With such forces General Nehring realised that he could never halt but only delay any strong Allied assault and indeed, if we may anticipate the course of events, we shall see that the Allied thrusts which began on 21 November caused such alarm that the Germans were preparing to burn their secret files. It seemed to the German commanders at that time that their forces would be in occupation of Tunisia for only a few days and that the length of their stay would depend upon the speed and power of the Allied advance and the defensive ability of the Axis forces. But Nehring was too old a soldier not to realise that even with massive reinforcement a German victory was no longer possible and that the most his troops could do was to delay the inevitable Allied victory.
The problems facing Nehring were daunting in the extreme. He had no staff of officers to help him run his embryo Corps and he asked for the senior staff of 10th Panzer Division to be sent to Tunis to command the splinter groups which he nominally led and to establish a military system. There was neither radio nor signals equipment for HQ Nehring, as his command was called, and no transport. Strategically the situation was even more desperate. Nehring saw that the Allies' successful landings had given them the military initiative and that he must prepare for Eisenhower's forces to make the next move. This could be either a direct thrust for the principal objectives of Tunis and Bizerta thereby strangling the supply line to Rommel. Alternatively, part of the Allied armies could strike for the Gabes Gap, and thus contain Rommel while the main striking force of the Allied army attacked Sicily. Alternatively, the main thrust could drive from Gabes to the sea and thus separate the forces in Tunisia from those in Tripolitania while a smaller force contained the Axis armies in northern Tunisia. Thereafter, the 8th Army in the desert and the Allied armies in Tunisia could destroy the Italian-German armies piecemeal.
Nehring saw that his only counter lay in converting Tunisia into a strong area into which Rommel could withdraw his African army. This then, linked with the forces which he had been promised would arrive from Europe, would enable him to convert Tunisia into a wound in the Allied side. By switching his forces he could counter any assault in the north or south by threatening the flank of the attackers. But even more important was the supply route to Rommel's army and, with the expected loss of the port of Tripolitania, only the Tunisian harbours remained open and they were the nearest to Sicily and to Italy. But the political situation had to be regularised. Permission to enter and to transit through Tunisia was not sufficient; militarily he must occupy the country. For his part Kesselring aided the movement and on 16 November, in the interests of military administration, formed out of HQ Nehring the XC Corps with Nehring as General Officer Commanding and having power over German and Italian military forces in the Tunisian area.
Although the naval and air forces of Germany and Italy were not under Nehring's control the paratroop battalions - technically on Luftwaffe establishment - and two battalions of Italian San Marco Marines were assigned to him. The composition of the small force which had been dignified with the title of XC Corps was part of 5th Para Regiment, the Barenthin Para Regiment, of which at that time only Witzig's Para-Engineer Battalion was available, a battery of four 8.8cm flak guns, a reconnaissance squadron of six-wheeled armoured vehicles each armed with a 7.5cm cannon, and an infantry replacement battalion. The Italian component, in addition to the two battalions of marines already mentioned, was two battalions of infantry from Superga Division which had been rushed across from the mainland of Europe. Everything else was formed on an ad hoc basis. In the absence of signals equipment the Axis forces were forced to rely upon the French Post Office to maintain communication with their forward units. Until military vehicles arrived from Europe civilian lorries had to be hired to maintain the supply system and there was no military medical organisation; for the first months the sick and lightly wounded were treated in civilian hospitals. Even Nehring's driver was not German but a captain of Italian extraction serving on the French Army reserve. With this insufficient and un-coordinated force Nehring's orders were to strike for the Algerian-Tunisian border and to establish good defensive positions on the western side of the hills there. At all costs the Allies must be prevented from gaining observation points from which they could dominate eastern Tunisia. High ground was to be the key to success in the forthcoming battles.
The attitude of the French in Tunisia was dichotomatic. The senior officers of the services were either wholly or partially loyal to the Vichy French Government of Marshal Petain which had concluded an armistice with the Axis in 1940. Many of these officers and their civilian counterparts were prepared to tolerate and, in some cases, support actively an Axis occupation of the French North African territories. Other officers, particularly in the lower echelons of the military hierarchy, were pro-Allied and hoped to prevent an Axis occupation by delaying the Germans and the Italians and by allowing unhindered passage to the Allied armies.
Certainly the troops of Koch's paratroop spearhead had found the delaying tactics of the French quite exasperating. It was important for the German commander to know the French intention; whether General Barre was intending to remain neutral and passive or whether he was determined to go over to the Allies and deny to the Germans access to the bridgeheads across the Medjerda river. The area which his division was holding was of strategic importance and delay in clarifying the situation was of benefit to the Allies and a disadvantage to the Germans. French senior military officers deferred conversations between the paratroop officer delegation and the commanding general until leading elements of British troops, men of 6th Battalion the Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, had entered and occupied Beja. The British 78th Infantry Division at that time comprised almost the whole of the Allied fighting strength in northern Tunisia and one of its Brigades, the 36th, was advancing as a left-hand column upon Bizerta, spreading a thin film of troops across the countryside.
The head of the column, the striking point, was aiming at Djebel Abiod and the important road junctions, in that place, of the Bone—Beja, and Bone— Bizerta highways. A second brigade of 78th Division, the llth Infantry Brigade, was advancing along the Beja road towards Medjez el Bab with the ultimate intention of thrusting towards Tunis. Supporting the two British infantry brigades was an Anglo-American motorised and armoured unit called Blade Force. The Allied fist with two ringers thrusting towards the enemy's vitals was preparing to strike.
The first major clash between the British and the Germans in Tunisia happened during the early afternoon of 17 November, when Major Witzig's battle group advanced upon Abiod from Mateur, aiming to reach Tabarka. His column was made up of two paratroop companies from the Para-Engineer Regiment's 11th Battalion, a squadron of 15 Panzer IVs, two Italian SP guns, a troop of 2cm flak guns, and a battery of 10.5cm cannon.
At Abiod three rifle companies of the West Kents, supported by a troop of 25-pounder guns and elements from 5th Battalion The Northamptonshire Regiment, were in position and dug in around the houses on the eastern side of the small town. The British infantry held fire even as the vehicles of the German battle group rolled past the houses and not until the 25-pounders opened up at almost point-blank range did the battle open. With the first shots some of Witzig's tanks were destroyed and the column was brought to a halt. The lorry-borne paratroops debussed and formed a firing line in front of the town while others raced for high ground and the artillery began a bombardment of the British positions. Under this barrage the soft-skinned vehicles were withdrawn. Witzig flung out a small infantry group to probe the British defences while the 2cm flak gun, which had halted and taken up position on the road, opened fire and poured a barrage into and upon the West Kent positions until a direct hit from a 25-pounder shell smashed the weapon and killed the crew.