Although he was progressive in his thinking about many things, the Chief of the General Staff, General Beck, opposed the formation of a so-called motorized combat troop (Kraftfahrkampftruppe). Most theoreticians traced their thinking back to the experience of the First World War. Based on the decrease in significance of cavalry, it was felt that airplanes and tanks could not in any way carry lead to the reintroduction of mobile operational principles. In turning away from the basic principle of "movement," the conduct of operations focused exclusively on the factor of "fire" (effect).
It is significant diat as early as 1921 the Chief of the Army High Command (Chef der Heeresleitung), General von Seeckt, stated in a memorandum, "Fundamental Considerations for the Rebuilding of Our Armed Forces" (Grundlegende Gedanken fur den Wiederaufbau unserer Wehrmacht): ". . . that less than ever does the salvation of the weaker lie in rigid defenses, but rather in mobile attack." Paradoxically, in a land that had been thoroughly demilitarized by the victors and was scarcely capable of defending itself, the principles of free-reigning operations and the offensive employment of armor was increasingly being recognized. With this thought, possibilities increased for a numerically inferior but better equipped and mobile operating force. The dreams of the infantryman, who had been pulverized by artillery in crushing positional warfare during the First War, also played a subliminal roll. It was important to seize the opportunity to penetrate the static elements of the operational thinking of the time!
The manifold opposition and hindrances to the formation of such troops were finally overcome in the mid-thirties, when Reichskanzler Hitler personally took an obvious interest in thematter. He, himself, was marked by the trauma of positional warfare and was promulgating expansionist ideas. It was especially obvious to him that the armored branch of the service (Panzerwaffe) had the potential to offer an especially effective instrument with which one could wager the step across the borders.
That also tipped the balance toward the establishment of armor formations with particular characteristics. In contrast to the armored battalions of other nations, the new armor battalions (Panzer-abteilungen) were seen from the start as capable of carrying out independent operations, rather than just as support for the infantry. Among other things, the essential step in the right direction came in 1935 from a great demonstration and experimental exercise in North Germany near Munster, that was, at times, attended by Hitler in person. The formation of the new Panzerwaffe matched Hitler's political interests. Laughably, a number of generals later attributed their opposition to the mechanization of the army to having recognized this at that time! It was important then for the few creators of the German Panzertruppe to set about forming an effective army with the few resources available and making Germany capable of defending itself.
Certainly it cannot be their fault that false operational ideas were taken up in the neighboring countries! (France increasingly became the exception. It had effective tanks and, by the end of the 1930's, had started organizing armored divisions on the German pattern.)
The First Three Panzerdivisionen
In spite of opposition from most quarters, the Kom-mando der Kraftfahrkampftruppen was given the assignment of organizing three large armored formations (PanzergroBverbande). This started in 1935 and was, to a certain extent, a large-scale experiment. The 2- Panzerdivision, then in Wurzburg, was turned over to (at that time) Oberst Guderian, one of the most ardent proponents of an operational Panzerwaffe. Many had the thought that, in this way, he himself would have to see the senselessness of such measures.
The path to these organizational measures had already been laid over the course of years of secret activity in the Reichswehr, part of which took place in the late 1920's in the Soviet Union (at the KAMA facility). On 1 November 1933 a training unit was formed at Zossen with the cover-name of "Kraftfahrlehrkommando" (motor vehicle training command). Within a few months, additional company-sized formations were activated. Soon they were consolidated into battalions and regiments. In the rapid expansion after 1935, the accumulated experience paid off. The new German Panzertruppe could grow from within itself. It was imperative to avoid forming new units from untrained command personnel, as was done in other countries. In Germany that principle is called "Kalben" (calving).
The decision to form separate armor formations was not in itself a guarantee of future success. (Many countries had armor formations, after all.) In this connection it is important to note that from the beginning in Germany these formations were capable of operations as combined arms teams. They did not need the external attachment of other formations to do that. Among them were integral motorized riflemen (Schutzen) who were initially only transported on trucks. They soon developed into mechanized infantry (Panzerschutzen) and, in 1942, were given a special branch of service designation (Waffengattung) as "Panzergrenadiere." The Panzerdivision included correspondingly motorized artillery (later the Panzerartillerie), combat engineers (Panzerpioniere) and signals troops (Panzer-nachrichtentruppen). Air defense against aircraft (Flak) was also soon motorized.
The heart of the new Panzerdivision was the Panzer-brigade and the Schutzenbrigade. The [33] Panzerbrigade originally included two Panzer-regimenter, each consisting of two Panzerabteilun-gen (corresponding to an American armored battalion) containing one medium and three light tank companies. The Schutzenbrigade originally contained a motorized Schutzenregiment, a battalion of Kradschutzen (riflemen on motorcycles) and a Panzer-Abwehr-Abteilung (antitank battalion). Divisional troops included a Panzeraufklarungs-abteilung {armored reconnaissance battalion), a motorized artillery battalion within the divisional artillery regiment, a Pionierbataillon and a Nach-richtenabteOung, as well as logistic formations. The inadequate production of tanks, especially the medium Panzer Ill's and IV's, prevented a uniform outfitting of the units. The concept of the Panzerdi-vision was not entirely proven, because three so-called "leichte Divisionen" (light divisions) were also formed. They only included a single Panzer-abteilung and, in the Polish campaign, proved to have inadequate striking power.
During the pre-war years, the tables of organization and equipment changed relatively often. It would pass beyond the intent of this book to go into the details. At the end of 1938 two additional Panz-erdivisionen and one more leichte Division were created. In April of 1939 another two Panzerdivisionen and another leichte Division followed. Starting at that point in time, only a single Panzerregiment was authorized in a Panzerdivision. The start of the war
came in the midst of these organizational measures so that the formation of the 6. through 9. Panzerdivisionen was postponed and two Panzerabteilungen were assigned directly to army districts.
First Experience in War
In Poland and especially in France it became evident that the brigade organization was too ponderous and the Panzerdivision had to be pared down. The unarmored riflemen were also not powerful enough. The armor-weak Leichte Divisionen were reorganized into Panzerdivisionen immediately after the Polish campaign. Henceforth the Panzerdivisionen included only a single Panzerregiment. With the arrival of the first Schutz-enpanzerwagen (SPW) (armored personnel carriers) the first rifle battalion of the Schutzenregiment was equipped with it and became the "gepanzertes Schutzen-bataillon" (armored infantry battalion), renamed "Panzergrenadier-bataillon" in 1942. The combat engineers were also given armored vehicles and the artillery and air defense forces received self-propelled mounts (Selbstfahrlafetten).