Now was the time for the troops of the southern pincer to come into action and small parties of Koch's men began to filter through the Allied defences making for high ground from which they would be able, at a later date, to fire with effect upon the retreating Allied columns. The short December day ended with a stalemate. To the north the early success against Blade Force armour had ended with the main thrust baulked and unable to move forward. To the east the important high ground was still in British hands but a tactical victory had been gained through the destruction of the American armour. To the south and south-west Koch's men were slipping their noose round the Allies, but the end was not yet in sight.
Both sides took the opportunity, during the night of 1/2 December, to improve their positions and to re-organise. New and fresh American armoured forces arrived in the area and relieved the shattered remnants of Blade Force. A small battle group from the Liider Group made a direct and vicious drive towards the Tebourba Gap but the attack faltered and died away in the Allied defensive fire. Then the German tactics changed; Fischer had decided upon a change of plan. He really had no need to move forward at all. If he could bleed the Allied tank strength then this would reduce its potency to a point where it would no longer be able to attain the objective of Tunis. All his battle groups needed to do were to weaken the Allies by continual assault and to confuse them by infiltration. Already there were signs that the Allied forces were becoming nervous as a result of the penetration of their lines by Koch's paratroops for these had, by now, almost completed the southern investment of Tebourba.
The situation on the Allied side was not as serious as the local commanders believed it to be. The Allied tank force was now grouped in and around the Tebourba area gathered into one compact mass, and, given the right leadership, might have driven the Germans back, for Fischer's men were not in a sound tactical situation. They were confined in a narrow area between Tebourba and the Gap and, therefore, subject to fire from all directions. Whichever way they turned to attack they could be fired at.[22] But the Allied tank commanders, and particularly those on the American side, had still not learned the basic lesson of armoured warfare — the use of mass and the need to conserve their machines by not wasting them in tank versus tank combats. The Allied tactic was still to engage in what were, in essence, cavalry charges and the first of a series of such assaults - isolated and unsupported - was launched against the Djedeida Group.
The United States tanks rolled eastwards towards the waiting panzers and at 11:00 hrs battle was joined. The American light tanks drove forward, thirty of them seeking to destroy the panzers and quite unaware that during the night a battery of 8.8cm guns had been sited on the flank of their advance. As the tanks poured through the orchards advancing towards the German positions, they met not only the fire from 7.5cm tank cannon but also a battering from the fast-firing 8.8s. Within 15 minutes, eight American tanks lay smashed or burning on the battlefield. Other American squadrons went in in futile assaults and their efforts, too, were smashed by the fire of the 8.8s and that of six Panzer IVs. The Allied armoured weapon was shattered against the steely panzer defence.
Slowly Battle Groups Liider and Hudel fought their way towards the Medjerda river suffering casualties from the well directed Allied artillery fire, but with every yard gained, threatening to cut the main road. At dusk the protagonists broke off the tank fighting and left the battle to aggressive and violent infantry patrol clashes. Slightly, very slightly, but very certainly the Germans had gained the upper hand and were beginning to win the battle.
During the night of 2/3 December Panzer Grenadier reinforcements arrived for Battle Group Djedeida. The infantry component of this battle group had been too weak to drive the British from their .positions on the ridge above the village and, with no reserve immediately to hand and upon which he could draw, Fischer had airshipped to him from Europe two of the Grenadier Companies of 10th Panzer Division. These had barely arrived upon the battlefield when they were put into action and into an attack upon the British infantry.
The Djedeida Group had been promised Stuka support for their new-drive but this had not materialised by 10:00hrs and so the infantry was committed to the assault without it. [23] The German Grenadiers mounted a two-pronged thrust against Djebel Maiana and had captured this by midday. During the afternoon British counter-attacks came in but these were beaten off and, having regrouped, the German attack was resumed, this time with tanks. The armoured punch smashed through the position held by the Hampshire and cut off part of that battalion. The East Surreys were sent in to restore the situation and carried out a determined assault upon Djebel Maiana but even their elan failed in the storm of defensive fire which the Panzer Grenadiers poured down upon them. Liider Group reached the Djedeida thereby cutting the road to the Tebourba Gap while Battle Group HudeL which had co-operated in the thrust to the river, closed and held tight shut the escape routes to the north and north-west.
The situation for the Allied force in the Tebourba area and, particularly for the infantry battalions of llth Brigade, had become more and more precarious. A withdrawal through the Gap was authorised. The Allied retreat from the village began after dark but was soon caught in the storm of artillery fire which the Germans brought down upon the columns. Lorries, tanks, guns - all were abandoned on the western road upon which the machine guns of Koch's paratroops were also now pouring a rain of bullets and mortar shells in an effort to destroy the Allied convoys. By 3 December there was no doubt that the advantage lay with the Germans and they crowned their success with the capture of Tebourba on 4 December. Just after noon of that day Koch's men met up with the Lüder and Hudel Battle Groups and jointly they pursued the Allies westwards and back along the road to Medjez el Bab.
That it was a German victory there could be no doubt for the Allies had voided the field and had abandoned 55 tanks, 29 pieces of artillery, 300 vehicles, and had lost over 1000 men as prisoners of war. The immediate threat to Tunis was over; now the Germans could begin the extension of their perimeters.
The North-Western Front
The Allied withdrawal continued until a point was reached some 8 miles east of Medjez. In position there was another force of Allied soldiers and the officers of 10th Panzer Division were surprised that this force had made no attempt to resume the advance to Tunis and it was supposed that, either, the Allied group was intended to hold the bridgeheads across the Medjerda river or, alternatively, that the Allies had suffered a more serious setback than had been at first believed. If this latter were the case, then the weakness of the Allies must be exploited and the Axis perimeter enlarged by aggressive action.