It can now be appreciated that as a result of the build-up of troops, Nehring had been able to form a small infantry and panzer reserve. No longer was the military situation so desperate that it was the case of having to plug gaps with newly debarked troops. Now their placement and replacement could be carried out in a more regular manner than had been possible heretofore. With no real divisional organisation, for as yet no complete division had arrived in Tunisia, there was still a need for battle groups, those ad hoc formations, in the construction of use of which the Germans were masters. With this reserve of men and armour in hand, Nehring could make plans and he found himself faced with the choice of two very risky alternatives. Either he could use his new panzer force defensively, that is wait until the Allies were strong enough to beat him, or he could act aggressively and throw it against the Allied force around Tebourba, and risk losing it at the first throw.
His mind was made up for him by an order from Kesselring to carry out an attack. The Supreme Commander South was convinced that the Allies were still too weak to make their final thrust and was also critical of Nehring's precipitate retreat. An offensive was ordered to regain the ground which had been lost.
To command the troops in the forthcoming offensive Nehring chose Fischer, commander of 10th Panzer Division, whose unit's advanced party had arrived in Tunisia and who had taken over the responsibility for the defence of Tunis West. Due to Allied air raids the unloading of I Oth Panzer's vehicles took three days but by 30 November two panzer companies together with other troops, were in position around Protville ready to deal with any Allied thrust aimed at Tunis or Bizerta. The units which had arrived in Africa included 80 Panzer Ills from 7th Regiment and these were formed into two companies. In addition, two companies of a motor cycle battalion had arrived, followed by elements of an anti-tank battalion, one company of which had its 7.62cm guns mounted as SP. Among the essential vehicles which had not arrived were those of the divisional command. Fischer had to be content with a scout car without wireless as his command vehicle. The rest of his headquarters' group was mounted in motor cycle combinations.
Nehring's order to Fischer was simple and brief. 'You will attack and destroy the enemy troops in and around Tebourba', and in accordance with his instructions Fischer moved his command during the night of 30th to a point north-east of that small town and made ready for battle. Nehring then withdrew 5th Para from the line and posted it to El Bathan, south of Tebourba and gave Fischer units from other battle groups as well as four infantry replacement battalions. The 10th panzer commander realised that as he was weaker than his enemy he would have to defeat the Allies by cutting their retreat and stopping reinforcements from reaching them. These reinforcements and supplies had to come through two passes. The road from Medjez to Tebourba ran through one, the second pass being the Chougui, through which ran the road from Beja to Sidi Nsir.
If the Germans could capture these passes - and the lie of the land favoured them in this enterprise - they could block any attempt by the Allies to break the German ring and could then go on to defeat the enemy forces one by one.
Fischer's plan proposed an encirclement attack from three sides to pin the Allies against the river and the hills. The Allied positions were roughly triangular in shape with a mainly infantry force to the east and to the southeast. The armour belonging to Blade Force held the apex of the triangle at the Chouigui pass.
Battle Group Liider was located some 3 miles north of the pass and Fischer armed it with a company of 20 tanks, 3 field guns, and a company of infantry. The task of this group was to block the road from the Chouigui pass. On the left flank of Battle Group Liider, was Battle Group Hudel, the strongest of the four battle groups. This had two companies of tanks under command, numbering perhaps 40 vehicles, two companies of anti-tank guns, and a company of infantry. The task of this force would be to destroy the Allied armour by enticing the tanks on to an anti-tank gun screen or by ambushing them. This group would move from the position it held about 5 miles to the north-east of the pass and would converge to form a wedge with the Liider Group. Together their task would be to attack Tebourba from the west or else to block the Gap at that place. The seven companies of Battle Group Koch's paratroops, together with three companies of infantry, a German and an Italian anti-tank gun company, and two field guns, as well as a bicycle platoon of para-engineers had a holding role and were to advance north-westwards towards the Gap cutting off the Allied forces from their escape route. The fourth and final battle group, Djedeida, was to act as a reserve for the first part of the attack. Once the Chouigui pass had been penetrated this group would press westwards, driving the British infantry from their positions on the ridges west of the village.
To carry out its part in the attack, the Battle Group had under command a company of paratroops, two companies of infantry, two anti-tank companies, 18 guns of 2cm calibre, a motor cycle engineer platoon, a battery of 35.5cm SP guns, 2 Panzer Ills, 2 Panzer VI’s, and several 8.8cm guns.
There was little time for adequate planning or accurate reconnaissance to be undertaken and to overcome the problems raised by the lack of signals equipment Fischer arranged for motor cycle couriers to bear messages. The Tiger tanks, too, presented difficulties for they had been sent only for testing under active service conditions and had, therefore, to be given to the battle group with the least difficult task - Medjeida Group. D-Day for the operation was 1 December and General Fischer expressed his intention of leading the attack in person.
Allied observers on the hills around the Chouigui pass would have seen in the bright light of a December morning, two columns of tanks heading towards them. As the panzer columns came within range they took up battle formation - in each case a shallow wedge, a tactic which allowed each gunner a good field of fire. The wide but shallow wave swept down upon the Allied tank forces at the mouth of the pass. At long range the panzer cannon openec fire and smoothly, efficiently, and destructively the German armour smashed at Blade Force overrunning some part of it and dispersing the remainder towards the Tebourba Gap.
A British counter-attack was certain to come in and in anticipation of tnis a troop of Panzer Ills was concealed under olive trees in one of the extensive orchards which dotted the area. From another olive grove the tanks of 17/21 st Lancers broke cover moving forward in a counter-thrust but as these passed the hidden Panzer Ills they were taken "in flank. Within minutes five of the Lancers' tanks had been destroyed. The others withdrew. The German infantry component was brought in personnel carriers more than halfway up one djebel — marked on the maps as Hill 104 — were quickly debussed, and then raced for the summit of the feature from which they fired upon the columns of Allied soft-skinned vehicles which were already being withdrawn through the Gap. The German tank wedge was thrusting strongly for the main road when it came under Allied artillery fire skilfully directed by British and American gunner observers. The Allied fire halted the Lu'der and Hudel Groups north of the road. The attack on that sector was stopped.
Fischer then changed the direction of his offensive and brought up the Djedeida Group, leading this into the assault in person. Shortly after 14:00hrs the giant Panzer VIs led the German armoured column westwards along the road to Tebourba. In the leading Tiger, Captain von Nolde searched the area ahead of his column for the American tanks which had been reported. There they were, some distance ahead heading down the road towards his group. The 16-foot long, 8.8cm gun on Nolde's tank swung, aimed, and fired. High velocity shells struck and destroyed the American vehicles blowing off turrets and tracks and 'brewing up' others. Nolde swung his Tiger off the road and entered one side of an olive orchard, through which he passed to emerge on the other side ready to intercept and to cut off the American tanks as they withdrew down the road towards Tebourba. The American armour had been engaged and defeated but there was still the British infantry holding the high ground - the ridge above Djedeida. It must be stated at this point that the German replacement battalions were of very low calibre and, in fact, their poor showing was the subject of bitter comment in Fischer's report of the battle. The German Grenadiers' attacks, although heavy, were not pushed home with vigour and determination and were driven off with heavy losses. It is, however, fair to record that Colonel Buerker, in his report on the battle, stated that the infantry had had no previous experience of collaborating with tanks in an assault.