The battles at Mareth had weakened the Axis forces and quoting the War Diary of 164th Division, it was calculated that at El Hamma manpower losses had amounted to 1100 men. The rifle strength of 164th Division was down to the equivalent of three understrength battalions although two companies from a replacement battalion belonging to 15th Panzer Division came on strength from 30 March. The usual divisional components were equally weak and the artillery support was still only a single battery. Acutely aware of the impotence of his forces and the even more serious inability of the Italians to defend their positions, Rommel deployed his forces so that the Germans held the sensitive areas. Italian XX Corps, with 90th Light under command, guarded the coast road while 164th Division under XXI corps, took up position on that Corps' right flank around and east of Djebel Heidoudi. The mountain positions were all held by Italian troops and to maintain contact with Panzer Army Africa's main body and von Broich's 10th Panzer Division battle group, the Sahara Group carried out wide-ranging and frequent patrolling. There were several major movements of armour as a result of which 21st Panzer Division was posted to 5th Panzer Army, leaving 15th Panzer Division in Army reserve and positioned behind Army's left wing.
The whole Axis front lay waiting throughout the long nights of the last week of March for 8th Army's new blow to fall and in anticipation of this the outpost line in position on a low ridge three miles in front of the main body was withdrawn. The first British attack came in on the night of 3/4 April and positions were lost by Trieste Division. A counter-attack by 90th Light won these back but these were only probing attacks by the British whose main assault came in at dawn on 6 April, behind a heavy artillery barrage. At Djebel Tebaga a silent night attack by Gurkha troops and carried out before zero hour had captured the crest of the mountain before the main attack went in. By lO.OOhrs on 6 April the front held by both Trieste and Spezia Divisions had been breached and Djebel Roumana and Djebel Tebaga Fatnassa had both been lost. The 164th Division, minus the battalion from 15th Panzer, was then moved to a point behind the front centre of the line to act as Army reserve and, as the division was moving, the order came for the non-motorised units to begin their withdrawal to the Enfidaville position while the German Panzer units held the line. The Schott line could not be held and the Axis armies were moving back to new defensive positions.
But even as the rearward movement was taking place a fresh British thrust carried past the right wing of 164th Division and broke through the Sahara patrol group forcing it to give up more ground under British pressure. The Panzer Army moved back to occupy another temporary line south-west of Agareb on 9 April and, when the final stages of the retreat had been concluded on llth, 164th and 90th Light were in position to the south-west of Enfidaville.
This new line was the southern face of the Axis-held area of Tunisia and had such excellent defensive features that it was considered to be the last ditch defence. Possession of the high ground around Djebel Zaghouan dominated a network of main roads: the Kairouan—Pont du Fahs highway, the Sousse— Enfidaville—Tunis road, and the Sousse—Enfidaville—Gromballia—Tunis road. Thus the high ground and particularly Djebel Garci, a steep and bare feature with several crests, dominated any advance from Sousse into the plains around the capital city.
To hold the last ditch positions XXI Corps held the right sector and had under command Spezia and Pistoia Divisions and the Luftwaffe Infantry Brigade. The Italian XX Corps held the left flank with Trieste, Young Fascist, and 90th Light Divisions. As usual the. German units held the most threatened sectors. The 164th Division was blocking the Pont du Fahs road, east of Djebel Garci the Luftwaffe Brigade dug in to control the Zaghouan road, while 90th Light covered the Enfidaville-Gromballia highway. The Italian units held the high ground with Spezia on the extreme right flank and Trieste and Young Fascist Divisions on either side of Takrouna. A secondary defence line behind the Young Fascist positions was held by non-armoured units from 15th Panzer. Parts of 10th Panzer came under command of Africa Corps and were located on the far right flank where they were joined some weeks later by elements from 21st Panzer Division.
To help hold the line there was a sudden but small spate of reinforcements and the numbers reaching 164th Division enabled second battalions to be formed for 382nd and 433rd Regiments. Battalions and artillery detachments from other units were also taken on divisional strength but the greatest number of these, and all the artillery, flak, and Nebelwerfer batteries, were taken from 164th Division when the Allied offensive opened and were then posted to 5th Panzer Army.
One of the most warmly interesting of the letters dealing with the attitudes of the German rank and file at that time is the report written by a young regimental officer after a tour of inspection to the front line. He wrote:
'On 11 April in the burning sun of mid-morning I saw eight men of 1st Battalion marching along the Kairouan—Enfidaville road in full equipment carrying arms and extra ammunition. They had had no food and had already marched for 25 miles before I met them. They were on their way to new positions at Zaghouan and refused my offer of a lift to any wounded saying that they would do the "little bit" of a march to Zaghouan. They arrived at battalion before nightfall.'
There was quiet along the sector held by 164th Division until the morning of 16 April when British artillery began to 'range in' and patrolling activity was reported. Three more days of calm passed but then Pistoia Division was hit during a night attack. The reconnaissance detachment of 164th Division, acting as reserve, was brought forward to capture the positions which the Italians had abandoned and on 21 April the Italians made their own counter-attack but this collapsed and broke in the face of British artillery fire. It was clear that Pistoia could no longer be considered an effective fighting force and it was removed from the line.
The next Italian division to come under the hammer blows of Montgomery's Army was Young Fascist but it held its ground on the Takrouna heights despite fierce attempts to drive it back, while on the Enfidaville plain the 90th Light was heavily engaged. A minor adjustment of the line to shorten this and thus to release men was carried out and these units were then sent to help the hard-pressed Hermann Goering Division north-west of Pont du Fahs. On 29 April the Spezia Division was forced off the heights which it had held.
The absence of British armour on the Enfidaville front pointed to the fact that 8th Army's tank divisions had been moved and, obviously, to Medjez el Bab from which sector would come the decisive blow. All anti-tank weapons on the southern flank were therefore rushed to the threatened western sector. Montgomery was fulfilling his plan to make the Germans 'run like wet hens' between the two Allied armies.
There were no other major British offensives against 164th Division and it remained inactive while the offensive through Medjez el Bab brought about the fall of Tunis. It is now to the battle front at that town that we return and to when, during the latter weeks of March, the American, British, and French forces having been regrouped, were preparing to make the thrust which would end the war in Africa.