Now that Medjez el Bab was in British hands Tebourba had become the next most important stepping stone in the advance by 11th Brigade and it fell to 1st Battalion the East Surrey Regiment at dawn on 27 November. The concentration of Blade Force armour in and around Tebourba and the Chouigui pass, some 4 miles north of the village, convinced Nehring that this was the area and the direction from which the decisive Allied assault would be made. The possession of Tebourba would determine whether Tunis would fall or would be held. Nehring sent in a series of armoured probing attacks to ascertain the Allied strength in the area. Two columns of infantry and tanks attacked; one from the north-east and the second from the east. Small, bitter battles were fought in the olive groves which are laid out all around the town.
Early in the morning of 27 November the East Surreys in the perimeter around Tebourba were attacked by a German tank column, Battle Group Lu'der. Leading the assault were two of the giant Panzer VI Tigers, which had been rushed over to Tunisia. A dozen or so other tanks completed the armoured group. The first wave of panzers rolled over the forward British infantry positions but then came under fire from a battery of British 25-pounder guns positioned behind the East Surreys. The tank gun versus field gun duel was short and predictable: all 8 guns of the British battery were knocked out and lay smashed and silent. But dotting the rolling countryside were 10 tanks of Battle Group Lüder, completely destroyed. At last light the German panzer column drew off down the road to Djedeida taking a further four damaged vehicles with it.
During the night of 27/28 November both sides improved their tactical positions or regrouped their forces. The British commander intended to capture Djedeida and then to move 11th Brigade in a north-westerly direction to cover the flank of the Allied force which would then thrust for Tunis. The elaborate plan for 36th Brigade to attack Djebel Abiod was not required for Witzig and his men had slipped away in the night and had moved back upon Bizerta. They had dug positions in the area of Jefna on the road to Mateur and stood there waiting.
On the morning of 28 November the 36th Brigade column led by the carrier platoon of 8th Battalion the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders advanced into the valley between the Djebel el Azag, known to the British as Green Hill, and the Djebel el Ajred, known as Bald Hill. Hidden in position on the slopes above the valley lay the men of Witzig's para-engineers and a pair of Italian SP guns. The German fire discipline was excellent and no shot was fired as the rifle companies of the Argylls moved into the valley. The Scots opened fire at 13.45hrs with machine guns and mortars upon suspected German positions but still no fire was returned. Emboldened by this lack of opposition the Argylls moved into the valley and Witzig gave the command to his men to open fire. A single shot from an anti-aircraft gun opened what became a hurricane of fire upon the Scots. The Italian SPs' first round smashed the last carrier on the track and the ground on either side of the track was mined. There could be no advance in the face of the fire which was being poured down upon the British nor could they withdraw. Within minutes eight carriers were smashed and blazing as they were picked off one after the other. Nor did the screen of riflemen forming the Argyll's advanced guard escape the fury of the German fire wfiich smashed into the killing ground, and only six men of the leading company reached the British lines. Further assaults or succeeding days by 6th Royal West Kents and No 6 Commando were alsc beaten back with heavy loss to the attackers. Exhausted by their fruitless efforts the men of 36th Brigade could make no further effort and fighting diec down on this sector,
German contrattack
To divert Nehring's attention from the main thrust, to compel him to split his force and thus to ease the British assault, General Evelegh ordered a para drop by 2nd Battalion upon Depienne on the southern flank of the advance. The British drop would capture the Luftwaffe's advanced air base at Oudns after which it was to join up with Blade Force. Meanwhile 1st Commando on the sea flank would make an assault landing near Sidi el Moudjad, behind the back of the German force which was opposing the advance of 36th Brigade.
The sea-borne assault was betrayed to the Germans by local Arabs anc Nehring, with his forces committed to holding 78th Division's thrust, had nc reserve upon which he could immediately draw. The German troops were sc thin on the ground that only 30 men garrisoned Tunis town. Nehring's only solution was to use the men who were arriving by air. As the aircraft landec the soldiers were hastily embussed and taken to Cap Serrat, the area in which the commandoes had debarked. In the densely wooded hills, which are a feature of that coastal sector, the newly arrived German troops and the British elite troops fought desperate hide-and-seek battles in the darkness of the trees. Commando pressure pushed towards the Sidi Salah crossroads only IS miles west of Bizerta, but fresh German troops were flung into the battle anc the commandoes were compelled to re-embark.
The British para drop was also unlucky. The airfield objective was found to be abandoned and, in the absence of a relief force, the British paras preparec to make their way back to the Allied lines. But their move was intercepted by men of Koch's 1st Battalion as well as by the German armoured car reconnaissance company. Although they were harried, the British were not beaten and when the German paratroops, supported by tanks and armoured cars, made a frontal assault upon them, the British parachute troops destroyed the lead panzer. The Germans, riding into battle on the outside of the armoured vehicles, leaped off and formed action groups, moving forward under the protection of the armoured cars. In hand-to-hand fighting the British 'red devils' and the German 'green devils' of Koch's regiment fought a running battle which lasted until 2 December.
When the British battalion reached the safety of its own lines a count showed that it had sustained over 200 casualties.
As neither the paratroop drop nor the assault from the sea had achieved any reduction in the German opposition, General Evelegh ordered a temporary halt to allow his offensive to regain breath before making the final attack. But his hope of a pause was to be thwarted by the German offensive which was launched by the aggressive commander of 10th Panzer Division, General Fischer.
Although the British and the Americans had been carrying out plans to finish the campaign, it must not be assumed that the initiative had been only with the Allies. The Germans, too, had been very active. The greatest number of troops in their bridgeheads, particularly in the early weeks of the fighting, had been paratroops. These men were among the elite of the German forces and were capable, aggressive, and skilled. On the northern sector their idea of aggressive defence took the form of deep penetration into the Allied rear areas. Witzig's men had the task of delaying the advance of 36th Brigade and had decided that raids behind the British front and demolitions on the supply routes to the forward positions would have a greater effect than a straightforward blocking action. Night after night, often in pouring rain, the patrols went out slipping into the darkness to mine roads, to demolish bridges, and to intercept convoys of lorries, or even single vehicles well behind the British front line. But this was not enough for Witzig. Deep penetration to halt the convoys of supplies and reinforcements coming to Algeria would help to strangle the Allied supply routes and he increased the radius of his commando-type operations by para drops. In a short series of night jumps the German para-engineers landed far in the hinterland of the Allied armies demolishing and mining, causing confusion and alarm to the men on the ground and to their commanders alike.
The men of the para-engineers were all-round specialists and professionals. To cover the weakness in men and further to delay the Allied advance, they laid mine-fields covering every sensitive area, particularly the approaches to those defiles in the hills through which assaults must come. Because of the shortage of real mines many of the fields were sewn, either wholly or in part, with dummies and further to increase the difficulty of lifting them, sophisticated anti-handling devices were fitted.