The 1st German/Italian Panzer Army was ordered to stand on a position at Mareth which had first been constructed and then destroyed by the French. At the high echelons of command in Rome and Berlin it was perhaps believed that the Mareth line was strong and well fortified; but this was not the case. The whole position was badly sited and quite-weak. Immediately in front of the main defensive position a ridge dominated the Axis positions and to garrison this took men from the battle line. In the south the flank was wide open and the gap between Djebel Ksour and the coast required a strong garrison to protect the over-long western-flank against an outflanking movement. Then too, the Allied presence in Gafsa required that intensive and heavy patrols be maintained in the area of the Djerid Schott.The French had constructed this weak line against the Italians in Tripoli and had left the western flank open for it would have been from Algeria and Tunisia that their reserves would have come. But to the Axis commanders the passes leading from the interior of Tunisia and debouching on to the coastal plains were a constant source of worry because it would be out of these passes that the attack might come which would sever 5th Panzer Army from 1st German/ Italian Army. Every one of these passes lay behind the troops who were defending the Mareth position, and they would be a threat until the Enfida-ville line was taken up. But that is to anticipate because the Mareth Line was ordered to be held to the last.
The whole line was a geographical and not a military position and certainly not one which any soldier would have chosen to defend nor risked men trying to hold.
Rommel was disappointed but not surprised to find that the arms and fuel had not arrived as Hitler had promised they would. So little had been received that there was no barbed wire and only a small number of anti-tank mines. Once again his army would have to make do: the men, turning to obsolete and, in some cases, obsolescent weapons, and depending upon the fighting spirit of those whose time spent in the front line was now being measured in weeks and not in days.
Rommel deployed the Italian XX Corps and 90th Light Division to hold the main battle line and placed in reserve the 15th Panzer and 90th (Africa) Divisions. The east—west passes at Kieddache and Halouf were blocked by 164th Division. In support of the thin infantry and panzer line there were 65 German and 340 Italian field guns. There were also 36 batteries of Italian anti-aircraft guns; 18 light and 18 heavy, while among the 12 batteries of German 8.8cm flak were 2 batteries fitted out with guns of the new, improved 1941 pattern. Another defensive grouping was made up from 10 batteries from 19th Flak Division.
There were, however, grave and serious shortages of infantry. The 90th Light Division had had such losses that regiments had been reduced to an average strength of 350 bayonets and the whole division was almost completely defenceless against armoured attack for most of its anti-tank guns had been lost and not replaced.
The total artillery fire-power of 164th Infantry Division was a single battery of field guns, for it was anticipated that the German infantry would be able to sustain a defence in the mountains with only minimum support. The most dangerous military risks were being taken and there were sectors which were covered only by patrols.
On 28 January, Commando Supremo, fearful of an attack to the sea by American forces which were being assembled in the Tebessa area and conscious of a similar threat posed in the Gafsa area, ordered that an offensive be launched to seize and to hold the western passes,
Kesselring's orders to Rommel were to attack and destroy the American forward line and once the
United States forces had been driven back on Sbeitla and Feriana, then Sidi bou Zid could be taken and the Gafsa and Touzeur sectors could be seized. To carry out his part of the plan von Arnim's army, with two panzer divisions under command, would strike for Sidi bou Zid in an operation code-named Frithlingswind, while 1st German/Italian Panzer Army, in its operation Morgenluft, would drive to secure the west and the north-westerly flanks and then return its armoured units back to the Mareth front. The Luftwaffe Brigade would be used to garrison the captured areas.
There were deep and fundamental differences between Rommel and von Arnim as to their respective strategies for the forthcoming operations. Von Arnim, with his cautious approach considered that his task was to hold the bridgehead for the longest possible time and, not wishing to risk his forces, intended to launch only large-scale spoiling attacks. Rommel, with his greater flair for far-flung battles grasped the opportunities which such an operation presented.
By combining the Axis forces the western passes could be captured and then in a massive punch the Allied front could be smashed open. Through the breach would flood the armoured divisions aiming for Tebessa and then for Souk el Arba, deep behind the front of the Allies' 1st Army. Faced with this thrust in the back the Allies would have to give ground and withdraw to Algeria. The Axis bridgehead in Tunisia would, therefore, have been enlarged.
Von Arnim could not agree to Rommel's bold plan and both commanders appealed for Kesselring's decision. Mussolini's order, transmitted through Kesselring as Supreme Commander South, was a dilution of Rommel's plan for the objective was not to be towards Tebessa and Souk el Arba but towards Le Kef, a road junction immediately behind the Americans. Rommel argued that it would be at Le Kef that the Allied commander would have his strong reserve forces, and that, in any case, a successful advance upon Le Kef would achieve only a tactical and not a strategic victory, nor would it lead to a collapse of the Allied front in Tunisia, nor to the withdrawal of Allied forces which Rommel had planned.
Thus the die was cast. The two independent operations had as their intention the seizure of the western passes with Paid as the first objective and with this in Axis hands then the drive towards the Kasserine pass. Then would follow the attack against Gafsa and if this were successful then the sensitive south-western flank of the Tunisian bridgehead would have been secured, and the threat to the desert army holding the Mareth line would have been annulled.
The 10th Panzer, one of the two armoured divisions which von Arnim was to use in operation Fruhlingswind, moved through the streets of Tunis in the dark and cold days of early February and arrived in positions south-west of Kairouan. By now the men of the German panzer divisions had learned the need for correct camouflage and had dispersed their vehicles under nets among the cacti which grew profusely in the area. The infantry was dug in for better concealment in the sides of wadis which crossed the region and the division prepared itself for action. Ration and supply points were built for armoured actions, for particularly when these were fought at night, easily locatable dumps were required at which the tanks could refuel and rearm before returning to battle. It had become standard practice for extra drums of fuel to be carried on the outside of the tanks, despite the fire risk, to increase the length of time that the vehicle could stay in action. So that the tanks did not have to return for extra ammunition it had become usual for an additional box of armour piercing shells to be carried inside the tank.
In the workshops of each panzer company fitters carried out the final adjustments and minor repairs. Sand and dust which had clogged the air filters were cleared out. The dust which penetrated into every crack of the machinery reduced the life of the engine and the standard filters, originally fitted to the outside of the tank, had proved ineffective. These had, therefore, been enlarged and placed inside the vehicle. The increased life of the motor, which this refitting produced, was offset by the disadvantage that the interior of the machine was quickly covered with sand which affected the gun and its ammunition. Even the gun muzzle had to be fitted with a cloth to protect the