Towards evening the firing died away and both sides took stock of the situation. Witzig had lost eight of his tanks and had failed to take the road junction but his infantry was on the important high ground and he was, therefore, in a superior tactical position. He could feel content; his small force may not have reached its given objectives but it had halted the eastward advance of a British column. A reshuffle of German forces during that evening brought the Witzig Group under the command of the newly formed von Broich Division. To build up the striking power of this division all Witzig's heavy weapons were withdrawn from him and handed over to Broich.
For the next two days barrage and counter-barrage succeeded each other in the Abiod sector while both sides sent out patrols to probe for weaknesses in the enemy's front. One German fighting patrol made up of No 1 Company of the Para Engineer Battalion set out on the night of 21/22 November just after midnight and had, by 03.00hrs, reached the road outside and to the north of Abiod. A challenge rang out from the British sentries, the para-engineers rushed the houses firing their machine pistols and hefting explosive charges into the buildings destroying British opposition. They returned to their own lines with minimal casualties.
The Luftwaffe was much in evidence during this period bombing and strafing the forward British positions and thereby aiding the efforts of the German ground forces. During the latter half of November Witzig's battle group, shrunken in number by casualties, received an Italian paratroop battalion as reinforcement. This crack unit was immediately committed to battle and launched an attack upon the 36th Brigade positions around Abiod. The assault collapsed in the fire of the British infantry and was beaten into the ground. Shattered by its losses the Italian unit was withdrawn and Witzig's men took over their former positions.
Vehicles of the only German armoured car reconnaissance unit in Tunisia were caught and destroyed in an ambush set by a British paratroop company in the area of Sidi Nsir during 18 November. Both sides were testing each other. This process continued on 20 November, when part of British 11th Brigade thrust a column along the valley of the Djournina towards Mateur with the intention of outflanking Witzig's group. The German commander relying upon the support of some Italian SP artillery switched the guns from flank to flank - at Abiod halting an infantry drive at Sidi Nsir stopping the advance of part of a British paratroop battalion. During this period a British armoured force was assembled to drive back the Axis forces from their positions on the Djebel Abiod and under this armoured pressure Witzig's met made a methodical, step-by-step withdrawal until they reached prepared defensive positions at Jefna.
Allied pressure during 18 November served to convince the Germans thai the time of crisis was at hand and that an all-out Allied offensive could be wholly expected. This anticipated advance, as the Germans saw it, would be facilitated by the attitude of the French vis-a-vis the Allies, for the Anglo-Saxons would be allowed to move with best speed towards the German bridgeheads. Nehring at that time had only four 8.8cm guns in Tunisia and he personally selected the sites on which they were placed. One was on the Pom du Fahs road and two others were set up to act as the last artillery defence for the capital. But, as the hours passed without the decisive thrust being made, Nehring grew more confident and flung out more and more battle groups to seize and to hold key points and vital heights. There could be no question of forming a battle line, just pockets of battle hardened men utilising even minute and every feature and turning both to thek advantage. As new units were formed or arrived in the akports they were rushed to the front and injected piecemeal into any sector where the need was greatest.
Kesselring, meanwhile, had promised that with 10th Panzer, the Hermanc Goering and the 334th Infantry Divisions, together with two infantry divisions which the Italians had promised to supply, a new Army would be created. [21]
Thus, on 19 November and from the German command point of view, the situation was that the northern area around Djebel Abiod was secure. In the centre, around Medjez el Bab, the position was still uncertain. In the south the western Allies had, as yet, made no appearance. The time had come for Nehring to seize quickly and to hold open the southern gateway, the Gabes area, and thus permit the safe withdrawal of Rommel's forces. But from where were the men to come to carry out this operation? An immediate solution presented itself in a small group of para-engineers who had been serving with Rommel in the desert and who were now in the Gabes region. Many of this handful of men were sick or convalescent and all were due to go on leave to Germany. But at the call of duty they took up battle positions, occupying key points in the region and determined to hold them until reinforcements reached them from the bridgehead area.
Back in the northern sector a company of 5th Para was assembled and together with No 3 Company of Kesselring's headquarters defence battalion was embarked into 12 JU 52s with the intention of landing upon and holding the aerodromes at Gabes as well, the Gabes Gap itself. The arrival of the German machines on the runway at Gabes was the signal for the French troops holding the area to open fire with machine guns and artillery. The Junkers aeroplanes and their paratroop load were driven off and headed northwards again back to the aerodrome from which they had taken off. En route to Tunis a hurried conference between the leaders of the enterprise produced a new plan and it was decided to make an emergency landing on a suitable piece of flat land some 30 miles from Gabes. The machines landed, the paratroops disembarked, and sent out a reconnaissance patrol to Gabes. A second patrol went out to capture the airport to prepare for the landing of follow-up troops. The remainder of the small command then took up all round defensive positions. A third patrol went out — seven men under command of a lance corporal — and these, having been taken prisoner by the French, were brought back to Gabes aerodrome for interrogation. By bluff they convinced the French commander that unless he surrendered the place by the following morning it would be laid flat by a Stuka attack.On the morning of 18th the sound of aircraft was heard and a stream of JU 52s was seen roaring towards the aerodrome with the intention of air landing the troops who were to occupy the Gabes Gap. The French, convinced that they were to be bombed from the air, abandoned the airfield and the us landed.
One of the vital positions for the passage of the desert army had been taken almost without bloodshed. As early as 19 November small detachments of German and Italian troops in southern Tunisia had been active on reconnaissance patrols. Based on Zarhouan and Pont du Fahs they had ranged across the Goubellat plain, had reached Tebourba, El Bathan, and the whole area to the south-west of Tunis without meeting any serious opposition. Axis troops occupied Ksar Tyr on 20 November and El Aroussa three days later. The towns of Sousse and Sfax were taken over and a force of Germans and Italians hastily assembled and moved westwards to hold the hills around Kairouan against an expected- Allied thrust in that area. On other sectors demolition teams went out to mine roads and to destroy bridges in areas which the Germans were too weak in number to hold. The whole region was sealed by the second day and the paratroops prepared defensive positions from which they first held, and then threw back, the initial thrusts made against them by American forces striking towards Gabes.