The panzer commanders laid their appreciation of the situation and their plans for the resumption of the attack before the Corps commander but on the same evening changes in administration raised the command structure to that of an army and the new Army commander, von Arnim, took up post. The complicated chain of command which had been responsible for so many of the disappointments that Rommel had suffered was reproduced here. Although von Arnim and his 5th Panzer Army would be subordinate to the Commando Supremo, in practice he would have direct dealings with Supreme Commander South. His position vis-a-vis Rommel was never made quite clear and was later to lead to difficulties and to complications. Nehring left his command on 8 December, three days after the arrival of von Arnim.
The leaders of 10th Panzer Divjsion realised that in view of the new administrative changes no decision would be forthcoming that evening and acted on their own initiative and, as they believed in accord, with the principle of General Nehring,
A three-pronged attack was made during the morning of 6 December. One prong made a reconnaissance in force towards Medjez el Bab with the intention of uncovering Allied weaknesses, of testing strengths, and of gaining time to build up the 5th Panzer Army's numbers. A second prong struck at American tanks at El Guessa and such was the pressure that the British Commander-in-Chief, General Anderson, withdrew the American armour to Djebel Bou Aoukaz, and the British llth Brigade to Longstop Gap. The attack was showing every sign of being another success for 10th Panzer Division with the Americans abandoning equipment and vehicles but then the advance was halted on the command of von Arnim. The intelligence officers of 5th Panzer Army had interpreted the slowness of the Allied advance as difficulties in supply and had forecast a resumption of the assault to coincide with one which was likely to go in against Rommel. Von Arnim thereupon gave orders that all operations were to be defensive in character to conserve strength. To meet the anticipated assault a re-organisation was undertaken and boundaries changed. Command of the right flank went to von Broich, of the centre to Fischer's 10th Panzer, and of the southern flank to the Italian Superga Division.
In anticipation of the new attack and with movements halted by the heavy rain which fell between 6 and 9 December, the central Tunisian front entered upon a period of quiet which was only broken by a British offensive to capture Djebel el Ahmera, known as Longstop Hill. This feature remained in German hands until Easter 1943.
The intention of the offensive, to dominate the gap between the Djebel Lanserine and the Medjerda river, had been achieved by 10th Panzer Division's armour while other units from that formation had gone on to seize Bou Djebel Toum. The 334th Division had captured the pass area to the west of Chouigui and the important high ground was then in German hands. To the south of the Tunis bridgehead, Koch's regiment and Superga Division had advanced their positions on both sides of Pont du Fahs.
Thus by the end of the year the Germans had gained their objectives. There was a bridgehead of such depth that it could not be destroyed by a surprise attack. A firm link existed between the forces in the southern half of Tunisia and Rommel's desert army and the military initiative had been seized from the Allies.
This sudden transition from defence to attack was an example of the flexibility of the German military mind as well as a demonstration of the ability of the infantry and the panzer men. But the role of the Luftwaffe during those tense and difficult days and weeks must not be overlooked for it was crucial to the success of the Axis defence and counter-offensive. Indeed it is true to say that the Germans could not have survived the first days of the campaign without the active and vigorous support of the Luftwaffe in attacking, obstructing, and, in some cases, destroying the Allied spearheads. As an example of its activity, during the period from 20 November to 12 December, a daily average of 18 dive-bombing attacks and 25 missions by fighter and fighter-bomber was carried out. During the three days of the 10th Panzer Division counter-attack the number of missions flown was 54 and 108 respectively.
This short-lived superiority in the air enjoyed by the Germans was due in part to the fact that their bases at Tunis and Bizerta were all-weather airports and aircraft could and did operate from them when the Allied airfields were unusable. This all-weather facility and the close proximity of the aerodromes to the combat zone enabled the Luftwaffe to give complete cover and almost immediate support to the troops in the field as well as protection to the machines of transport command which were airlifting men and materials from Sicily. The achievement of that command was that it brought into the bridgehead areas during those first months no less than 7 battalions of infantry, whole batteries of field guns, 2 armoured reconnaissance companies, and at least 19 tanks, of which 4 were the giant Tiger Panzer VI.
German impressions on how the campaign was progressing are interesting for they show how clearly the men in the field anticipated the future turn of events. All ranks from Rommel and von Arnim down to subaltern officers realised that the Allies would seek to separate 5th Panzer Army from 1st German/Italian Panzer Army by an attack from one of the western passes through the mountains, and that the decisive blow would be delivered from the area of Medjez el Bab. It was apparent to all German commanders that Medjez el Bab held the key to the whole campaign and in order both to protect their own bridgehead as well as to deny this key point to the Allies, 5th Panzer Army proposed to seize the town in a pincer operation code-named Olivenernte, The time set for the opening of this offensive was the second half of January and the plan was that 334th Division would strike from the north and meet the pincer of 10th Panzer ascending from the south. To divert Allied attention and to gain important features, other German battalions would capture Djebel Mansour while Superga Division secured the Pichon heights.
To hide from the Allies the fact that 334th Division had left the line to prepare for the forthcoming assault, 'Chinese' attacks were launched in Djebel Chirich area and at other points along the Medjez sector. The Allies however were not inactive and an attack which was launched at Jefna on 6 January involved the German garrison in battles which swayed to and fro for nearly a week until 5th Para were sent in and restored the situation. Down in the deep southern half of the bridgehead the Superga Division, in position east of Djebel Chirich and west of Sbikha, was attacked by a French Corps which was now fighting alongside the Americans. The poor showing of the Italian soldiers in this sensitive area renewed the fear that they could no longer be trusted to defend themselves or their positions and that they could no longer be stationed in an area from which an Allied assault might strike to the sea. German counter-attacks recovered the ground which the Italians had lost but it was clear that given the shortage of infantry from which both Panzer armies were suffering, there could be no forces to undertake Olivenernte. Von Arnim therefore decided to strike at the weakest of the Allied armies and organised an offensive against the French Corps with the code-name Eilbote.
The 334th Division which had by now left the line was selected as the most suitable unit. It was moved by night drives in commandeered and requisitioned vehicles to a sector south-east of Pont du Fahs. The gap, which had been created by the removal of this division from the battle line, could only be plugged by shortening the line and a number of tactical withdrawals from mountain crests was undertaken and had been completed by 17 January.