fuel to take them any great distance. Rommel's message concluded with the bitter forecast that Hitler must be prepared for the total destruction of the Army in Africa. The German commander had telegraphed no less than the truth for the artillery had no fuel to tow the guns and the panzer strength of the Corps had sunk to 30 machines.
Hitler's reply was characteristic: 'The German people follow with me ... the men of the Italian and German unjts in their heroic battles ... Not one step back. Victory or death.' This sort of armchair strategy did not suit Rommel who needed freedom of action. With Hitler's reluctant permission to move back to the Fuka pass came the usual promises of future supplies, including the improved 7.5cm anti-tank gun and the new 8.8cm weapon; but no immediate help could be given and in the retreat to take up the Fuka positions there were more serious losses when Montgomery's tank regiments, impatient for revenge, overhauled and smashed the less speedy Pavia, Brescia, and Folgore Divisions, wreaking such havoc that XX Corps was reduced to one weak battalion without tanks and Ariete was completely destroyed as a fighting force.
On 1 November a new and temporary front was built at Sollum and the panzer divisions held, as usual, the open desert flank against 8th Army's thrusts out of the sand seas. At every defensive line along which the Axis armies tried to halt the British advance certain situations repeated themselves. Firstly, the mobile troops would restrain for as long as possible 8th Army's assaults and appeals would be made by Rommel for permission to evacuate the non-motorised units of the Italian Army. From Hitler or from Mussolini would then come the order to hold the stated line to the last, but then they would finally give the authority to ferry back the Italian infantry to a new line. Lastly, in this series of frustrations the panzers would cover this withdrawal and conduct another fighting retreat to the next position, at which the same sequence of events would be repeated.